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AUSTRALIAN ARMY

LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE

LWD 0-0

COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

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2. It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned amendment lists have been made in this publication.

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3. All superceded Amendment Certificates should be retained at the rear of the publication for audit purposes.
DISTRIBUTION

1. See Page 201 of this publication for Distribution List.
The Army is an important institution in Australian society. Almost three million Australian men and women have served proudly in its ranks, and the Army continues to produce soldiers and units recognised for their adaptability, courage, initiative, teamwork and professionalism. Today’s Army has a responsibility to the Australian people for achieving the Army’s mission, which is to win the land battle, and recognises that, in the final analysis, this mission is achieved in combat by soldiers.

By the very nature of their job, soldiers are required to achieve the nation’s objectives at great personal danger and, therefore, need to develop appropriate characteristics that are vital to the successful performance of their duties. Those characteristics that the Army seeks to foster through its ethos, values, traditions and standards of behaviour require effective command, competent and confident leadership, and astute management practice.

The purpose of this publication is to provide the framework for understanding the Australian Army’s approach to command, leadership and management in order to provide a foundation for practical application.

Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0 Command, Leadership and Management is written to support primarily officer and senior non-commissioned officer command, leadership and management training and development. The tenets and principles described, however, are applicable to commanders at every level regardless of rank.

This publication is the capstone document for understanding the Army’s approach to command, leadership and management within the context of the ADF’s approach to warfare and Army’s warfighting philosophy. It describes basic tenets and principles, and provides guidance for the exercise of command, the application of leadership and the employment of management techniques in both operational and non-operational
scenarios. It differentiates between the concepts of command, leadership and management; describes their interrelationship; and provides models to aid the understanding of professional mastery and command, leadership and management as an integrated system of action.

Application

6. Understanding should not be confined to this publication. Importantly, commanders and leaders must apply the theory in this publication to experience and practical experimentation. Every member of the Australian Army has the professional responsibility to continually develop and attain a broader and deeper appreciation of the command, leadership and management challenge, leading to the development of individual professional mastery. Study, practice and feedback can only achieve this. Aspiring commanders and leaders should, therefore, seek out additional knowledge to enhance their understanding and application of the profession of arms, and commanders at every rank level must maximise their team’s fighting power through deliberately planning, executing and reviewing their subordinates’ development. Such development must transcend the more urgent, but less important day-to-day tasks.

References

7. This publication should be read in conjunction with other publications and documents, in particular:

a. Defence Instruction (General) Administration 58-1, Authority in an Integrated Defence Organisation, 23 June 1999;


e. Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2002;

f. Land Warfare Doctrine 0-2, Leadership, 2002;

g. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1, Command and Control of Land Forces, 2001;

h. Training Information Bulletin Number 83, Risk Management, 1998; and
On-line Doctrine

8. On-line doctrine is also available at the Army Doctrine Electronic Library website located at:

http://adel.defence.gov.au

Gender

9. This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.
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GLOSSARY

The terms listed below are used in this pamphlet. Definitions which appear in Australian Defence Force Publication 101, Glossary, 1994 are shown verbatim in normal type. Definitions or portions of definitions which are not included in Australian Defence Force Publication 101, Glossary, 1994 are shown in italics:

**corporate governance.** Corporate governance is a management term used to describe the process by which agencies are directed and controlled. It encompasses authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control.

**cost-effectiveness.** Cost-effectiveness is a concept used in evaluation theory that describes the relationship between inputs (or the price of outputs) to outcomes, where prices are expressed in dollar terms but outcomes are not monetary or cannot readily be converted into dollar terms.

**effectiveness.** Effectiveness is a concept used in evaluation theory that describes the extent to which actual outcomes are achieved in terms of the planned (desired) outcomes.

**efficiency.** Efficiency is a concept used in evaluation theory that describes the extent to which outputs are maximised for a given level of inputs or to which inputs are minimised for a given level of outputs.

**military capability.** Military capability is defined as the combination of force structure and preparedness, which enables the nation to exercise military power.

**mission command.** Mission command is a philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior of his intentions. The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated; however, subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

**outcome.** An outcome is the longer-term change or impact that occurs as a result of an activity. The consequences of an activity may be expected or unexpected.

**output.** An output is the product or condition resulting from an activity, stated in a way such that it is rendered observable, and if possible, quantifiable.

**preparedness.** Preparedness is the measurement of how ready and how sustainable forces are to undertake military operations. It describes the combined outcome of readiness and sustainability.
**professional mastery.** Professional mastery integrates the components of fighting power. It is an expression of personal competence displayed by an individual’s ability to combine character, self-confidence, effective leadership, professional knowledge, professional military judgment and experience. It is measured by performance in battle and is a process of continual learning developed through education, training and experience.

**readiness.** Readiness denotes a force’s ability to be committed to operations within a specified time. It refers to the availability and proficiency/serviceability of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables allocated to a force.

**sustainability.** Sustainability denotes a force’s ability to continue to conduct operations. It is measured in terms of the personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables necessary for the force to complete its assigned operational tasks.
## ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in this publication. Abbreviations which appear in *Australian Defence Force Publication 103, Abbreviations and Military Symbols, 1995* appear in normal type. Abbreviations shown in italics have not been accepted for joint Service use.

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<td>LWD</td>
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<td>MBO</td>
<td><em>Management by Objectives</em></td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td><em>non-government organisation</em></td>
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<td>RAR</td>
<td>Royal Australian Regiment</td>
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<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</td>
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<td>TQM</td>
<td><em>Total Quality Management</em></td>
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CHAPTER 1
COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision; its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, of statistics, of methods, time tables and routine: its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential.¹

Field-Marshall Sir William Slim

SECTION 1-1. INTRODUCTION

1. The quality of commanders and their staff is vitally important to the Army's warfighting philosophy and to the operational effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The Army's people are required to command, lead and manage and consistently make decisions, while constrained by time, in an environment characterised by complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, risk, violence and danger. This operating environment, together with the unique Australian approach to warfare, provides the context for the Army's people to exercise command, apply leadership and employ the management techniques necessary for success on the battlefield.

2. This chapter describes Australia's distinctive approach to warfighting and the Army's warfighting philosophy to emphasise the centrality of the individual in the successful prosecution of warfare. It examines the differentiation between the concepts of command, leadership and management as well as their interrelationship. The Army's viewpoint of the primacy of command is also addressed.

¹. From an address delivered to the Adelaide Division of the Australian Institute of Management on 4 April 1947. This address titled 'Leadership in Management' is reproduced in Australian Army Journal, Volume 1, Number 1, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, June 2003 pp 143-148.
SECTION 1-2. THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO WARFARE

The Origins of the Australian Approach to Warfare

3. Australians have a distinctive approach to warfighting. The ADF's doctrine reflects a balance between the historical experience of warfare and how challenges on future battlefields might be met. While the ADF's principal philosophy of warfare is derived from its long involvement in Western approaches, the Australian perspective reflects a sound understanding of the nation's constitutional framework, geo-strategic influences, and national identity and culture, tempered by lessons from past conflicts. These complementary influences have shaped the distinctive ethos, character and sense of identity of Australia's armed forces and the way that the present-day ADF conducts military operations.

4. The ADF is an important national institution that has as its mission: 'The defence of Australia and its national interests'. The way that the ADF is employed reflects Australian values about the primacy of the rule of law and of the civil authority in upholding the rule of law. These community values include the need for Australia, where it can, to seek to resist international aggression, relieve human suffering, promote justice and freedom internationally, and protect Australia's borders and Exclusive Economic Zone.

5. Societal influences on Australia's attitude to Defence have, in part, developed from the high proportion of Australians involved in World War I and the great number of battle casualties that left few Australian families untouched by that conflict. The community attitudes and outlooks generated by World War I were reinforced two decades later by the experience of World War II. More recent involvement in humanitarian and peace-keeping operations in the latter half of the 20th century and the responses to the anarchy and terrorism of the early 21st century have solidified the community's respect and admiration for their defence force.

2. This synopsis has been adapted from Department of Defence, The Australian Approach to Warfare, Defence Public Affairs and Corporate Communication, Canberra, ACT, June 2002.
Australian Defence Force Warfare Concepts

6. The ADF's warfare concepts reflect Australia's geography, military and economic resources, opportunities offered by technology and innovation, and the professionalism and fighting spirit of its people. It is these characteristics which make Australia's application of essentially Western warfare concepts unique. Australia's limited resources put a premium on professional skill, delegation and initiative; therefore, forces must be able to innovate and improvise to overcome obstacles, whether operational, logistic or human, and achieve coherence across all levels of command.

7. The key ADF warfare concepts include:
   a. integration of the capabilities of the three Services (Navy, Army and Air Force) in joint operations;
   b. the early resolution of conflict in a way that allows Australia not only to win the war, but also win the peace;
   c. mobility of forces and well-directed application of firepower to ensure economy of effort and decisive effect, while maximising the physical and psychological pressure on the adversary's will to continue fighting; and
   d. the ability to operate effectively in coalition with other nations.

8. Joint Operations. Australia's approach to warfare focuses on joint operations across the physical environments of maritime, land and aerospace. The conduct of joint operations, rather than single-Service operations, is a matter of practical necessity for Australia. It is the effective integration of thought and action at all levels of command to achieve the common goal that produces a synergy in the conduct of operations, which is the strength of the ADF joint warfare approach. This is not to deny the particular demands of the operational environment in which each Service trains and fights, nor the Service values enshrined in their traditions.

9. Early Resolution of Conflict. The Government directs the ADF to conduct military operations in a political context. Post-conflict relations between nations will be influenced by their treatment of each other during such conflict. The ADF is a professional fighting force, which conducts military operations in accordance with the international laws, conventions and mores governing the conduct of armed conflict. Accordingly, when the ADF takes action to win the war, it must remain aware of its potential longer-term impact on the relationships between Australia and other members of the international community.
10. **Manoeuvre.** There are two broad types of approaches to warfare – manoeuvre and attrition. Manoeuvre is the strategic and operational concept that defines the way the ADF conducts operations. This involves the movement and placement of forces in a favourable position relative to the enemy and the application of firepower, such that the physical and psychological effect is sufficient to break an adversary’s will to continue fighting or otherwise conclude hostilities on Australia’s terms. This warfighting approach maximises the ADF’s strengths and minimises exposure of its vulnerabilities. In particular, manoeuvre emphasises the importance of joint operations, timely and accurate intelligence, short decision cycles, mobility of forces and economy of effort.

11. Attrition warfare seeks to destroy the enemy’s warfighting capability by trading losses of one’s own personnel and materiel for enemy losses, at a ratio which exhausts the enemy first, resulting in victory. Following the American Civil War and WWI, attrition became synonymous with unimaginative leadership and indifference to cost and suffering. In major wars Australia has never been in a position to use attrition, but has been at risk from it, due to our relatively small regular Army, population and manufacturing base.

12. **Coalitions and Alliances.** It is important for the ADF to be able to conduct coalition operations in support of Australia's national security objectives, where required. To participate in or to lead a coalition, Australia requires detailed knowledge of coalition partners, including their military affairs and language, politics and culture, and also needs to maintain a flexible and cooperative attitude. Accordingly, the ADF maintains defence relationships with a variety of nations. Australia also occasionally operates with a wide range of other defence forces as part of the ADF's participation in multinational peace operations, usually under United Nations (UN) auspices.

The Importance of People

13. The ADF aims to cultivate and display in its personnel certain qualities and skills. While similar qualities and skills may exist in other national armed forces, it is the way the ADF draws on the national character and ethos that has shaped its *esprit de corps* and enabled it to develop its distinctive Australian approach to warfare. Based upon the ADF values of professionalism, loyalty, innovation, courage, integrity and teamwork, other qualities and skills, fostered through training and experience, include trust, compassion, fairness, respect for the individual, cultural understanding and tolerance. These attributes are vital in combat situations to preserve the morality and legitimacy of action, as such situations inevitably involve death.
14. A distinctive feature of the Australian approach to warfare is the way that it emphasises the role of individual initiative, but not in a way that cuts across the requirement for effective teamwork and unit cohesion. Involvement in past conflicts has amply demonstrated in our young leaders the qualities of resourcefulness, initiative and the ability to adapt rapidly and in an innovative manner to changing situations. The approach to training allows individual commanders and other personnel to maximise their personal contribution in any given operational situation.

15. The importance of leadership in maximising operational effectiveness is also well recognised. Accordingly, the ADF places a strong emphasis on cultivating leadership qualities in its people. Historically, one of the strengths of the ADF has been the high quality of its leaders at all levels. Leadership by example helps the ADF maintain morale, avoid wasted effort and promote initiative in young leaders.

SECTION 1-3. THE ARMY'S WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY

16. The Army's warfighting philosophy is termed the 'manoeuvrist approach' and is derived from the Australian approach to warfare and an understanding of the utility of land forces and their role in national military strategy.3 The manoeuvrist approach seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose, creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation which the enemy cannot cope with. The manoeuvrist approach focuses commanders at every level on exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy strengths and protecting friendly vulnerabilities. At all times, the commander is seeking to undermine the enemy's centre of gravity.4

17. The manoeuvrist approach is based on 'manoeuvre theory', which is a way of thinking about warfare rather than a particular set of tactics or techniques. Its essence is defeating the enemy's 'will' to fight rather than the enemy's 'ability' to fight. The manoeuvrist approach, which is applicable at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, emphasises the centrality of the human element in warfare. It relies on speed, deception, surprise, and the application of firepower and movement. The fundamental tenets of manoeuvre theory concentrate on


4. The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. The centre of gravity is that vital element of the adversary's and our own overall capability that, if destroyed or neutralised, will lead to defeat.
applying strength against weakness; recognising and exploiting war's inherent characteristics of friction, danger, uncertainty and chaos; and focusing friendly planning on defeating the enemy plan rather than on defeating the enemy forces.

**18.** Commanders should expect to confront a clever and creative enemy who will also attempt to apply manoeuvre theory. Superior tempo and security, therefore, are essential to developing a winning advantage.

**19.** As a warfighting philosophy, the manoeuvrist approach is well suited to Australia's experience of war, geo-strategic circumstances and the nature of its soldiers. It is not a detailed prescription of what to do in battle. Instead, the manoeuvrist approach aims to develop a state of mind that focuses the Australian soldier's courage, initiative and teamwork against a creative and thinking enemy. Its aim is always to undermine enemy cohesion and, therefore, the will to fight. Shattering the enemy's will to fight requires the application of the right means to produce coherent effects in a way that makes the situation appear lost to the enemy. Dislocation and disruption aim to trigger this collapse by converting the Army's fighting power into effects on the enemy.

**20.** The successful application of the manoeuvrist approach depends on the imperatives of mission command, orchestration and close combat. Most importantly, the manoeuvrist approach is built on joint warfighting, a knowledge edge, boldness, rigorous training, effective command, exemplary leadership and astute management practice.

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5. Mission command is a philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication of a superior commander's intent. Detail on this philosophy is contained in Chapter 2. Orchestration refers to the coordination of effects across space and time. Close combat involves the ability to find, close with and destroy an enemy.
SECTION 1-4. DIFFERENTIATING COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

21. The concepts of command, leadership and management have specific meaning in the military. The acts of leading and managing are generally well documented and researched in the analytical fields of leadership and management, but the art of command is peculiar to the military. While much has been written about command and commanders, theories and principles that are sufficient to apply in all command situations are less developed. It is accepted that the concepts are interrelated, but the sheer weight of debate has led to misunderstanding and confusion over their distinction.

Definitions of Command, Leadership and Management

22. The definitions of command, leadership and management used within the Army are as follows:

a. **Command.** The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.  

b. **Leadership.** The art of influencing and directing people to achieve willingly the team or organisational goal.

c. **Management.** The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.

23. From these definitions one aspect is clear. The purposes of commanding, leading and managing each involve engaging and motivating people with a focus on task accomplishment. Each involves deciding what needs to be

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6. This is a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) definition. When NATO definitions closely match the ADF view, they are used in doctrine in the interests of commonality and interoperability.

7. From Pierce J.L., and Durham R.B, *Managing*, Fresman and Company, Illinois, 1980. Use of this definition was proposed by the then General Officer Commanding Logistic Command and endorsed by the Chief of the General Staff Advisory Committee in May 1995.
done, creating and nurturing the necessary interpersonal relationships and ensuring the mission is achieved.

24. Although the terms of command, leadership and management are closely related each has a common purpose, which is accomplished in different ways. It must be clear that command does not equate to leadership or military management, and is wholly different from corporate management. While the corporate environment may at times be complex, uncertain, ambiguous and risky, the atmosphere is unlikely to involve violence, fear and danger. Examining the concepts of command, leadership and management as if each was a subset of the other is useful in understanding their interrelationship.

The Command Perspective

25. Command is the authority bestowed on an appointment. With this authority a commander provides the vision, direction and purpose. A strict definitional analysis advocates that command provides the legal authority and responsibility to achieve a task, and that leadership and management are the two means through which the task is completed. Leadership works through providing moral authority and inspiring and motivating people, while management applies the resources and processes necessary to plan, organise, direct and control action. Effective command requires good management and importantly, without effective leadership there will be weak command. This command perspective is illustrated in Figure 1–1.
26. Leadership engenders influence. It is a quality. The leadership focus is on aligning people with the vision, communicating, motivating and inspiring. Its purpose is to build the interpersonal relationships necessary to achieve tasks, satisfy basic needs such as recognition, self-esteem and comradeship, and provide individuals with challenging opportunities. Leadership survives without command, and history provides isolated examples where leadership without command has been spectacularly successful. In this regard, command is not a subset of leadership; however, the leader needs authority when unable to persuade followers by force of character alone.

8. The separate exploits of Privates George Cartwright and Frank Partridge whose actions inspired and motivated their comrades into heroic action are detailed in Wigmore, L. (ed), *They Dared Mightily*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra ACT, 1963, pp 149-150 and pp 267-268 respectively.
27. Leadership creates in an individual a command presence through moral authority. Moral authority is a function of individual integrity based on character and is bestowed by members of the team not necessarily one's superiors. It is a direct result of leadership and experience. Leadership also requires some organisational ability that requires a degree of management skill. The interrelationship from a leadership perspective is illustrated in Figure 1–2, although the leadership task is more complex than this figure portrays.

![Figure 1–2: Leadership Perspective on Command, Leadership and Management](image)

The Management Perspective

28. Management is about control, efficiency, effectiveness, rules and procedures. It is a skill. Management is an impersonal, rational act involving activities such as planning, budgeting, performance measurement and resource allocation, but it does require some form of authority to engage people to work. Authority may be provided through the appointment of military command or by workplace authority. Workplace authority is the authority of a workplace superior to direct the activities of a subordinate. Such authority is exercisable by a civilian over
an ADF member or an ADF member over a civilian according to their respective positions in the workplace.  

29. Management can be actioned without leadership; however, without leadership management becomes routine processes and administration. Of itself management does not motivate. Any influence to achieve tasks is compliance based and will not endure. Authority without the ability to lead will not produce effective results or build the mutual trust necessary for individuals to continue to willingly achieve tasks.

30. Management theory also views people as resources (hence the term human resources), but the astute manager who appreciates the difference between people as individuals and other material resources will achieve more effective results. The management perspective is illustrated in Figure 1–3.

![Figure 1–3: Management Perspective on Command, Leadership and Management](image)

**SECTION 1-5. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT**

31. Command, leadership and management are all responses to a situation. Considered separately, the different perspectives all portray 'methods' for achieving tasks and separately may be considered as 'the method' to achieve all tasks. What is clear from the independent perspectives is that the functions of command (authority), leadership and management are interdependent. For an individual to effectively engage people to achieve organisational outcomes; leadership skill, management ability and some form of authority are all essential irrespective of which title is assigned or which function is considered to have primacy. The emphasis placed on each function will inevitably vary according to the situation, but all three responses will be needed in every circumstance to some degree.

**SECTION 1-6. CONCEPTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT**

32. Command, leadership and management are distinct but complementary systems of action. Each has its own specific function and characteristics. Misunderstanding between the concepts, however, has been heightened by the constant interchange of terminology between the military and civilian sectors of society. This has confused and separated the functions, not only in theory but sometimes also in practice. The primary reasons for this confusion and separation have been:

a. unclear language;

b. the ease of independent definition of the management functions which has led to separate education, training, doctrine and viewpoints;

c. a lack of understanding of the interdependence between command, leadership and management;

d. an institutional resistance to the full acceptance of 'management' as a military function; and

e. a semantic dispute over which of the three functions is the eminent activity and what is the subordinate relationship to the other elements.
Unclear Language

33. Over time, the use and meaning of language has not only evolved, but has been misunderstood, distorted and placed in different contexts. Civilian use of military expressions to describe business activity is common. References to business competition as 'the enemy' and 'strategic planning' to describe the business of corporate planning abound. Newspaper headlines declaring war against drugs or taxes, and describing corporate leadership struggles as 'combat' and executives being in the 'frontline' use the high drama of the language of war in order to describe non-military activity in a powerful way.

34. Other academic works on leadership adopt the concept of 'tactical proficiency' to mean the ability to rapidly adapt to changing situations. While this figurative meaning has merit, the unacquainted reader may not appreciate the literal meaning associated with the knowledge and ability to balance the application of firepower and manoeuvre. Tactical proficiency concerns tactics – fighting in the battlespace.

35. Adding to the misunderstanding is the fact that the principles of administrative management, developed in the early 1900s by the French engineer Henri Fayol (1841–1925), underpin the derived concepts forming some of the accepted military principles of command and leadership. Fayol also developed the five functions of management (plan, organise, command, coordinate and control), which still form the basis of current management thought and action. Fayol’s management function, labelled command, is referred to as leadership, direction or motivation in current management terminology, but the term has a specific meaning in the military.

36. Distortion is not only restricted to military terms. The term benchmark, a surveyor’s mark set into the ground as a reference used to determine elevation, has been corrupted by the quality movement to mean any number of management activities associated with best practice, continuous improvement and business process comparison.

10. In fact there is even confusion amongst management theorists as to what is meant by strategy in management-speak. The academic Henry Mintzberg provides four different meanings for strategy. See Mintzberg, H., The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Prentice Hall, New York, 1994, pp 23-29.


12. Fayol’s principles of administrative management are detailed in Chapter 4.
Institutional Resistance

37. Command, leadership and management are required in peace and in war. The outcome any commander seeks is success on the battlefield. Consequently, the command focus has traditionally been on orchestrating fighting power effectively. Management has mistakenly been seen as a civilian activity, the role of bureaucrats, accountants and analysts, akin to economics, with a focus on achieving outcomes efficiently, moreso than effectively.

38. War is inherently destructive and disproportionately resource intensive; consequently, there will always be tension between the effectiveness and efficiency of chosen courses of action. On occasion, decisiveness at the tactical level may go beyond what is considered to be efficient but is acceptable if the outcome is positive. For a commander, the focus must remain on effective mission accomplishment but not to the extent that efficiency is totally disregarded or two of the principles of war, economy of effort and sustainment, are ignored. These two principles relate directly to management and are not just the responsibility or purview of logisticians. Astute management practices are central to command and leadership. This is reflected in the truism espoused by Major General Jim Molan: ‘You will never have time to lead if you can’t manage’.

39. Field-Marshal Sir-William Slim also provided a sobering comment to the Adelaide Division of the Australian Institute of Management on 4 April, 1947 where he focussed attention on the most important issue during conflict:

In war the general may not be haunted by finance, but his is the responsibility for good management and economy in matters more important than money – his men’s lives.

40. In addition, there are some misguided attempts to glorify management by drawing parallels with the art of military command. Such comparison serves only to oversimplify the concept of command and generate scepticism among those entrusted with it. The executive, who returns home at the end of the day, has very little in common with the commander who is issuing battle plans for another night of combat.

13. Made as the Commander Australian Defence College in an opening address to the Command, Leadership and Management Focus Group meeting of 20 February 2003.

41. It may be argued that institutional resistance may have more to do with terminology than with the concept of management itself. To the military mind, the processes of planning, organising, directing and controlling are embodied in command, leadership and administrative functions. The term management and its associated lexicon do not fit comfortably in the glossary of warfighting. In addition, the Army's people take special pride in the fact that they enlisted to serve the nation as soldiers and dislike terminology that portrays their Army as a corporation.

42. Soldiers' views are justified by the fact that the professional practice of management has been corrupted by corporate flirtations with techniques and terms such as total quality, re-engineering, best practice, benchmarking, continuous improvement, gainsharing, change management and matrix management. While the techniques have some application, such activity is often associated with novelty, quick fixes and short-term fads. The collapse of many global corporations based on a management culture of greed, unethical behaviour and the total abrogation and dissipation of any sense of individual accountability and responsibility, through transferring culpability to boards of management, all contribute to tarnishing the image of management and managers.

Semantics

43. There is a semantic debate about which of the three functions is the eminent activity and what is the subordinate relationship of the other functions. Because the military concept of command is peculiar to the profession of arms, it is rarely, if at all, addressed in management theory. Traditional management theory suggests that management is the whole activity and that leadership represents the influencing process in the sub-functions of directing and controlling.

44. Leadership motivates and influences people. It is gaining greater acceptance in management circles as being significantly different, in that the nature of how the management function is carried out must change to accommodate such revised thinking. The military viewpoint is clear. Command embodies leadership and management.
45. Within the Army, the philosophical viewpoint is that the exercise of command has primacy. Command is the response to situations, which requires command authority, the application of leadership and the employment of management techniques. These three functions form an interdependent trinity of purpose that provides the authority and the mechanisms for commanders to achieve their mission.

46. The collective name for this trinity of purpose is embodied in command, and the practitioner is known as the commander. The commander must have professional competence and apply skills and qualities to simultaneously employ these functions, in order to achieve an efficient, effective and ethical outcome with the assigned people and resources.

47. There are three concepts behind the Army’s philosophy on command, leadership and management. They are:

   a. Character and Competence. The performance of a commander is dependent on individual character and competence, and consideration of a number of attributes, qualities and skills developed through professional mastery, including:

      (1) commitment to service;

      (2) living the Army’s ethos and values, and behaving ethically;

      (3) professional knowledge;

      (4) decision-making and managing risk; and

      (5) effective communication.

   b. Interdependence. The Army needs individuals who are commanders, leaders and managers concurrently, at every rank level and in every appointment. All three functions are required at the same time to complete a task efficiently, effectively and ethically. They are related through the common action of directing people, resources and processes to bring about a future situation. The emphasis on each function may vary depending on the task or the situation; however, it is the outcome that is important not the label.
c. **Enabling Vision.** The central function of the commander is to:

1. comprehend the present state;
2. visualise a future state; and
3. through command, leadership and management create movement towards the achievement of this future state.

48. The integration of these philosophical concepts is discussed in Chapter 5.

**SECTION 1-8. CONCLUSION**

49. The environment in which the Army's soldiers are required to operate is exhausting, chaotic and dangerous. Success in this environment is founded on the unique character of the Australian soldier and the ADF's approach to warfare, with reliance on effective command, exemplary leadership and astute management practice. While there is semantic debate regarding the concepts of command, leadership and management, within the Army, the concepts are distinct yet interdependent, but the exercise of command has primacy. Put simply:

a. command will always be command – among other things it is the legal authority to apply military force;

b. leadership will always be leadership – individuals need to be inspired and motivated, and not just managed; and

c. management will always be management – the scientific application of theories and procedures to quantify issues for a decision; an essential part of warfighting.

50. Proficiency in all three functions will create success on the battlefield. A poor performance in any of the three functions could lead to failure, remembering it is the outcome that is important not the label.
CHAPTER 2
COMMAND

SECTION 2-1. INTRODUCTION

1. Command authorises designated commanders to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for mission and task accomplishment. To achieve this effectively, the ADF has a philosophy of a permanent, joint and unified command system for the conduct of operations, to which the Army subscribes. The central basis is to ensure that air, land and maritime components of the ADF can operate jointly and to facilitate their interoperability in coalition operations with allies and partners.

2. This chapter describes the doctrinal concept for the command of land forces within the ADF command and control philosophy, and discusses issues for the exercise of command in operational and non-operational scenarios.

SECTION 2-2. THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE'S COMMAND AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

3. Australia's geographic circumstances and strategic posture demand that the ADF command and control arrangements remain unambiguous, flexible and efficient to ensure successful missions in a broad range of contingencies and activities. Commanders at all levels must be well versed in exercising command under difficult and rapidly changing circumstances, irrespective of the level of conflict. In this regard the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) commands the ADF and normally exercises command of operations through the Commander, Australian Theatre, who is the principal adviser on all matters concerning the conduct of campaigns and operations. The Service Chiefs command their respective Services and are responsible for raising, training and maintaining forces for operations. They remain the CDF's principal military advisers on Defence policy, military strategy and the employment of their respective Service's forces.
4. The ADF command and control system must be effective in both times of conflict and peace and should:
   
a. meet the requirements of government,

b. provide for the lawful delegation of authority,

c. allow commanders at all levels to achieve their mission through their initiative and the application of the art and science of war,

d. facilitate the effective and efficient employment of capabilities and resources, and

e. be adaptable to any military operation the ADF might be required to execute.

Command and Control

5. The terms command and control are complementary, but not equal. Command is the authority invested in an individual, a uniquely human activity; whereas, control encompasses the protocols, processes and equipment (ways and means) that a commander uses to exercise that authority. Control is the means initiated through command that may be altered to match the changing needs and priorities of a particular mission.

6. Commanders at all levels must understand the degree of authority they exercise over forces assigned to them and the responsibilities they have for those forces. They must also be equally clear about their responsibilities to their higher command. The use of agreed terminology and definitions is fundamental to an effective system of command and control and the development of joint doctrine and procedures. The following definitions have some agreement internationally, although not all allies use the terms with exactly the same meaning. It is necessary to understand terminology to discern the differences in application among foreign forces and avoid confusion on operations.

7. Command. When applied to a military command and control system, command is defined as:
...the authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.¹

8. **Control.** When applied to a command and control system, control is defined as:

...the authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.²

9. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures that are employed by a commander in planning, directing and coordinating forces and operations. Command and control capabilities include resources to:

a. obtain, report, communicate, process, analyse, synthesise, display and disseminate information to support command planning and decision making;

b. formulate alternative courses of action;

c. make decisions; and

d. communicate orders to subordinates and receive the results of actions and the status of forces.

10. Within the ADF, the effective application of command and control requires commanders and staff to employ common doctrine for command and the use of standardised procedures for control. This is articulated through joint operational doctrine and common understanding of the states of command. Command and control are thus inextricably linked, with commanders and staff requiring a thorough knowledge and understanding of both concepts.

¹ This is a NATO definition. When NATO definitions closely match the ADF view, they are used in doctrine in the interests of commonality and interoperability.

² NATO definition.
The Philosophy of Mission Command

11. Mission command is a philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinate commanders are given clear direction of a superior's intent. That is; the clear articulation of the result required, the tasks to be undertaken and any constraints. It also requires that the resources to achieve tasks be provided.

12. War is a clash between human wills, each with freedom of action; therefore, commanders cannot be expected to anticipate, with absolute certainty, an adversary's intentions. The interactive and complex nature of war guarantees uncertainty, which to the military mind can suggest a loss of control. There are two ways to react. One is to attempt to seize control through strong centralised command. The other is to accept uncertainty as inevitable and adopt a decentralised philosophy of command that places emphasis on a common intent between all levels of command and mutual trust between superior and subordinate commanders. This is the basis of the ADF philosophy of mission command.

13. Put simply, mission command means that the superior commander directs what is to be achieved but leaves the subordinate commander freedom to decide how to achieve it. There is a requirement for superior commanders, however, to ensure that the elements of their command are synchronised to best effect.

Prerequisites for Mission Command Success

14. There are a number of prerequisites for success based on the philosophy of mission command:

   a. _Doctrine_. Mission command is most successful when supported by relevant doctrine. Freedom of action, within the parameters of the commander's intent, requires doctrine based on sound application of leadership and operational principles. The purpose of doctrine is to provide guidance for intelligent application, not dogma for automatic response.

   b. _Reliability_. Mission command requires reliability of response, where commanders must regard their superior's intentions as fundamental guidance, and make the attainment of such guidance the underlying purpose of every action. High demands must be made on the leadership qualities of subordinates, on their initiative and on their sense of responsibility to carry out assigned tasks.
c. *Trust.* The real basis of mission command is an unbroken chain of mutual trust and respect between commanders at all levels. Subordinate commanders must have confidence that they will not be given unachievable tasks. The superior must have the courage to foster their subordinates’ initiative and trust them to achieve the assigned tasks largely undirected. Trust must also include the courage to share the responsibility for errors. The required level of trust will not be achieved easily. It can only be realised through effective leadership and practising mission command in intensive training.

d. *Understanding.* For mission command to succeed, subordinate commanders must have a clear understanding of the intentions of their superiors so that, as a situation develops, their actions can accord with those higher intentions. This will develop subordinates’ capabilities to act independently in accordance with their immediate commander’s intent. A constant and comprehensive exchange of information between commanders and their staff is an essential step towards achieving the necessary unity of thought, which will support unity of action. The alternatives to mission command are either to resort to ponderous, detailed orders that stifle initiative and slow down the tempo of operations, or not to issue orders at all.

e. *Risk.* With mission command there is the need to accept a certain amount of risk to achieve success. In a rapidly developing battle, where it is critical to gain and retain the initiative, the consequences of delay through hesitation and indecision, or time wasting by seeking confirmation, may be more dangerous than a flawed but timely decision based on the best assessment of incomplete information.

15. Consideration of these prerequisites illustrates that mission command cannot simply be directed to be used. Application of this command philosophy requires continuous practice and personal example by both superiors and subordinates.

16. The critical factors in mission command are:

   a. commanders ensuring subordinates understand the intent, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context;

   b. subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it is necessary;

   c. subordinates being allocated sufficient resources (including information) to carry out their missions;
d. commanders using a minimum of control so as not to unnecessarily limit the subordinates’ freedom of action; and

e. subordinates deciding for themselves how best to achieve their missions.

SECTION 2-3. THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMMAND

17. The world faced by today’s commander is radically different from that of the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War period. An environment of rapid change, complexity and uncertainty has subsumed the familiar paradigm of conventional warfare with a notional enemy or primary threat upon which to base planning and training.

18. The environment of command is inextricably linked to the environment of operations of that particular theatre, the strategic context and the technology available. For example, the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction will add to the ever-present physical and mental stresses of command and may raise difficult moral issues. Therefore, a military force is unlikely to succeed unless its commanders understand the environment of their command – an environment in which the activities of their forces and of their adversaries play but a part. Commanders in action will be subject to a wide range of environmental factors including:

a. continuous action (day and night);

b. technological improvements delivering weapon systems with increased range, lethality, precision of fire and a wider range of effects;

c. greater dispersion of more agile units;

d. an increased likelihood of fighting in complex terrain with an unavoidable emphasis on close combat; and

e. the paradox between greater stealth (due to dispersion and speed) and increased risk of detection due to greater numbers of more capable enemy battlespace sensors.

19. This environment will create even greater demands for information and continue to compress time and space. This trend presents inherent dangers, particularly the potential for over-reliance on equipment and automated command and control systems. Moreover, used unwisely,
technology can become part of the problem, contributing to information overload and feeding the dangerous illusion that certainty and precision in war are not only desirable, but also attainable.

20. In the complex conditions of contemporary conflict, commanders are increasingly likely to have to consider a wide range of factors such as political, legal, cultural and social issues. At all levels of command, friendly force manoeuvre will remain legally obligated to international and national law, even if the enemy does not. Such requirements demand that commanders maintain moral authority to uphold the professionalism and discipline of the troops under their command. Moreover, the instantaneous media saturation and mass communication technologies that are features of the Information Age create transparency of action and accelerate the speed at which public awareness of events develops. Here, an understanding of, and the ability to influence the social, cultural and political environment will remain an increasingly important skill for commanders, down to the lowest tactical level.

SECTION 2-4. UNIQUENESS OF THE COMMAND EXPERIENCE

21. Command is a uniquely human experience influenced by individual personality, knowledge, personal experience, context, mission, environment and power relationships. Only at the junior levels of command is there some commonality of experience among commanders. To command is to lead well when leadership is required and to manage well when management is called for. A commander, however, must also be a tactician and strategist, technician and logistician, warrior, moral arbiter, disciplinarian, trainer, and a soldier of great physical and mental endurance.

Command in an Environment of Complexity and Uncertainty

22. The environment of command illustrates that today’s commanders must operate in a world where there exists a far more complex milieu of threats and missions. The uniqueness of the command experience is heightened on operations where a commander must lead and exercise command in conditions of complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, risk, violence, fear and

danger and consistently make decisions while constrained by time. Such complexity is detailed in the 3rd Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment’s Post Operation Report for Operations SPITFIRE and WARDEN, August 1999 to February 2000.

The United States Marine Corps ‘three block war’ model aptly describes the complexity faced by commanders at all levels. This model was observed to be applicable to both urban and rural environments in East Timor.

The three-block model describes the complexity generated on an expeditionary force from opposing regular forces, irregular forces and civilians. Diverse incidents could occur simultaneously and in close proximity (a block apart). Alternatively, incidents could occur on the same block at different times... In East Timor the contrasting impact of the TNI, Militia and Falantil and the destitute populace created the three-block environment.

Complexity arises because soldiers and commanders on the spot must respond appropriately to different incidents despite the ‘stresses’ being similar. For example, the techniques for dealing with thousands of unruly civilians at a humanitarian aid point is different from responding to a group of stone throwing Militia... Such incidents could all be imposed on the same rifle section in a single morning.

Further complications exist because an incorrect response to one group can have a collateral impact on another group. For example, disregarding local sensitivities in delivering humanitarian aid could turn passive civilians into Militia recruits.

Friction (the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult) adds to the chaos and confusion of conflict. Commanders should not only accept the inevitability of confusion and disorder, but should seek to generate it in the minds of their opponents.

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Friction (the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult) adds to the chaos and confusion of conflict. Commanders should not only accept the inevitability of confusion and disorder, but should seek to generate it in the minds of their opponents.
24. Much as they may try, commanders cannot master all conditions and events affecting their command. Commanders, therefore, should attempt to create only sufficient order out of the chaos of war to enable their own operations to be carried out. Much of the scope for a commander’s success will largely depend upon experience, adaptability, determination and decisiveness.

25. The human endeavour of command and the physical components of a command and control system are particularly vulnerable in the 21st Century. The increased scope of responsibility of commanding a modern military force demands a great deal of expertise from any officer or soldier placed in a position of authority. Thus, the environment or reality of command in today’s climate must be understood and accepted as a professional challenge.

The Relationship between Authority and Responsibility\(^5,6\)

26. A key element of command is authority – the right and power to carry out actions. Authority can be official (or legal) as codified in the Defence Act, 1903 as well as personal (or moral), which is developed through effective leadership.

27. Legal Authority. Legal authority is generally, but not exclusively, a function of military rank and bestowed through law. This authority requires the commander to accept responsibility for actions in the accomplishment of assigned missions. Responsibility and its complement, accountability, are, therefore, the root of command and its principal motivator.

28. The relationship between authority and responsibility is the key to understanding the concept of command. An individual either has, or has not, the authority to act and either accepts, or does not accept, responsibility for actions. This relationship leads potentially to different types of command as illustrated in Figure 2–1.


29. When an individual has the authority to act and assumes responsibility for his or her actions, balanced and effectual command (quadrant 1) is possible. Responsibility without authority (quadrant 2) yields only ineffectual command (if this is even possible). Having neither authority nor responsibility (quadrant 3) constitutes no command at all; or, if an individual still acts, an illegal form of command. Quadrant 4 yields a very dangerous form of command. Having authority to act without accepting any responsibility for the outcome is an abuse of authority and morally unacceptable.

30. More importantly, Pigeau and McCann argue that the combination in quadrant 4 has critical implications for the role of automation in command and control systems.

As technology becomes more sophisticated, and the need for speed and accuracy more pressing, a solution may be adopted that will 'empower' automated systems to initiate predefined actions. Since such systems are incapable of being programmed with 'responsibility' sub-routines, 'veto' or 'failsafe' procedures must be
incorporated for the human commander. This strategy is referred to as Command by 'negation', and as a philosophy of Command it is undesirable because it reduces Command to a re-active (ie., Control) rather than pro-active function, and it induces tremendous psychological stress on the human commander.7

31. The adage no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension remains paramount. Even though Information Age technologies provide tremendous potential to deliver information to support decision-making processes, they do not replace commanders applying their judgment and being accountable for their decisions. Commanders must not become paralysed by analysis. They must have self-confidence in their ability to make decisions without over-reliance on decision support systems. Such reliance breeds insecurity. The Army requires commanders who can apply their ability and intuition consistently, not as the contingency when technology fails.

32. Moral Authority. Moral authority is a function of individual integrity based on character and is bestowed by members of the team not necessarily one's superiors. It is a direct result of leadership and experience. Moral authority engenders mutual trust, promotes team cohesiveness, motivates individuals and accelerates team building. It is impossible to lead people without trust. Soldiers will not put their lives on the line for something in which they do not believe, nor will they for someone they neither trust nor respect. Mutual trust and personal confidence permits a commander to delegate authority and responsibility to subordinates. Without moral authority, command becomes weak and ineffective.

33. Securing command in legal and moral authority means that command is a uniquely human endeavour. Just as there can be no command without authority, there can be no authority without human involvement. Only humans can accept responsibility and only humans can be held accountable.

The Legal Basis for Command

34. It is vital to the maintenance of high morale and professionalism of the ADF, and the good standing enjoyed as an institution in Australian society, that the ADF’s use of combat power is applied only in circumstances where such use is legally authorised. This is ensured within Australia’s democratic system through the principle of civil control of the military by which decisions to deploy the ADF are made by the Government.

35. Command has a legal and constitutional status that is codified in the Defence Act, 1903. Australia’s exercise of military power is legally based on:
   a. the Australian Constitution and a number of Westminster system constitutional conventions, known as the express powers; and
   b. legislation passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, known as the incidental powers.

36. Section 68 of the Australian Constitution invests command in chief of the ADF in the Governor-General; however, despite references to the Queen and to the Governor-General, and the apparent military command authority provided to the Governor-General in law, the Governor-General is the commander of the ADF in title only. Neither the Queen nor her representative, the Governor-General, has an executive role in directing or commanding the ADF. As Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General acts solely on ministerial advice.

37. Executive power rests with the Government, and the constitutional authority for setting strategic and defence policy lies unequivocally with the Parliament and the Executive. In practical terms, the Cabinet and the National Security Committee of Cabinet exercise this power.

38. The Minister for Defence exercises general control and administration of the ADF under Section 8 of the Defence Act. Section 9 of this Act provides that the Governor-General may appoint an ADF officer to be the CDF. The CDF commands the ADF, and the Service Chiefs command their respective Services.
39. Under Section 9A of the *Defence Act*, the Secretary of the Department of Defence and CDF jointly administer the ADF, except with respect to matters relating to the command of the ADF and any other matters prescribed by the Minister. The CDF and the Secretary exercise their authority subject to, and in accordance with, any directions given by the Minister.

40. The commander’s authority distinguishes a commander from a leader and civilian manager. Commanders are vested with the legal authority to impose their will and decisions as defined in a unique and separate system of military law, the *Defence Force Discipline Act*, 1982. The commander also exercises administrative authority under a range of government, financial and administrative regulations. The onus is on the individual commander not to abuse or misuse the authority of their appointment.

The Levels of Australian Defence Force Command

41. The ADF has three levels of command, within Australia’s organisational framework, for managing the challenges of national security. These levels which delineate responsibilities for planning and conducting military operations are strategic, operational and tactical.

42. **The Strategic Level of Command.** Command at the strategic level of war is concerned with the art and science of employing national power to achieve an end-state favourable to the national interest. At this level, all the elements of national power are employed in a manner that maximises their relevance and effect. The strategic level is subdivided into *national strategic* and *military strategic* levels as follows:

a. **National Strategic Level of Command.** The national strategic level of command refers to the political dimension of conflict at the macro level, both domestically and internationally, and the mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to meet the Government’s strategic objectives. The political dimension relates both to the desired political end-state and to the domestic support on which governments depend to enable the prosecution of hostilities.

b. **Military Strategic Level of Command.** The military strategic level of command is concerned with the military aspects of planning and the direction of conflict. This level includes the setting of the military end-state and the broad military approach to its achievement. Military strategic commanders provide advice to the

8. National security requires the coordinated interaction of all of the elements of national power: political, economic, military, societal and environmental.
Government and translate the Government's strategic objectives into policy and plans for the use of military force. As part of this responsibility, strategic-level commanders establish military strategic objectives, provide direction to operational-level commanders, craft military strategies, allocate resources, and impose conditions and limitations on the military actions to be undertaken in designated theatres of operation. Australian Defence Headquarters, incorporating Army Headquarters contributes to the national strategic level of command and has responsibility at the military strategic level of command.

43. **The Operational Level of Command.** The operational level of command is concerned with planning and conducting campaigns to attain military strategic objectives within a theatre of operations. The operational level entails sequencing tactical events to achieve strategic objectives and applying resources to bring about or sustain those events. Military actions at the operational level are invariably joint and often coalition in nature. The operational level is the vital link between military strategic objectives and tactics. Headquarters Australian Theatre, Headquarters Northern Command and occasionally the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters work at the operational level.

44. The operational level of command involves the manoeuvre of formations and units and the consequential achievement of a result by fighting at the tactical level. It is at the operational level that the primacy of the military commander in war emerges. The commander at this level requires the ability to integrate the operations of different environments towards the achievement of campaign objectives and the responsibility to translate directives received into concepts of operations. Commanders must then oversee the execution of their concepts by their subordinate tactical commanders. Proficiency in command at the operational level further requires the ability to deal with political, legal, financial and media pressures. Thus, the operational commander needs to have a wide perspective of the application of military force and to understand its strategic context and the risks involved in its use.

45. **The Tactical Level of Command.** At the tactical level of command, commanders plan and conduct battles and engagements to support operational-level (campaign) objectives. Tactical activities focus on integrating and applying 'fighting power' to defeat the enemy at a particular time and place, and to exploit this success. In comparison with the operational level, events at the tactical level occur within relatively

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short time-frames, and the options available to commanders at this level are limited. Most ADF units fight at the tactical level.

46. Tactical level command demands a sound knowledge and understanding of tactical doctrine. In short, the tactical commander’s focus must lie on the skilful defeat of the enemy by timely decision-making, superior use of arms and competence in synchronising combat power on the battlefield. It requires flexibility to allow a quick response to changing situations and a detailed knowledge of the enemy that allows their weaknesses to be exploited.

47. Overlap in the Levels of Command. The levels of command do not depend on the scale, intensity or duration of a conflict, and they overlap, as shown in Figure 2–2. The levels of command overlap because, while commanders have different responsibilities, the effects of their decisions will pervade all levels. For example, decisions taken by strategic leaders on rules of engagement and the allocation of resources will have a direct impact on tactical level outcomes. Similarly, decisions made by a junior commander in combat might have direct strategic repercussions. Overlap between the levels of command also highlights the importance of a coherent chain of intent from top to bottom that ultimately produces the desired national end-state.

![Figure 2–2: The Levels of Australian Defence Force Command](image-url)
SECTION 2-6. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF COMMAND

48. Although arrangements for the command and control of land operations may be varied to meet the specific requirements of a particular operation, those arrangements must be based upon and conform to some fundamental principles to exercise command effectively. The ADF recognises six fundamentals of command:

a. unity of command,
b. span of command,
c. clarity,
d. redundancy,
e. delegation of command, and
f. control of significant forces.

Unity of Command

49. Unity of command involves assigning all assets under a single commander for a particular operation. To achieve unity of command, it is imperative that there is a single recognised command authority at all times. This ensures clarity and unity of effort, promotes timely and effective decision-making, and avoids potential conflict in orders and instructions. The command authority may change as tasks change, but the principle of unity of command, with one designated commander clearly responsible for each task, must be maintained. This is particularly important in certain joint operations, such as airborne or amphibious operations, where the circumstances could otherwise create doubt about who is in command of the operation at various phases.

Span of Command

50. The span of command is the number of subordinate organisations commanded directly. The overall size and spatial deployment of the forces that a commander has to direct will determine this. No finite or optimum number can be prescribed; however, there is a limit to the number of subordinate units if command is to remain effective. Determining the most effective span of command will depend on a range of factors and may vary according to the nature and type of operation.
being conducted. Narrowing spans of command may add levels of command with potential undesirable effects on timely decisions and actions.

51. While all command and control arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope with additional subordinate elements, commanders must not be overloaded to the point where they are unable to operate effectively. Subordinate command arrangements should be put in place before a commander’s span of command becomes unmanageable.

Clarity

52. Clarity is achieved through a clear understanding of the military chain of command and related coordination processes. The military chain of command (the hierarchical succession through which command authority is extended and exercised) requires commanders at each level to respond to directions from higher headquarters and in turn issue directions to subordinates. Conversely, each headquarters normally reports to only one superior headquarters creating an unambiguous chain of command. All the elements involved must be aware of their superior and subordinate headquarters, and the command and control relationships with other elements operating in the same theatre or area of operations.

Redundancy

53. Redundancy provides for continuity of command. Alternative commanders and headquarters (as appropriate) must be nominated at all levels of command to provide redundancy. Procedures must be established and practised to allow command to be passed to the alternative commander in such a way that operations are not adversely affected. The purpose of this process is to ensure that ongoing operations and commitments are not disrupted during a transfer of authority. At the tactical level, redundancy is commonly articulated should the commander become a casualty. At the operational and strategic level, higher-level commanders must nominate alternative headquarters should their own become inoperative. A familiar method of articulating redundancy provisions is through the Command and Signals paragraph of the standard orders format.
Delegation of Command

54. Delegation of Command is the process by which a commander assigns tasks and authority to subordinates, who then accept responsibility for those tasks. Delegation is thus based on the principles of authority, responsibility and accountability. Underlying the principle of delegation of command is centralised direction and decentralised execution. Superior commanders may delegate authority and hold subordinates accountable; however, they cannot delegate ultimate responsibility since they remain answerable for all aspects under their command.

55. At all levels of command, subordinate commanders should be given the necessary directions and resources to conduct tasks without further interference. Superior commanders, however, must continue to play a vital role in ensuring that the elements of their command are synchronised to focus resources and activities to produce maximum effect at the right time and place. The extent of authority delegated must be clearly stated.

Control of Significant Forces

56. There are some forces or assets that require treatment as significant resources because of their wide utility but limited availability, or limited expert control cells. Across the ADF, these resources might include submarines, special forces and strike aircraft. Within the Army, armour, artillery and aviation assets may require special consideration.

57. Resources considered significant must be held at the highest practical level of command. The delegation of authority over such designated resources is rare and would normally be only for a specific task or limited duration. Any delegation will invariably involve procedures for the rapid return of the authority if and when circumstances change.

58. Figure 2–3 illustrates the relationship between the organisational aspects of these fundamentals.
The Role of the Commander

For those who aspire to lead military forces, to be given command is a privilege, but with this position of authority comes a responsibility above that of military duty. Commanders must earn the respect and trust of their subordinates by demonstrating through their personality, values and intellect that they are competent, approachable and have their soldiers’ welfare at heart. Furthermore, command demands selflessness, sacrifice, the pursuit of natural justice and the determination to achieve assigned tasks, even when such tasks will impose hardship and suffering upon subordinates. Commanders must exercise leadership to achieve their mission, otherwise they remain commanders in title only.
60. In order to carry out their functions, commanders must be prepared to perform many roles in war and peace. The multi-dimensional character of land warfare means that, in order to prosecute it successfully, commanders must be perceptive, intuitive, innovative, skilled in balanced decision-making and possessed of extraordinary willpower in order to orchestrate all the resources available to defeat an adversary. The commander must be at times a tactician and at other times a strategist or a master of the operational art. To do this effectively, commanders must have a sound understanding of all the Army's battlespace operating systems, their interrelationships and how to orchestrate them to best effect. Commanders must have the knowledge and insights of the logistician and must also husband and manage resources; otherwise, they may fail the ultimate test on the battlefield.

61. All commanders are responsible for the oversight and development of their subordinates both personally and professionally. They must be physically and mentally capable of withstanding great stress and also understand and enforce the requirements that lead to the good health, physical fitness and mental well-being of those they command.

62. In combat, the role of the commander is to provide the means to orchestrate the effects of the Army's battlespace operating systems to achieve successful outcomes. Commanders must be flexible, possess a deep understanding of their role, understand the capabilities of their team and realise the ramifications of their actions. The future conduct of warfare will also require commanders to coordinate their efforts jointly, in coalition with other military forces, non-government organisations (NGOs) and other national powers. In the violence of war, the commander must be prepared to assume the role of the warrior, which has at least four challenges:

a. to be courageous in the face of great danger;
b. to engender the will to fight with courage and aggression;
c. to wage war with the violence necessary to achieve victory; and
d. to restrain their use of that violence, in order to meet required standards of legality, morality, and justice.

63. The commander must be both a disciplinarian and moral arbiter for the troops in their command. They must insist on high standards of conduct both on and off duty, and a performance of duty that is consistent with mission accomplishment and ethical standards of behaviour. On operations, commanders have specific responsibilities under the Law of
Armed Conflict to ensure that members under their command and other persons under their control are aware of their obligations under the law. They must take all feasible measures to prevent violations and take appropriate action against offenders. To be effective, commanders must lead by example and create an ethical command climate built on individual character, maintenance of moral values, trust and mutual respect.

64. For the commander, the importance of leadership, professional competence, strength of character and the willingness to make tough decisions is reinforced by Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly who said:

> I think a leader at any level has to be prepared to do unpleasant things. He’s got to be prepared, say at section level, to drive his section forward if it looks like faltering. It means that the platoon commander or the company commander has got to be prepared to send his troops into a situation in which he knows perfectly well he’s going to suffer causalities, but he has to do so if they are to achieve their objective. The same goes for commanders at a higher level. Brigade and battalion commanders have to take difficult decisions, which they know may be costly. I know in my own case I still think sometimes of the various decisions I took. I wonder if the decisions taken at the time were the right ones, because as a result of those decisions, some men were killed, some were wounded and I often wonder whether if I had done it differently, they’d still be with us today. But a commander has to take decisions and wear the results and he often has to do so quickly. It is therefore necessary that he should be competent and professional. I think if you read history, you will find commanders like Monash and indeed Morshead and George Wootten, two of my old brigade commanders, were tough chaps who took tough decisions. They had great strength of character.10

Creating the Command Climate

65. Whether in peacetime or on operations, a commander, by force of personality, leadership style, command presence and general behaviour, has a considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of personal staff and subordinate commanders. Thus, it is a commander’s responsibility to create and sustain an effective command climate. This climate of command must encourage subordinate

commanders at all levels to think independently and to take the initiative. Subordinates expect commanders to keep them informed and, when possible, explain reasons for instructions. Commanders need to work hard at building relationships based on mutual respect and open communication. This fosters a common understanding, a sense of involvement in decision-making and a shared commitment.

66. Major General 'Horrie' Howard as Officer Commanding A Company, 3rd Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) during the Battalion's 1967-68 tour of duty in Vietnam reflected on how the Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel Shelton, maintained the command climate:

I had a great deal of respect, and still do, for the CO. He was a relatively quiet gentleman. I did mention earlier about his very formal and very thorough orders and I thought that they were good. I carried them on later in my career and I think I was successful in the same way that he was, by being really thorough in orders. He would also, as I mentioned earlier, call us back to him individually to discuss how we might handle our area of operations, then he'd let us get on with it, and I think that's terribly important. He didn't push anyone to my knowledge, for example, to conclude a contact or push home an attack, because he felt that we who were on the ground knew what we needed to do better than he. But he was always there on the end of the radio to give encouragement, to have a chat and to make suggestions, and of course he always had something up his sleeve in terms of support, if we really got desperate. He did it in those fairly quiet ways and I believe he was highly successful.

Particularly I would like to repeat that he allowed us to get on with it and didn't push, particularly when we were in contact, he encouraged. I have heard of other COs who pushed companies to do things that maybe if the CO involved had been on the ground he wouldn't have done. I believe he was a very successful CO because of that and I believe the Battalion benefited from his outlook, to the extent that we had great confidence in him, knowing he was there if we needed help, but knowing that we wouldn't interfere with detail.11

11. Ibid., pp 175-176.
Managing Risk

67. Commanders must also create a tolerance of risk and error within their command. Part of risk management is an acceptance of a certain amount of risk in subordinates' decisions and learning from mistakes. However, commanders must ensure that risk management does not become risk aversion. Risk management is not about risk aversion; rather, it is about controlling risks, thereby enhancing force preservation and mission or task accomplishment. Creating a risk-averse climate within a command is to create a climate in which subordinate commanders are reluctant to take the initiative or to make decisions within their tactical or operational authority.

68. Risk management is a fundamental part of Army life. All administration, training and doctrine are examples of risk management. It is a decision-making and problem-solving philosophy and system, which is integral to the Military Appreciation Process. There are two possible approaches to the application of risk management. The first, a behaviour-based approach, relies on effectively training personnel. This enables individuals to actively participate in the risk management process. The second approach involves the application of a hierarchy of appropriate controls. The Army Risk Management Model incorporates both approaches.12

69. Commanders should be encouraged to take the initiative and make considered, independent decisions without fearing criticism for mistakes. This is not an invitation to recklessness, nor to condone defeat. Creating a climate in which risk-taking is regarded lightly is to invite carelessness, lowered standards of training and operational conduct, and negligence. It is incumbent, therefore, on commanders at all levels to strike the right balance of risk-taking and error acceptance within their command. This requires a training and operational culture which promotes an attitude of calculated risk-taking in order to win the land battle rather than to prevent defeat, which may often appear as the safer option.

The Assessment of Subordinates

70. Superior commanders must know the personalities and characteristics of their subordinate commanders. Some need a tighter rein, while others work best under minimal control. Some will be content with a general directive; others will prefer more detail. Some will tire easily and require encouragement and moral support; others, perhaps uninspiring in peace, will find themselves and flourish on operations. Matching talent to tasks is thus an important function of command.

One of the most important duties of commanders is to report on their subordinates and to identify future candidates for senior appointments in command and on the staff. Individuals should be placed in circumstances where they must make decisions and live with the consequences to allow the objective assessment of their command qualities. They must be challenged to provide some indication of their potential to perform at the next rank level, and they must also know that their superiors have sufficient confidence in them to permit honest mistakes. In particular, any assessment of subordinates should confirm whether they exhibit the necessary balance of qualities required to carry the added breadth and weight of responsibilities that go with promotion.

The superior commander must continue, therefore, to judge subordinates and staff in peace and on operations, in order that the right appointments can be made in the right place at the right time. Particular care must be exercised when considering a staff officer for a command appointment. The recognition of subordinates’ strengths and weaknesses is vital to the effective exercise of command and critical on operations.

**SECTION 2-8. THE QUALITIES AND SKILLS OF AN EFFECTIVE COMMANDER**

The art of command is a very personal matter and although no two commanders will work in the same manner, effective commanders require a balance of intellectual, moral, and physical qualities and skills. It is worth noting, however, that there is no agreed list necessary for effective command, although history suggests a number of common qualities in many successful commanders. Irrespective of the rank of the commander, the foundations for success are built on good leadership supported by professional knowledge and underpinned by personal example and integrity. In general, the higher the level of command, the greater the responsibility, requiring a wider scope and greater depth of qualities and skills from commanders. The intellectual, moral and physical qualities and skills required of commanders can be encapsulated in the following attributes:

a. leadership,
b. professional knowledge,
c. intellect and vision,
d. courage and resolve,
e. integrity and example,
f. judgment and decisiveness,
g. credibility, and
h. adaptability.

Leadership

74. The most important element of command is leadership. Commanders command organisations but lead people. Above all else, leadership is about people and requires commanders to possess a good understanding of human nature to enable them to exploit individual strengths and appreciate weaknesses. Leadership creates the foundation for the development of a level of trust and mutual understanding between leaders and their team members. It is essential that soldiers have confidence in the leadership of their commanders, as it is the single most important factor in the attainment and maintenance of high morale. An army’s will to fight – the human dimension of fighting power – is in no small measure sustained by morale and reflected in a willingness to endure hardship, danger and mortal peril. This component of fighting power is generated and maintained through effective leadership.

75. Leadership is about influence. Commanders must be leaders, projecting their personality and character to influence their teams to achieve tasks. Leadership does not replace or reduce command authority, but it produces more effective results because it engages people at a deeper, more personal level.

Professional Knowledge

76. Commanders must be technically and tactically proficient at their level of command, and consistently seek opportunities for self-development if they are to aspire to command at the next level. Professional knowledge is not confined to own force doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures but includes knowledge of the capabilities and tactics of allied and adversarial forces. The acquisition of expert professional knowledge, leading to professional mastery, is a primary requirement of an effective commander and leader. Without this expertise, the commander is a potential liability and may endanger the lives of subordinates especially during combat operations.
Knowledge, as an element of the individual contribution to professional mastery, encompasses not only the knowledge to perform a skill, but also the knowledge of people, situations, concepts, processes, and the knowledge and understanding to justify action. Professional expertise is acquired through a wide variety of means including developmental programs, personal research and operational experience. A commander must have professional knowledge in terms of the following:

a. **Technical Proficiency.** Commanders must have sufficient knowledge of the characteristics, capabilities and limitations of the Army’s battlespace operating systems to judge the soundness of technical advice received from staff. It is expected that junior commanders, particularly tactical level commanders, working within a more confined operating environment would have a greater depth of technical knowledge of the capabilities they control.

b. **Tactical Proficiency.** Commanders must be tactically proficient, both literally and figuratively. In the literal sense, tactical proficiency concerns tactics – fighting in the battlespace. In simple terms, it is a balanced combination of two functions; the application of firepower and manoeuvre, and the control of both by the commander. To be tactically proficient a commander must have the knowledge and ability to employ and manoeuvre capabilities if a successful outcome is to be achieved. At higher levels of command, where the operating environment becomes increasingly complex, a greater breadth of tactical proficiency is demanded from commanders. Figuratively, tactical proficiency is closely aligned to adaptability, which requires commanders to have the capacity to operate in a rapidly changing environment. It also encompasses the ability to interact effectively with people where there may be disparate languages, cultures, ideals, values and agendas. This type of tactical proficiency requires mental acuteness and strong leadership.

**Intellect and Vision**

78. The future operating environment, with the potential for increased asymmetric threats and continuous operations, characterised by high technology, powerful analytical tools, reduced decision-cycle times, and the complexity and chaos of conflict, will impose a high premium on the psychological and physical stamina of commanders and their team. Making sense of this environment will require commanders with superior intellect and vision. Commanders must possess the intellect to discern and understand, and the insight to visualise the battlefield. People are the intellectual component of warfighting capability, and this is what separates the exercise of command from the structures, processes and procedures of control.
79. Intellect is the power of thought; the capability to think accurately and to analyse and solve problems. The intellectual contribution to generating fighting power requires a commander to possess the analytical excellence to assess a situation quickly and accurately, and determine and communicate an appropriate response reliably. Intellect is a product of the mind informed by training, education and experience. Its epitome is the commander and team who can not only move through the decision-cycle faster than an adversary but also embrace the requirement to coherently integrate military, political, social and psychological considerations to produce a successful outcome. Intellect is most powerful when applied with innovation and imagination borne of vision.

80. Vision is pivotal to command and leadership. It implies a uniqueness of insight and overview and in this sense, any element of compromise by the commander will lose the cutting edge of true vision. Originality of thought, unpredictability and use of initiative will cast doubt in the mind of an adversary, consistently throw the enemy off-balance, and give the commander greater freedom of action to destroy, capture or neutralise the adversary's critical vulnerability and break the opposing forces morale and resolve.

81. Outside of the battlespace, vision is an essential ingredient for concept-led innovation exercised through the development of new capabilities, operational concepts and doctrine. Concept-led innovation is the product of an organisational climate that encourages inquiry, debate, experimentation, and informed change. More broadly, such innovation, driven by vision, underpins the Army's concept-led and capability-based modernisation on a continuous basis.

82. Coupled with vision, commanders must possess the ability to articulate their vision and define it clearly for all unit and team members. This is achieved through the application of decision-making and planning processes, the setting of attainable goals and communication. For the vision to be effective, however, the commander must ensure that it is shared. Without a common and shared vision there can be no unity of effort or maintenance of momentum, and the various actions will lack cohesion. A shared vision is something that requires commitment from the commander and all team members. Sharing the commander's vision and intent is the essence of the philosophy of mission command.
Courage and Resolve

83. Courage is the strength to do what is right, whatever the physical or moral challenges. Courage is more than putting life and limb on the line for country, mission and mates. It is also about making hard decisions with honesty and integrity. It is acting in the best interests of the nation and the Army in the achievement of the assigned mission, whatever the personal consequences. Courage is having the moral strength and resolve to balance the will to win with compassion and the sense of duty with mateship.

84. Resolve is a quality that directly relates to the first Principle of War – Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. It helps a commander remain undaunted by setback, casualties and hardship. Resolve provides the personal drive and will to maintain the momentum required to achieve objectives. It is reflected through an unrelenting persistence and unwillingness to be pinned down in the face of adversity. The borderline between resolve and obstinacy, however, is a fine one, and commanders must avoid the stubborn pursuit of an unsuccessful course to disaster. Such action invariably leads to an escalation of commitment and reinforcement of defeat.

85. Courage and resolve require commanders to be both mentally and physically fit, to possess the self-confidence to trust their professional judgment, to have the willingness to take calculated risks and to display a determination to win. Boldness and a healthy sense of steel and aggression are essential qualities for commanders, because a battle can only be won by seizing and maintaining the initiative. In most tactical engagements, audacity is one of the keys to a successful outcome.

Integrity and Example

86. Commanders have a critical role in setting and maintaining the ethical climate of their commands; a climate that must be robust enough to withstand the pressures of both peacetime and operational soldiering. This can only be achieved through the display of personal integrity and example.

87. Integrity is a human condition ingrained in individual character that bestows freedom from moral corruption. It is honesty founded on sound moral principles and is reflected in high standards of personal conduct on and off duty. Integrity is essential to all Army members as it implies honesty, sincerity, reliability, unselfishness and consistency of approach. Integrity is a basic assumption of the Army ethos and is more conspicuous
in its absence than its presence. It is what binds people to the commander's ideas and vision. Without integrity, a commander cannot engender trust, respect or commitment. Without integrity, the commander is nothing and will achieve nothing worthwhile or enduring in the long term.

88. Every commander must lead by personal example and set the high standards of conduct demanded of the profession of arms. The commander's conduct is to be such that it neither calls into question their integrity, nor brings the Army into disrepute. The one aspect of leadership that never vanishes is the power of personal example. Commanders that fail to maintain set standards or instill the Army's values in subordinates through personal example have no place in demanding the maintenance of desired levels of behaviour from the troops under their command. Maintaining integrity both on and off duty ensures the trust and respect of soldiers whom commanders are privileged to lead.

Judgment and Decisiveness

89. Judgment and decisiveness are critical for battlefield success and fundamental for the process of decision-making. Commanders must have the capacity to rapidly reach an informed decision, confidence in their own judgment and be resolute in maintaining their chosen course of action. This is achieved through practice and experience.

90. Judgment is the ability to transform the complex components of knowledge into understanding and to form a reasoned opinion. It is based on intellect, experience and intuition. It is the developed skill that is honed by the wisdom gained through experience. To succeed, a commander must be able to read each development in a particular situation, interpret it correctly in the light of the evidence available and arrive at well-balanced decisions. The commander needs a clear mind; to distinguish the essentials from a mass of detail, to identify the fundamentals of each challenge and to deliver practical solutions. At the junior levels of command, judgment is largely seen as a matter of common sense tempered by experience. As responsibility increases and the operating environment becomes more expansive, superior intellect is required of commanders to make sound judgments. These individuals must be equipped to think analytically, laterally and under considerable pressure. Another aspect of judgment is the assessment of character, particularly that of subordinates.

91. Decisiveness can be viewed in two contexts. Firstly, it is inescapably linked to judgment and the decision-making process. In this context, decisiveness is born out of a positive approach, objectivity, timely
consideration and sound evaluation of alternatives. Decision-making is central to command and influenced by an individual's personality, values and leadership style as well as the personalities, values and expertise of team members. Problems are solved and decisions made through a variety of techniques ranging from rigorous, team-based systematic approaches to simple methods. The chosen approach is largely dependent on the situation, time available and personal preference. Enthusiasm for one method should not, however, be at the expense of choosing the best method for the circumstances.

92. The analytic method, usually staff driven, aims to maximise value through a rational approach that includes detailed analysis and consideration of all alternatives guided by experience. This requires a commander to trust the judgment of subordinates and staff involved in the decision-making process. This method suits situations where time is not critical, issues are complex, courses of action must be justified or team decision-making conflicts need to be resolved.

93. The rational approach, in which the best solution is selected from perfect information, does not, however, always reflect the reality of decision-making. Often commanders will have to make decisions in the absence of desired information when, in their judgment, there is an imperative to initiate action quickly and there is insufficient time to weigh up analytically all the advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action. The naturalistic approach, which is suited to time-constrained conditions, is primarily command-centric and emphasises recognition based on military judgment, which in turn rests on an informed understanding of the situation based on professional knowledge and experience. It replaces methodical analysis with subjective, intuitive assessment, obtains a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one and uses analysis to refine decisions. The naturalistic approach recognises the concept of 'bounded rationality' acknowledging that there are real-world limitations on people's decision-making. Naturalistic decision-making is not wholly instinct and 'gut' feeling. It requires commanders to reflect on their decisions and experience if they are to truly develop intuition and insight.

13. Bounded rationality is a concept used to explain these real world limitations on decision-making where the ability to be perfectly rational is bounded by personal and situational limitations. Decisions are not based on optimisation but on the first minimally acceptable solution because of factors such as incomplete information, intellectual capacity, time available, inability to consider all alternatives and limited decision criteria. The reality is that individuals are restricted in their decision-making and select the first alternative that is satisfactory and sufficient; that is, they 'satisfice'.
94. In its second context, decisiveness is about acting decisively to exploit opportunities and involves the maintenance of a chosen course of action until there is a significant change in circumstances, the environment or new information becomes available that necessitates a new decision. While decisiveness is a key command attribute, the quick decision must never be made so as not to appear indecisive. Nor must commanders let impulsive enthusiasm outrun judgment.

95. The increasing pervasiveness of command support systems designed to assist in the decision-making process raises concerns that systematic decision-making may eclipse the intuition of commanders. There is also a danger that information age technologies and enhanced situational awareness provided by digitisation of the battlespace may provide the potential for information overload. No matter how expert or complex these systems may be, judgment and decisiveness remain purely human skills that simply cannot be reduced to procedures or rules. The environment of conflict demands that commanders possess high level cognitive skills to discern, judge and decide.

Credibility

96. Credibility is crucial for effective command and leadership. Commanders cannot maintain the confidence of their troops – nor can senior levels retain the confidence of the government and the Australian people – unless possessed of the highest degree of credibility. Without credibility commanders forfeit their command influence.

97. Credibility is a fragile attribute, based largely on others’ perceptions. To be credible, the effective commander must build a solid foundation based on qualities such as integrity, respect, service before self, professional knowledge, compassion and personal example. Credibility requires sincerity. It is built through consistency of approach and moral courage. Credibility, like trust, takes time to establish and accumulate yet can be destroyed almost instantaneously by deed or perception. Leader-follower relationships are influenced by factors such as loyalty, trust, competence, respect and credibility.

98. Organisationally the ADF, through the Senior Leadership Group, subscribes to four unbreakable rules that, if broken, would endanger the credibility of the whole organisation. These rules are:

a. never mislead;

b. never abuse authority/power;
c. never 'leak' information; and

d. never condone poor performance.

Adaptability

99. No commander, no matter how gifted, can predict the future. Therefore, in an environment characterised by rapid change, complexity and uncertainty, successful commanders must be prepared and capable to refocus themselves and their organisations on the challenges dealt by fate. Commanders must have the flexibility of mind to accept ambiguity and not only adapt, but thrive under such circumstances.

100. Adaptability refers to the capacity of individuals to accommodate changed circumstances without being overwhelmed or neutralised. It is expressed in a willingness to pursue new or changed objectives in the absence of a full explanation for change. Adaptability requires particular trust and confidence in higher leadership. Adaptable individuals also require confidence in themselves - in their training and preparation for battle - and in their capacity to comprehend a situation and respond appropriately with a minimum of supervision.

101. The commander's ability to adjust to changing patterns of behaviour in an adversary or the environment is, however, but one characteristic of adaptability. The adaptable commander is also proactive. Adaptability is not solely about becoming accustomed to changed circumstances; more importantly, commanders must generate change. Adaptability embraces the qualities of vision, initiative and resourcefulness. In conflict, commanders must have the battlefield visualisation to predict unfolding situations, seize the initiative and exploit fleeting opportunities.

102. Adaptability is fundamental to the ADF philosophy of mission command, and historically, Australians have been recognised for their resourcefulness, adaptability and initiative.

SECTION 2-9. EXERCISING COMMAND

103. The exercise of command is governed by principles, rules and procedures that assist a commander in the performance of functions, provide guidance on relationships with staff and subordinates, and advise the limitations under which they must operate. The competence and skill of the commander in directing subordinates, building team relationships, utilising systems and processes of control, and understanding how to best
use the resources available all help the commander to create and maintain the conditions under which subordinates can most effectively perform their duties. A key function of command is to provide leadership. This is an essential quality if a commander is to govern, persuade, animate and inspire confidence. As commanders become more senior, their span of command becomes larger and their command more complex. As such, contact between leaders and followers through the command levels becomes increasingly indirect. At these higher levels, the role of the commander competes for time and attention among the many roles demanded of senior command. The skill of exercising command, therefore, requires training and it is learnt through the experience of commanding, which must be practised at all levels in peace to prepare for command in war.

104. Command may be exercised through the issue of directives, instructions and orders to control and influence all actions in fulfillment of the commander's aim. Depending on the complexity of the operation, the commander may exercise centralised or decentralised control. Decentralised control, effected through the philosophy of mission command, allows subordinates that degree of initiative necessary to exploit situations. Consideration of the prerequisites for successful command based on mission command (common tactical doctrine, reliability, trust, understanding and risk) requires continuous education, personal example, practical application and a clear understanding of the various command and control terms that are used in both joint and single service doctrine.

The Commander and Staff

105. A commander cannot exercise command alone except in the simplest and smallest of organisations, such as those found at the lower tactical levels. Therefore, at most organisational levels, staff exist to assist and support the commander. The staff have no authority by themselves; rather, they derive authority from the commander and exercise it in the commander’s name. Thus, all of the staff's activities are undertaken on behalf of a commander.

106. The essence of the commander's job is not simply that of solving individual problems in specific areas but, rather, of achieving some measure of integration and synchronisation between the many elements that form their command. This is a distinguishing characteristic of the command leadership role.
107. The success, or otherwise, of the exercise of command is fundamentally dependent on a commander's personal qualities, leadership style and ability to establish a persona with their command. The importance of the command relationship with staff and the competence of that staff are fundamental for the successful conduct of operations.

108. **Duties of the Staff.** Regardless of the level of command, the staff have two main roles:

a. *Assisting the Commander.* The staff have the duty to advise, assist and caution the commander in decision-making. In assisting the commander, the staff focus on the two primary functions of control; coordinating and monitoring. Under the function of coordinating, the staff support the commander by gathering, processing, analysing and presenting information in a manner that helps the commander to select a particular course of action. The staff are then responsible for planning and the preparation and dissemination of control measures, normally promulgated in the form of orders. In the second and overlapping function of monitoring, the staff provide part of the dynamic feedback mechanism essential for subsequent timely decision-making.

b. *Helping Formations and Units.* The staff also exist to help subordinate formations and units. The ability of subordinate organisations to live, train and fight depends to a large extent on the actions of the staff of their superior headquarters. In the eyes of both superior and subordinate commanders and staff, the hallmark of a proficient headquarters is its staff's capacity to work in a timely, efficient and cooperative manner. Staff must not 'sit' on information. It is the responsibility of the staff to ensure that all relevant information is passed to subordinate and flanking formations and units.

109. **The Role of the Staff in Decision-making.** In practice, commanders focus the efforts of their staff by giving guidance and making the key decisions from which a framework of action is developed. By devolving decisions and setting priorities, commanders can concentrate on their own business of making the essential decisions applicable to their level of command. In lowering the level of routine internal decision-making, commanders allow their staff to act within their overall intentions and to take decisions within their own areas of responsibility. This is consistent with and an integral part of mission command.

110. **Qualities of a Staff Officer.** Many of the qualities required of commanders apply to staff officers. This is particularly so for senior staff officers in both national and multinational appointments who may have
considerable delegated powers of command or management authority and responsibility. Staff officers also work with subordinates and other support personnel and thus will be required to lead others. In addition to the fundamental quality of leadership, the following personal qualities grouped under character, intellect and industry typify a good staff officer:

a. Character. Staff officers must be loyal, tactful, trustworthy and supportive of their commander yet at the same time retain an independence of thought and judgment.

b. Intellect. Staff officers will not succeed unless they are professionally competent. This involves developing professional mastery of their area of responsibility or field of interest. They must be knowledgeable, imaginative, capable of anticipating and of acting and reacting in a flexible manner. This includes thinking and working under pressure and of communicating accurately, both verbally and on paper, with emphasis on clear, succinct powers of expression. Above all, they must be capable of taking a broader view of their responsibilities and not allow themselves to become too compartmentalised in outlook.

c. Industry. The object of most staffwork is to relieve the commander of routine and detailed work. Therefore, despite the requirements for originality and creativity, the reality of much staffwork is solid hard work, where a methodical, systematic approach and an eye for detail are necessary. If staff officers are responsible for a team, they must be able to delegate responsibility to subordinates, coordinate their work and present solutions based on team effort succinctly, accurately and on time.

SECTION 2-10. COMMAND NOT ON OPERATIONS

111. Non-operational activity generally occurs during the pre-conflict phase where an adversary contemplates or threatens the use of force to achieve their ends, and that period following exit from the post-conflict phase where situations are stabilised. The exercise of command outside of operations is primarily focussed on training but should be no different to that actually exercised during operations. The difference lies in the environment. The stark actuality of assuming responsibility for the lives of fellow soldiers under conditions of violence and uncertainty adds to the uniqueness of the command experience.
Commanders at all levels have an obligation to their soldiers to ensure they go into combat with the best chance of success and survival and this behaves them to remember the truism as you train, so you fight. This truism, based on years of experience often paid for in blood and lives, demonstrates a direct correlation between realistic training and success on the battlefield. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that individuals, teams and units under their command develop the tactical and technical proficiency required to enable them to accomplish their missions. This is achieved through rigorous individual, team and collective training in the necessary tactics, techniques, drills and procedures. The benefits of quality training and the adaptability of Australian soldiers to adjust to unfamiliar operational scenarios was demonstrated in the 1st RAR Battalion Group’s deployment to Somalia on Operation SOLACE in 1993.

By objective standards of soldiering and the opinions of NGOs, local Somali community organisations and senior foreign officers who commanded the Australians, the 1 RAR Group performed exceptionally well. Somalia was a dangerous, unhealthy place with a culture and climate that sapped the patience, tolerance and energy of Western-trained combat forces. Under David Hurley’s quiet and thoughtful leadership, initial expectations of fighting as a combat force against the warlords gave way to the disappointed recognition that, after asserting a presence through rigorous patrolling as well as search and clear operations, the 1 RAR group would be operating as a heavily armed police force, deterring hostile political and criminal groups from interfering with UN and NGO humanitarian activities. After reorienting their expectations, Australian soldiers individually and collectively achieved the right balance of aggression and compassion for humanitarian operations.

Operation SOLACE tested how well the Army’s individual and collective training systems had built on personal attributes to impart the leadership, military skills, knowledge and attitudes required for members of the 1 RAR Group to adapt and perform well in an unfamiliar operational environment. The Australian Army’s investment in meticulous individual training, the development of cohesive, close-knit teams and career training for NCOs paid off. The 1 RAR Group was able to deploy small groups of soldiers into isolated situations under the command of junior NCOs, confident that discipline would be tight, orders would be followed and common sense and initiative would apply.\footnote{Breen, B., A Little Bit of Hope – Australian Force Somalia, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1998, p 351.}
113. Commanders should concern themselves with the professional development of their subordinates to prepare them for positions of increased responsibility and to assume the next command level. Within its wider context, professional development includes fostering an interest in the conduct of war through the critical study of past campaigns and battles in order to learn relevant lessons for the future. In this respect, commanders should emphasise educating subordinates through battlefield tours, Tactical Exercises Without Troops and study periods to stimulate professional interest, evoke an understanding of the realities of war and widen military perspectives in peacetime.

114. Commanders also have a duty to employ common doctrine in the execution of command. This ensures that commanders, their staff and their subordinates work together in an efficient manner to a common purpose. Only in this way can unity of effort be achieved and maintained. The employment of a common doctrine for operations must not lead, however, to stereotypical planning for, and standard responses to, every situation. Doctrine provides fundamental principles to guide actions but requires judgment in its application. In this regard, commanders should also educate their staff in making appropriate and timely decisions, and the development of resulting plans. Opportunities to practise decision-making should be provided under realistic and demanding training scenarios.

115. The training and professional development of subordinates is a key responsibility of all commanders in peacetime and a core function which, if neglected, under-resourced or delegated without close supervision, will undermine the operational effectiveness and combat power of the team.

116. Aside from training and developing the competence of subordinates, a crucial part of the command responsibility is maintaining subordinates’ welfare, creating an ethical command climate and ensuring sufficient resources are available. An ethical command climate is built on the maintenance of individual and shared perceptions, moral values and attitudes, and requires commanders to lead by example. The availability of sufficient resources is essential if the preparedness of personnel and equipment is to be maintained at the required levels. Such resources, however, should not be obtained through deceit. Conversely, misappropriation of resources is not only fraudulent but also a sign of moral bankruptcy. Effective financial governance and accountability is achieved by promoting good personal administration, and equipment management and maintenance measures.
SECTION 2-11. COMMAND ON OPERATIONS

Types of Operations

117. An operation can be described as follows:

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training or administrative military mission. It is the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.\(^\text{15}\)

118. Operations fall broadly into two categories – ‘warlike’ and ‘non-warlike’. Warlike operations are those military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of casualties. These operations can include service in a declared war or conventional combat operations against an armed adversary; and peace enforcement operations, normally conducted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1945.\(^\text{16}\) Non-warlike operations are those military activities that are short of warlike and where the application of force is limited to self-defence. Casualties could occur but are not expected. Non-warlike operations can include hazardous duties such as bomb disposal, mine clearance and peacekeeping duties, normally conducted under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, 1945.\(^\text{17}\) Other non-warlike operations at the lower end of the continuum of conflict include humanitarian relief and emergency assistance.

Issues of Mandate

119. The path to conflict is dynamic, unpredictable and can vary in scale, intensity (tempo and degree of violence) and duration. Depending on the nature of conflict, this fact has significant implications for commanders particularly those on UN – sanctioned or UN – formed peace operations. The reality is that the distinction between peace enforcement (warlike) and peacekeeping (non-warlike) operations has become significantly


\(^{16}\) Chapter VII is essentially coercive and designed to deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression perpetrated by sovereign states. It provides scope for a graduated response to bring conflict to a conclusion, ranging from measures such as economic sanctions to the use of direct military force.

\(^{17}\) Chapter VI emphasises non-coercive means of settlement. Hence, the deployment of elements of the ADF pursuant to Chapter VI may be authorised by the UN Security Council in circumstances where there exists an agreement between all parties to a dispute.
blurred because conflict occurs on a broad spectrum of escalating violence. This can create uncertainty for commanders as the potential for a situation to escalate beyond the mandate authorised by the UN Security Council can leave forces stranded without the legal authority to apply such force as is necessary to contain a situation. This requires commanders to be clear about their mandate and in circumstances where a coalition is involved, be clear on any caveats imposed by foreign national command authorities for those foreign forces that may be under their command.

**Strategic Command Issues**

120. The ultimate decision on, and authorisation for, the employment of the ADF is the responsibility of the Australian Government. Military strategic commanders contribute to the Government's decision-making process through advice on the operational feasibility and implications of any proposed commitment. This advice will consist of available military response options including the preferred option, implications for concurrent operations elsewhere and the desired military strategic end-state of the proposed commitment. Deployment, redeployment, sustainment and financial considerations would also normally be addressed.\(^{18}\) In addition, military commanders must remain cognisant that they are unlikely to have primacy of command, as military involvement forms only one component of an integrated whole-of-Government response to issues of national security. To be effective, military strategic commanders must possess a broad understanding of national strategic issues as well as global political, social and economic factors and influences.

**The Execution of Operations**

121. The execution of operations can be simply described as putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.\(^{19}\) It is during the execution of operations that commanders at all levels most often confront the friction, uncertainty, violence and danger of land combat operations at their most severe levels. Execution, however, entails much more than just putting a plan into action. Commanders must, through their command support systems,

\(^{18}\) Such an arrangement was clearly demonstrated in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands in 2003. Overall command was vested in an Australian civilian diplomat as Special Coordinator. Command of the coalition military support contingent that included military personnel from Australia, Fiji, Tonga, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea was given to the Commander of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment.

\(^{19}\) *NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1, Command and Control of Land Forces*, 2001.
action. Commanders must, through their command support systems, monitor and maintain the continuity of operations. This requires continually proceeding through the various stages of the decision cycle, visualising the battlefield, making assessments and adjusting decisions and directing actions as the operation unfolds. This is necessary to prevent the adversary from seizing the initiative and executing a faster decision cycle. Assessment is particularly important given the fluid and dynamic nature of combat.

**SECTION 2-12. COMMAND ON MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL WAR**

122. Since the end of the Cold War, the upsurge in intra-state conflicts has placed new demands on armed forces of many countries. This reflects an international trend away from conventional war towards operations such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Since the 1980s, the ADF has deployed on multinational peace operations to places as diverse as Namibia, Somalia, Rwanda, Western Sahara, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), the Solomon Islands and East Timor. Humanitarian relief and evacuation operations have included mine clearance operations and clearance training in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia and Mozambique; drought and disaster relief in Indonesia (Irian Jaya), Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific; and evacuation operations in Cambodia and the Solomon Islands. The beginning of the 21st Century ushered in further challenges for the ADF with diverse activities including targeting the sources of terrorism in Afghanistan and peacekeeping, law enforcement and nation building in the Solomon Islands.

123. The Australian Government believes that this is an important and lasting trend, with significant implications for the ADF, and expects that the ADF will continue to undertake a range of operations other than conventional war in our own region and beyond over the next decade.²⁰ Implied in this is the expectation that the ADF will most likely be involved in these tasks either jointly, combined with allies or in coalition with regional partners.²¹


²¹. 'Joint' indicates activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participates. 'Coalition Operations' are military operations conducted in conjunction with, or in support of, the military forces of one or more other nations. 'Combined Operations' are a specific sub-set of coalition operations in which military operations are conducted in conjunction with alliance partners only.
124. Realistically, from an ADF perspective, the majority if not all future operations, be they short of war or otherwise, will most likely be in coalition rather than undertaken by the ADF operating unilaterally. While discussed under separate sections of this chapter, issues for command on operations other than war are equally valid for command on coalition operations. Command within coalition operations do, however, present specific challenges in addition to those of the ADF operating unilaterally and these are discussed further in Section 2-13.

Operational and Tactical Level Challenges

125. In operations other than war, the distinction between the operational and tactical levels of command can become particularly clouded. It is probable that in these types of operations, a tactical commander will have operational, as well as tactical level factors to consider in the exercise of command.

126. Unit or formation commanders, accustomed to training and operating at the tactical level, may be confronted with legal, political and media pressures normally associated with the operational level of command. Operations in this environment can present a special command challenge since the activities of relatively small units can have operational and even strategic impact. Therefore, there is a greater requirement for commanders at all levels to maintain a broader perspective and recognise the greater political and psychological impact of seemingly insignificant tactical activities and actions.

127. Command on operations other than war, therefore, places demands on commanders to enunciate clearly and effectively their vision and intent. When formulating their vision and intent, commanders should include clear political, psychological and military objectives and considerations. This will provide a focus for unity of effort among the force when conducting military missions and tasks and dealing with the plethora of other non-military agencies, civil authorities and NGOs.

SECTION 2-13. COMMAND ON COALITION OPERATIONS

128. The nature of Australia’s contribution to any given coalition may be single-Service or joint in nature, and could range from the provision of one or two individual personnel to more significant contributions in the form of formed units – or even coalition leadership. Coalition operations may cover the full spectrum of military operations, from disaster relief to high intensity armed conflict.
129. Not only are coalition operations a high priority for the ADF, it is also recognised that such operations are likely to occur and are not necessarily confined to Australia’s geographic region. This view is reinforced by Australia’s National Security – A Defence Update, 2003, that states:

The changed global strategic environment, and the likelihood that Australia’s national interests could be affected by events outside of Australia’s immediate neighbourhood mean that ADF involvement in coalition operations further afield is somewhat more likely than in the recent past. But involvement in coalition operations is likely to be of the type witnessed in Afghanistan, and which the Government has considered in Iraq if necessary – that is, limited to the provision of important niche capabilities.

130. The historical experience of the ADF is one of coalition operations. Most often this involvement has been as a junior partner in United States-led multinational forces. Since the late 1990s however, regional conflicts have seen Australia assume more responsibility in coalition leadership roles. The non-UN Peace Monitoring Group operation on Bougainville and the International Peace Monitoring Team deployment to the Solomon Islands were small-scale operations compared to the deployment of the International Force – East Timor (INTERFET) operation; the latter providing the ADF with valuable experience in building and leading a sizeable coalition force.

Strategic Realities

131. All military operations are an extension of political relations within or between states and are therefore carried out within a political context. Coalition operations are challenging and include a particularly complex web of political aspects because of the multiple nations involved and the international spotlight that inevitably comes with intervening in the affairs of another state. As for all military operations, military action must be combined with political action to restore stability.

132. The essential characteristic of coalition operations is that their objective is pursued and realised by the armed forces of two or more nations working towards an agreed endstate, usually without a formal alliance framework in place. Coalition operations may involve a large number of military forces with differing capabilities, each representing their own national

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interests and possibly inexperienced in operating with each other. Such operations are often ad hoc in nature, and these multinational dimensions add layers of complexity to the planning and conduct of the operation over and above the complexity that is already inherent in unilateral or combined military operations.

Operational Considerations

133. While the ADF places significant effort on developing interoperability with allies and traditional and regional partners, commanders engaged in coalition operations must be aware of the differences between the participants capabilities in terms of operating procedures, equipment, doctrine, training levels and cultural issues such as language, perceptions and religion. Incompatible technology and information systems, differences in map-marking symbology, disproportionate logistic capabilities and dissimilar cross-country mobility can also be expected. In addition, because of national restrictions, certain intelligence efforts might not be available to all national forces. Effective interoperability will depend on a common purpose, doctrine and technological compatibility as well as trust based on personal and professional relationships and well-developed cross-cultural skills. As stated by Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., Commandant of the United States Army War College:

*The antidote to the fog and friction of coalition warfare is not technology; it lies in trusted subordinates who can deal effectively with coalition counterparts.*

134. These interoperability considerations greatly increase the duties and responsibilities of commanders and their staff, and must be considered during the planning for an operation and as an integral component of training. Depending on the nature of the coalition operation, NGOs are also increasingly an integral part of peace operations associated with the provision of aid and medical care. While the requirement to establish security for these elements may be considered a distraction from the operational focus of the mission, military operations will have to continue to accommodate such voluntary organisations while the international community continues to rely on NGOs for humanitarian relief. It is inherent on commanders, therefore, to have effective civil-military liaison networks and procedures in place.


While key lessons from the INTERFET deployment included command and control, functional interoperability and logistical preparedness, the significance of cultural barriers to effective communication cannot be understated. As experienced during INTERFET, one of the real barriers to effective communication remained cultural.25 Addressing cultural issues may involve respecting religious holidays, modifying dress regulations, operating with the assistance of interpreters and making effective use of liaison officers. Gestures and body language may also impart different meaning across cultures. Clear communication is paramount particularly for briefings and orders groups. The Australian accent and speed of delivery has been known to cause difficulty even for English speaking coalition partners. This requires commanders down to the most junior levels to adapt to this fact.

Coalition Command Issues

Leadership of a coalition involves considerable cost and effort at the political, military, strategic and operational levels. The skills required of a coalition commander go well beyond those required for unilateral operations. The coalition commander must have highly accomplished political and diplomatic skills necessary to interact extensively with both military and political representatives of a wide range of nations, including the host nation, coalition partners, the UN, NGOs and the media. All these parties will be trying to achieve a range of political, social, economic, diplomatic and military objectives. The coalition commander and the staff must be prepared to accept and accommodate these differing and perhaps competing agenda.

The ultimate success of any coalition operation will be measured by the extent to which the commander and the staff are able to balance the national objectives of the participating nations with the mission’s overall objectives. The coalition commander is the public face of the coalition, and belief in the commander’s abilities will be a significant factor in ensuring support for the coalition and trust within it.

Clarity and Unity of Command are fundamental for effective command. Within coalitions there is the very real possibility that some contributing nations may not be familiar, experienced or comfortable with the philosophy of mission command and may require more prescriptive direction. This demands coalition commanders make command and control parameters very clear from the outset and ensure that subordinate commanders comprehend fully the extent of operational latitude provided by the command philosophy adopted.

25. ibid, pp 89-104.

2–44
139. Deficiencies in command and communication would also most likely intensify with higher operational tempos. The command structure for operations must ensure that unity of effort is achieved, while ensuring that national command objectives are not compromised. Placing forces under the command of another nation is a sensitive issue as it involves entrusting the care and use of a nation's military assets to a relatively unknown quantity. In addition, commanders at every level must remain aware that foreign contingent commanders have recourse to their own national command authorities. This normal maintenance of national links will complicate the operational chain of command and may impact on decision cycles. Commanders must also be prepared in the event that foreign national command authorities place caveats on the employment of their forces.

140. Unity of effort requires consensus building, which is possible only with a clear understanding and recognition of each contributing nation's requirements, capabilities and perceptions. Commanders at both the strategic and operational levels must maintain this consensus as the operation or campaign unfolds, despite the possible negative impact on the efficiency of their plans. However, while commanders must pursue coalition cohesion they must not lose sight of their mission. Coalition forces, by the very nature, present an adversary with an opportunity to exploit the collective will of a coalition; therefore, the exercise of command in this environment demands commanders of high ability.  

SECTION 2-14. CONCLUSION

141. To command a military organisation is to make decisions and impose one's will and transmit intentions to subordinates. It therefore encompasses the authority, responsibility and duty to act. Military command at all levels is the art of decision-making, motivating and directing all ranks to achieve missions. It requires a vision of the desired result; an understanding of concepts, missions, priorities and the allocation of resources; an ability to assess people and risks; and involves a continual process of re-evaluating situations. Commanders are required, above all, to decide on a course of action and to lead their command.

142. To command is the greatest privilege that can be bestowed upon an individual in the military. It lies at the heart of all activity and is unique in its requirement for leadership in conditions of complexity, uncertainty, risk, fear, danger and violence.

26. Coalition cohesion is a 'centre of gravity' for a multinational force, and an astute enemy will attempt to attack and undermine it. For example, Iraq's Scud missile attacks on Israel during the 1990-1991 Gulf War were probably intended to destroy Israeli civilian support for the conflict and produce a reaction to split the coalition's collective will.
CHAPTER 3
LEADERSHIP

SECTION 3-1. INTRODUCTION

1. Leadership is fundamental to the Australian Army. No operation in war or peace can be conducted effectively without the motivation and inspiration provided by a leader. Leaders develop their personal character, acquire knowledge and skills, and take action to inspire team members to achieve desired goals.

2. This chapter outlines the nature of leadership, the conceptual Defence and Army leadership frameworks, the principles of leadership behaviour and some issues in applying an Australian style of team leadership. The theoretical approaches to leadership are also discussed.  

SECTION 3-2. LEADERSHIP IN A COMMAND ENVIRONMENT

3. It is vital to understand the link between command and leadership. Command is the authority which is lawfully exercised by virtue of rank or assignment. Leadership is about influence. Commanders command organisations but lead people. In order to achieve missions, commanders influence officers and soldiers using a combination of legal authority bestowed through law and moral authority as a direct result of leadership. The unique aspect of leadership is that it is exercised in support of command authority, in conjunction with command authority and even in the absence of command authority. It is not necessary to be a commander to lead, but leadership is essential to exercise command. Leadership is not intended to replace or reduce command authority, but it produces more effective results because it engages troops at a deeper, more personal level.

4. The leadership challenge rests heavily on trust and mutual understanding. In effecting leadership in a command environment, the challenge for a commander is similar to that of a skilled horseman, 'to keep a strong grip and a loose rein at the same time'.

1. Detail on the Australian Army's approach to individual and team leadership is detailed in LWD 0-2 Leadership, 2002.
The Nature of Leadership

5. Annex A summarises various approaches to leadership. What is generally agreed is that leadership is not contingent upon a particular position or appointment, nor should it be confused with status, power or authority. Leadership is an interaction or dialogue between people. It is the essential integrating mechanism that affects all other systems and processes. Broadly, the many approaches within leadership theory suggest two essential roles for a leader:

a. to build interpersonal relations (or, 'relationship behaviour'); and
b. to achieve the task (or 'task behaviour').

6. These two roles which have certain characteristics and implications for leaders are summarised in Table 3–1.

Table 3–1: Characteristics and Implications of the Leadership Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Role</th>
<th>Key Characteristics</th>
<th>Implication for Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Relations</td>
<td>Interpersonal process affected by the situation (or context).</td>
<td>Character and Competence. This includes an ability to adapt behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Relationship Behaviour)</td>
<td>Influencing others towards achieving a specified task.</td>
<td>Define Purpose. The leader must define team purpose and focus, inspire and motivate the team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Followers are an active component of the process.</td>
<td>Build the Team. The leader must build an interdependent team in which members are able to make decisions. This includes mentoring people and developing relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve the Task</td>
<td>Goal setting beyond short term concerns.</td>
<td>Planning Direction. This is about long-term planning to fulfil defined goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Task Behaviour)</td>
<td>Decision-making and evaluating changes in the environment.</td>
<td>Diagnosis and Implementing Change. The leader must diagnose problems accurately, adapt plans and implement change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan and execute assigned tasks.</td>
<td>Communicate. This must be achieved in a manner that is generally understood and accepted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Influencing Factors

7. There are two broad factors that influence the nature of leadership. The first involves the organisational systems including culture, structure, and the policy and practices of the organisation (training, recognition and reward systems). The second aspect is the human element comprising variables such as personality, values, attitudes, perceptions, motivation and group processes, including communication systems and decision-making styles.

8. Leadership influence can be associated with either:
   a. Formal leadership which occurs when the Army appoints a leader of a team with the authority to guide and direct others; or
   b. Informal leadership which occurs when others unofficially give an individual, or individuals, power to guide and direct team behaviour. Informal leaders will emerge within any team over time.

Leadership Defined

9. There are many definitions of leadership. For the purposes of Army leadership training, leadership is defined as 'the art of influencing and directing people to achieve willingly the team or organisational goal.'

Components of the Leadership Task

10. Leadership style is directly linked to the essential roles identified in Table 3–1. The effectiveness of any leadership effort, however, always depends on the situation. In the definition of leadership outlined above, three components of the leadership process are clear:
   a. the leader (who influences);
   b. the team (because leadership is a process of influence, followers must be accepted as an integral part of the process); and
   c. the context (achievement of a goal that contributes to a wider ethical purpose).

11. implied in this definition is the indefinable nature of leadership that has as much to do with a leader's character (being) as it is action-based (doing). Thus, a leader must always remain aware of the interplay between the
three components involved in the process of leadership: the leader, the team and the context (see Figure 3–1).

![Figure 3–1: Components of the Leadership Task](image)

**The Challenge for Leaders**

12. The complex environment places different and challenging, even contradictory demands on leaders. Therefore, to remain effective, leaders are required to be adaptable and possess a broad range of skills. Some challenges leaders may need to consider include:

   a. *Finding New and Better Ways to do Things.* This requires the ability and capacity to challenge processes and change the status quo, to take risks, to innovate and to experiment.

   b. *Acceptance of Greater Levels of Responsibility.* This applies to both junior and senior leaders and requires a capacity for greater strategic understanding, autonomy and accountability.

   c. *The Implicit Need for Decision-making.* This requires an emphasis on judgment and management of risk and also the need for freedom of action by subordinates. There is a direct parallel with the philosophy of mission command, where higher commanders only communicate what is to be achieved (intent, concept of operations and tasks) and the resources required to complete the task. The superior does not dictate how tasks should be completed.
Leadership Emphasis

13. The central characteristics of Army leadership in action are:
   a. Far-sighted Vision and Clarity of Goals. All leaders need to think and plan strategically with the mission and task in mind.
   b. Drive and a Passion for Responsibility. While leaders should exhibit a drive for responsibility, they must also remain aware of the role of the team in the broader context.
   c. Effective Team Structure. Team structure provides a basis for team members to align their efforts in the pursuit of goals.

14. All leaders must seek to focus on outcomes and the long-term sustainability of the team, rather than on leadership style and the detail of how tasks are to be completed. Tasks or responsibilities should be delegated as necessary. Such an approach acknowledges that people have competency and provides individuals with the opportunity to use their own initiative.

SECTION 3-3. THE DEFENCE PEOPLE LEADERSHIP MODEL

15. Within the Defence Organisation, the leadership challenge is articulated through the Defence People Leadership Model. The model, which is the centrepiece of Defence's leadership development, identifies the behaviours that individuals can be held accountable for in the workplace. The model puts the onus on leaders to create the right environment so that people can give of their best. It is based on the belief that such an organisational environment must foster five principles that underpin good performance: challenge, elbow-room, feedback, self-esteem and pride. It is considered that these intangibles create the climate for success and have significant influence on retention and performance.

16. The construct of the Defence People Leadership Model, as illustrated in Figure 3–2, is that of a causal chain, where desired behaviours are underpinned by leadership capabilities, performance principles and the Defence values of professionalism, loyalty, innovation, courage, integrity and teamwork.
17. The performance principles, capabilities and behaviours desired of Defence's leaders are summarised in Table 3–2.

Table 3–2: Defence Performance Principles and Leadership Capability and Behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERFORMANCE PRINCIPLE</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP CAPABILITY</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenge</td>
<td>Defence leaders:</td>
<td>Articulate and communicate performance expectations. Explain where people’s contributions fit in. Exemplify the standard and encourage/assist others to perform to the standard. Measure performance and reward/sanction appropriately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People like a challenge and set new performance standards when they are clear about our purpose and understand where their contribution fits in.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elbow-room</td>
<td>Defence leaders:</td>
<td>Involve people in decision-making. Communicate the objective with clarity. Link direction to corporate goals. Ensure people have what they need to get the job done, within resources allocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are responsible, accountable, exercise self-direction and self-control when their supervisor involves them in decisions affecting their workplace and allows them to do their job.</td>
<td>Give meaningful direction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE PRINCIPLE | LEADERSHIP CAPABILITY | LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOUR
--- | --- | ---
Feedback | People exercise imagination and creativity to solve problems when they get constructive feedback on their ideas and are confident that communication lines are open. | Make communication a priority. | Tell it as it is. Make sure messages are understood. Listen and respond. Actively create a trusting environment.

Self-esteem | People who feel good about themselves do good work when their supervisor recognises a job well done – praise from supervisors enhances self-esteem. | Create the climate for success. | Take an interest in people as individuals. Explain people's roles in the organisational direction. Value and acknowledge people's contribution. Recognise people by name.

Pride | People are proud of the job they do and the organisation they work for when the organisation is making a meaningful contribution to society, engendering trust and mutual respect. | Persist until the job is well and truly done. | Celebrate the team's achievements. Continually review progress and adjust priorities. Help people understand why the job is important. Understand the resources necessary to complete the tasks.

SECTION 3-4. THE LEVELS OF ARMY LEADERSHIP

18. Within the Army, the practice of leadership is recognised at three levels; individual, team and organisational as illustrated in Figure 3–3. This perspective recognises that the foundation of leadership is based on individual character and competence with an emphasis on desired leader behaviour, as it is this that creates the foundation for the development of a level of trust between the leader and team members. A key assumption is that individuals must first develop themselves before they can realistically lead others. While individuals may spend much time developing professional mastery, the quality and character of the individual best defines leaders. Consequently, individual leadership forms the core for the practise of Army leadership.
The Individual Level of Leadership

19. The individual level of leadership concerns the development of personal character and competence, and involves a continual process that includes putting leadership into action. Individuals are naturally ingrained with certain values, attitudes and behaviours that are further influenced by their environment and upbringing. This influence of genetics and environment is commonly referred to as nature versus nurture and remains the subject of many academic debates.

20. In simple terms, the individual level of leadership can be expressed in the concept be, know and do as illustrated in Figure 3–4. This concept is based on the individuals ingrained attributes, referred to as be, that are developed through knowledge, know and actions, do. Over time, character is enhanced and competence is increased through an ongoing process of acquiring additional knowledge and gaining further experience. Knowledge generated from experience contributes to increased proficiency and mastery, and builds on the levels of competence gained.

Figure 3–3: Levels of Army Leadership
21. **Being.** At the core, *being* involves the development of character and values. Implicit in this is the requirement for reflection to understand oneself better, to live by the Army's values both on and off duty, and to instil the Army's values in subordinates through personal example.

22. Character is defined as those inner qualities of a person that are evident in behaviour that is positive and constructive in the development of self, relationships and community. Its roots are in a coherent belief and values system. Character is more than the sum of qualities a person might exhibit. It encompasses belief systems about individuals themselves, other people and the world, often rising out of a religious faith, but certainly out of beliefs about the meaning and purpose of life. Such belief systems produce qualities, attitudes and behaviours that are part of a person's identity, as distinct from those behaviours that are acted out in the development of a personal leadership style.
23. The morale, stamina and, therefore, the combat capability of an Army rely as much on the spiritual and moral qualities of its leaders and soldiers, as they do on physical fitness and skills – perhaps more so when under stress. There is ample evidence to indicate that operational service and adversity tend to focus people on what is important in life and sometimes leads to a complete re-evaluation of basic beliefs and life values. These spiritual and moral qualities are rooted in a person's character.

24. The power of inner strength drawn from a coherent belief and values system is no better illustrated than by the recollections of Signaller Hubert (Bert) Joseph Head, 8th Division Signals following his liberation after three and a half years as a Japanese prisoner of war during World War II. Bert barely survived Changi and the dreaded ironworks in Osaka, Japan. He variously described the latter as 'Dante's Inferno' and 'hell on earth,' far worse than his experience at Changi. In his book, which is a graphic and disturbing account of survival in the midst of misery and human suffering, Bert reflected on how his ordeal had focused his perspective on life's basic beliefs:

In pre-war years I had what might be termed an 'accepted' view of Christianity. I had accepted the beliefs of Christianity without giving them much, or any, thought. I had believed in a vague way that Christian teachings were the only worthwhile ones. I still feel that I would be a far better man today had I obeyed all the 'do's and don'ts' I had to listen to from the pulpit in my youth.

It is my firm belief now, however, that it doesn't matter at all whether a man is a Christian, a Jew, a Mohammedan or anything else. For each and every man on earth is answerable to his maker, not through his race, nor by the sect or religion by which he worships Him, nor by his sincerity in his faith in the precepts of his religion or church, but by his own individual spiritual and moral life. God is all merciful, irrespective of what a man's beliefs may be. And whatever our race and our creed, we all know deep in our hearts just how worthy or unworthy we are of being truthfully known as Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, or what you will, and thus of eventually meriting God's blessings.

2. Head recalled that the heat, din, confusion, bedlam, slavery and barbarism of the ironworks were the physical manifestation of images by the artist Gustave Doré of Dante Alighieri's literary work 'Inferno' published in 1314.

25. Character is particularly pertinent to soldiering in the way it strengthens a soldier to be committed to the team, to have courage, to display moral leadership and to endure under stress. It helps individuals remain consistent in the face of competing ideologies and propaganda, yet develop tolerance of other belief and value systems in fellow soldiers, the Australian multicultural society and overseas environments. The Battle of Maryang San, fought by 3 RAR in Korea during October 1951 was cited by the Official War Historian Robert O’Neill as probably the greatest single feat of the Australian Army during the Korean War. This battle also exemplifies the strength of individual character in the face of adversity. For Arthur ‘Bushy’ Pembroke, MC, Platoon Commander 9 Platoon, the character of his men had a profound impact on him. He recalled:

It’s so difficult to sum up my impressions after 40 years. Perhaps among the main ones were a feeling of inadequacy compared with competent, experienced NCOs. Difficulty in understanding how 9 Platoon’s part fitted in the overall plan. An initial sense of not really being part of the battle; the look on the faces of the men as they stood over their fallen mates; the comradeship and steadfastness of the men of 9 Platoon who uncomplainingly did everything that was asked of them and more. Above all, a frightening but most humbling experience. I shall never forget what the NCOs and men of 9 Platoon taught me about soldiering and the essential human values of living and dying.4

26. Knowing. Knowing not only requires technical and interpersonal competence but also an appreciation of the strengths and needs of others. Effective leaders will continually seek out opportunities to enhance their knowledge to master both current and future assignments. Knowing requires individuals, regardless of ability, to develop professional mastery. This is done by continually seeking knowledge and refining the interpersonal and conceptual skills required of the leadership task and the technical and tactical skills necessary to achieve desired outcomes.

27. Doing. Doing is about leadership in action and the acquisition of experience. It includes influencing others, taking action to achieve tasks and improving the team’s ability to undertake future missions. It requires the skill of discernment – to critically assess and respond to situations, to operate creatively within the environment and be aware of the consequences of actions.

The Team Level of Leadership

28. The team level of leadership is about the direct relationship between leaders and subordinates. It involves the leader, the team and the context focussed on an enduring need for results. Leadership at the team level is the least complex. It serves to satisfy both individual and organisational needs. Effective team leadership requires an ability to harness the talents of the team in order to achieve complex tasks that could not be completed by individuals working alone.

29. Within this process, there is both an emotional and intellectual relationship between a leader and team members, the essence of which is leading from the front in an open, adaptive style. Teamwork requires trust and two-way loyalty. The key team leadership tasks illustrated in Figure 3–5 are as follows:

a. **Setting Direction.** Setting direction is achieved through the establishment of a clear purpose and a shared vision.

b. **Building the Team.** Team building is achieved by using an appropriate balance of power and participation to encourage commitment.

c. **Managing the Team.** Team management is necessary to achieve an integrated picture of the situation and build collaborative processes to achieve the mission. This includes developing and adapting plans as necessary.
Further information necessary to apply the Australian Army's approach to individual and team leadership is contained in LWD 0-2 Leadership, 2002.

The Organisational Level of Leadership

The organisational level of leadership is about controlling and influencing the larger team, utilising staff and subordinate leaders, through a range of varied and complex events. It is sometimes referred to as institutional or executive level leadership. Organisational leadership is also the level of leadership at which the Army ethos is defined, identity is established and the Army culture is aligned with its ethos. Organisational leaders, therefore, must craft the desired leadership culture and environment and, in developing subordinate leaders, create a system that routinely fosters leadership and results from the everyday efforts of ordinary people.

There are two components to organisational leadership. The first component involves the scope and complexity of the leadership task, which is broader and the span of command greater than that experienced at the team level. The leadership impact at the organisational level is less direct than that achieved through team leadership. Leaders exert their influence more through policy making and establishing the organisational climate than through direct face-to-face contact with soldiers. This does not suggest leadership from afar. Effectiveness at this level requires leaders to make every opportunity to meet with junior ranks to learn first hand about the issues that affect them.
33. Secondly, at the organisational level, leaders must understand the wider environment and be able to provide strategic focus and direction. The strategic component involves defining organisational direction, allocating resources and communicating the strategic vision. Organisational leaders work in an uncertain environment on highly complex problems that affect and are affected by events and organisations outside of the Army. They must be able to build relationships and manage the process of organisational adaptation both internally and externally. This may involve simple change to structures and systems that are easily accomplished. It may also involve more radical change, such as cultural change, that is far harder to achieve. Leadership at this level demands the forging and sustaining of a strong consensus and understanding among many internal and external stakeholders such as the Army’s soldiers, regimental and corps associations, the sister services of the ADF, other government departments, the Australian public, the Australian Government, allies and regional partners.

SECTION 3-5. THE ARMY LEADERSHIP MODEL

Army Leadership – Conceptual Framework

34. The Army Leadership Model (ALM) provides a conceptual framework for effective leadership practice and outstanding teamwork that can be applied to relevant situations. The ALM is a product of research based on a number of leadership approaches with the emphasis on desired leader behaviour primarily concerned with defining purpose and the maintenance of effective relationships. This is achieved through a values based and adaptive leadership style within the culture and environment of the organisation. The application of the ALM is fundamental to creating a leadership culture within the Army. It provides practical guidance on the exercise of leadership and the process of becoming a more effective leader.

Elements of the Army Leadership Model

35. The elements of the ALM are illustrated in Figure 3–6. The model is based on a systems approach in which the components of a system are seen and understood as parts of a complex set of interrelationships. The model incorporates and extends the functional approach to leadership, (encompassing task, group maintenance and individual needs) and embraces key elements of leadership research: understanding the role of purpose, style and context in the practice of leadership.
36. The ALM is applied from the centre outwards by focussing on vision, functional needs, leadership style, culture and environment. The Army's ethos and core values are foundational elements in the ALM, and each of the elements can be applied, with some adaptation, across the individual, team and organisational levels of leadership. The ALM elements, summarised in the following paragraphs, are discussed in detail in *LWD 0-2 Leadership*, 2002.

![Figure 3–6: The Army Leadership Model](image)

**Vision**

37. The primary responsibility of a leader is to define the team's purpose and identity. Providing direction is central to the task of leadership. It equips leaders and their teams with the essential knowledge of their current position, future direction, the means to achieve this and the proposed organisational end-state. Organisational vision acts as glue that holds teams together and maintains momentum despite adversity. Its
placement in the model emphasises the central nature of vision. The leader has a key role in articulating the vision and defining it clearly for all unit and team members.

Functional Needs

38. The functional approach to leadership is based on John Adair’s theory of group needs encompassing task, group maintenance and individual needs.\(^5\) Within the Army context, however, the group is more often referred to as the team. This adaptation is reflected in Figure 3–7. Although quite distinct in themselves, the three areas overlap and action taken to satisfy one need will affect one or both of the other areas. The theory of group needs determines that a leader must be able to identify the needs that exist within a group and effectively provide for these needs.

![Functional Needs Diagram](image)

**Figure 3–7: Functional Needs**

Leadership Style

39. An individual's personal leadership style is a combination of personality, character and behaviour. A leader's ability to employ a range of appropriate behaviours is vital. An effective style involves a blend of appropriate behaviours; a skill that matures over time. To adapt an approach to a situation assumes a leader has, among other attributes, self-knowledge and sound interpersonal skills, and is able to move beyond a reward and punishment method of task achievement.

40. The ALM outlines the following selected components of leadership style as portrayed in Figure 3–8:

a. **Participative Behaviour.** Participative behaviour suggests a scale from high follower participation (collaborative) to low follower participation (directive) in problem solving and decision-making. The types of leader behaviour are not ingrained, rather they are approaches that are situationally dependent.

b. **Motivating Behaviour.** Motivating behaviour is concerned with persuading people to act willingly, through leader influence and motivation, to achieve organisational objectives and transcend their normal levels of performance. It includes two distinct and supportive processes, ‘transforming’ and ‘incentive-based’ (transactional) leadership. Transforming leadership, also referred to as transformational leadership, influences and transforms the leader-follower relationship by making followers aware of the importance of task outcomes and enabling them to sacrifice their own self-interest for the sake of the team. Incentive-based leadership uses transactional consequences (reward and punishment) to motivate or influence behaviour towards the completion of a task.

41. Over time and in response to specific situations, leaders will blend the two behaviours into a personal leadership style that motivates followers towards the shared vision or particular task. A balance in style is required, with more effective leaders being consistent in terms of personality and character, yet flexible in terms of team participation and motivational influence.

![Figure 3–8: Components of Leadership Style](image-url)
Culture

42. Culture is an essential leadership consideration as it is from within the Army culture that leaders must operate. Culture comprises those symbols, expressed values and underlying assumptions that form the basis of shared understanding within a group, as illustrated in Figure 3–9. Myths and legends, ethos, ethics, loyalty as well as the Army's expressed values of courage, initiative and teamwork are typical of the wider Army culture. A number of discrete sub-cultures also exist and some of these may be in conflict with one another.

![Figure 3–9: Elements of Culture](image)

43. Leaders create team culture when the team is initially formed. Once a culture exists, it determines the leadership values of the organisation and thus determines who will or will not assume leadership. Leadership practice takes place within this culture, and if leaders do not remain conscious of the culture within which they are embedded, that culture will prove overwhelming. While cultural understanding is desirable for all, it is essential for those who lead.
Environment

44. Environment is a dynamic entity that requires the Army to adjust to Defence, governmental, national, economic and societal pressures. It is imperative that leaders within a team or organisation are aware of the environment that influences and even constrains their actions. To adapt to these changes, leaders need to maintain a broad perspective and monitor and respond to factors in the environment that will impact on the team in the operational sense. Environment, as illustrated in Figure 3–10, includes a broad range of factors such as:

a. **Internal Factors.** Internal factors include the climate within the team (e.g., mood and morale) as well as the impact of organisational structure and processes.

b. **External Factors.** External factors include political, economic and social considerations, the impact of technology, and even regional and international issues.

![Figure 3–10: Components of Environment](image-url)
45. Once leaders clearly define the vision, they must ensure that the team's internal environment is aligned with that vision. The leader must also align the team with the external environment. Aligning a team in a dynamic world is a constant challenge, and leaders must adopt a broad perspective when examining any given situation rather than relying on isolated snapshots of a problem.

SECTION 3-6. THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOUR

46. Leaders must be able to adapt to any given situation and the application of some key principles assists in this task. The principles of leadership behaviour and their relationship to various components of the ALM can be used as a tool to assess the current leadership situation in a team or organisation, and can also be used as an action plan for individual improvement. The principles of leadership behaviour in the Australian Army have withstood the test of time and are useful for self-assessment and in developing a personal leadership style.

Be Proficient

47. Soldiers trust leaders who are confident in their own abilities. Confidence comes with technical and tactical proficiency – knowing how to do the job both in theory and in practice. Leaders will never gain the respect of their soldiers unless they are proficient in their job. They must not bluff, as such behaviour will be seen through sooner or later. Worst of all, poor proficiency can jeopardise lives in combat. Proficiency can be attained through a combination of formal training, on-the-job experience and self-improvement. Successful leaders recognise that developing proficiency is a lifelong pursuit. It is the capacity to develop and improve skills that distinguishes good leaders from others. They have the self-discipline to develop themselves.

Know Yourself and Seek Self-improvement

48. Gaining insight into one's strengths and weaknesses requires putting aside time for personal reflection on individual performance and considering the feedback provided by superiors. Knowing oneself and making a conscious effort to improve lays the foundation for knowing others. The more leaders are aware of their own values, needs and biases the less likely they will be to impose these values and biases on others. Leaders will be also able to consistently act in a manner that reflects their values, gaining them credibility with the members of their team. This
principle complements the first. Become knowledgable and stay knowledgeable.

Seek and Accept Responsibility

49. Being a leader will always involve responsibility. Leaders must be prepared to accept those responsibilities passed from superiors and those demands placed on them by subordinates. Beyond stated responsibilities, superiors expect subordinate leaders to take the initiative in accordance with the commander's intent and to train and encourage their subordinates to seek responsibility. The example set by leaders in assuming responsibility helps to shape the team.

Lead by Example

50. Soldiers expect their leader to be a role model. The purest form of leadership is example and no aspect of leadership is more powerful. If the leader expects courage, competence, candour, discipline, commitment and integrity from followers, then the leader must personally demonstrate those qualities. High, but attainable, standards should be set, and the leader should be willing to do what is required of the rest of the team, and to share dangers and hardships with team members. Good leaders know when to listen, when to act and when to refocus their energies.

Provide Direction

51. The team must understand its purpose. Its members need to know the nature of the task to be completed, the standard to be achieved and the timeframes within which it is to be achieved. Being able to analyse the superior commander's intent and operate within the environment of mission command is essential for success. In the absence of orders, the leader and the team should have the skills, knowledge and initiative to act in accordance with the commander's vision. Use of the established chain of command and clarity of communication is vital to effectively provide direction.

Know and Care for Your Subordinates

52. The individual soldier is the foundation on which leadership must be based. Leaders must commit time and effort to listen to their soldiers and learn about and recognise their individual differences. They must strive to understand what drives their soldiers and what is important to them. Leaders who show genuine concern for their team will find that the team will in turn trust and respect them. Failure to care for subordinates during
training will send the message that little value is placed on their lives in battle.

Develop the Potential of Your Subordinates

53. Delegating authority enables subordinates to develop their potential as leaders. When a leader is willing to delegate authority, he/she indicates trust in the team and will foster an environment in which team members seek more responsibility. It is the leader's responsibility to create conditions in which subordinates' potential may flourish. Delegating authority should not be confused with command responsibility, which cannot be delegated.

Make Sound and Timely Decisions

54. Leaders must be able to rapidly assess a situation and make sound decisions. Delay or indecision will lead to loss of confidence and confusion. Good decisions made at the right time are better than the best decisions made too late. Successful leaders do not have all the answers all the time. They do, however, have to be prepared to endorse a decision to act when necessary.

Build the Team and Challenge its Abilities

55. Soldiering is a team activity. The leader must develop a camaraderie among subordinates that motivates them to willingly and confidently meet all challenges. Subordinates need confidence in the leader's ability to lead them and in their own ability to perform as members of the team. Individuals will perform better when they share the goals and achievements of the group. Subordinates will gain satisfaction from performing tasks that are reasonable and challenging but will be frustrated if tasks are too easy, unrealistic or obviously unattainable. These goals set people up for failure and bring about the collapse of morale and discipline.

Keep Your Team Informed

56. Success depends upon team support. Individual soldiers have changed the outcome of battle using initiative in the absence of orders but withholding information makes initiative dangerous. Keeping subordinates informed helps them to make decisions and execute plans within the commander's intent, encourages initiative and improves teamwork.
57. Soldiers who are well informed are less likely to be influenced by rumour, and their morale and confidence will be higher. Soldiers will look for logic in orders and in a high trust environment should question when logic is absent. They expect the leader to keep them informed and, when possible, explain reasons for instructions. Leaders will need to work hard at building these relationships through mutual respect and open communication.

SECTION 3-7. DETERMINING LEADERSHIP STYLE

58. The application of leadership is focused on influencing subordinates and building team relationships to achieve assigned tasks. Within the Army, leaders (in command positions) are appointed and thus are able to enforce behaviour when they are unable to persuade by force of character. Effective leadership, however, is concerned with influencing without the need to use force and obtaining willing obedience, confidence, respect and loyalty.

59. The components of the leadership task introduced in Section 3-2, identified that the effectiveness of the interpersonal relationship between the leader and subordinates depends on the situation and context in which leadership is applied. The two situational extremes for any leader are whether leadership is to be exercised in combat or peace.

60. Leadership on the battlefield is different from leadership in a peacetime environment. In an environment of low stress and certainty, a participative style in decision-making may be appropriate. In war or crisis situations, a more directive style may be preferred, even necessary. Importantly, effectiveness in battle is based on a flexible leadership style that is largely developed during peace. How leaders shape and balance the ranges of participative and motivating behaviour will define their style. This style will reflect the individual’s own ethics, beliefs and personal value system and will vary within the parameters individuals define for themselves. Importantly for leaders, while the approach they adopt will differ from situation to situation, each individual must retain their own personal style and be consistent in its application.

61. Effective leadership is a result of observed and perceived leader behaviour over an extended period of time and is influenced by factors such as loyalty, trust, competence and credibility. Leadership, therefore, demands an adaptive style in which the use of moral authority helps create and maintain the conditions under which subordinates can most effectively perform their duties.
SECTION 3-8. ISSUES IN APPLYING LEADERSHIP

The Requirements of Service

62. The ultimate requirement is to lead soldiers into battle. Thus, the Army has specific requirements of each individual as a leader and a strong ethos and values system that all those joining the Army must embrace. These ethos and values are supported by specific requirements of service. These requirements, described in more detail in Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 36-3, Inherent Requirements of Service in the Australian Defence Force, 27 July 1998, are:

   a. operational service;
   b. a military system of command and discipline;
   c. unrestricted service;
   d. proficiency in military and trade skills;
   e. regular postings within Australia and sometimes overseas, including deployments at short notice;
   f. maintenance of high standards of physical and medical fitness;
   g. regulation of personal lifestyle in certain areas; and
   h. adherence to dress and grooming standards.

Professionalism

63. The Army demands from its people a high standard of conduct, discipline, judgment, ethical behaviour and a degree of accountability for actions in the performance of duties. This is referred to as professionalism. The high standards demanded reflect the uncertainties and demands of the operational environment in which soldiers are required to serve. Soldiers must also possess a range of knowledge and a level of competence to undertake tasks.

64. Achieving the required level of competence, however, is insufficient. Every leader has a professional responsibility to continually develop and attain a broader and deeper appreciation of the leadership task. This is not restricted to leadership but all aspects contributing to the development of professional mastery. This is achieved through the concept of study,
practice and feedback. The commander's obligation to maximise their unit's fighting power is a compelling reason to deliberately develop the leadership abilities of all leaders within their command. Commanders should deliberately plan and execute subordinate leadership development. It must transcend the more urgent but less important day-to-day tasks. The development of leaders has implications far greater than those routine events of the week, the month or even the year.

At the individual level, all leaders should continually seek out information, study, learn and practise new leadership techniques and seek feedback on their performance. Experience from multinational coalition operations indicates that leaders must be more politically and culturally sophisticated and must maintain currency in terms of developments within the Army and in the wider environment. At the team level, superiors should assist subordinates with their development by jointly designing developmental action plans that provide relevant information for learning, providing opportunities to use what they learn, and providing various forms of performance feedback. Organisational commanders should establish the programs to achieve developmental goals and objectives. The commander's programs should address the three components of the leadership development concept: study, practice and feedback.

The institutional and operational environments will provide the student of leadership with information for their development, but it is the individual's motivation and conceptual ability that will determine learning from the acquired information. The development of subordinate leadership is imperative. It is a responsibility shared by the leader, the direct supervisor, the commander and the Army. There is no greater or longer lasting contribution a commander or supervisor can make to improve the individual, team and unit to shape the Army of the future.

Adaptation to Organisational Culture

Australia's culture and that of the Army require unique leadership practices. Likewise, cultural preferences influence leadership style. Reasonably, leadership should respect and embrace hard-won traditional qualities such as impartiality, fairness, initiative and compassion. This is not, however, a justification for the reinforcement of any emotional attachment to the past. There is a need to balance military heritage with the requirement to challenge less useful practices and embrace innovation and new ideas.
Leadership Effectiveness

68. It would not be realistic to list a single complete guideline for effective leadership. As stated previously, leadership is a complex process that involves the leader, the team members and the overall context. A simple measure of effectiveness is the degree of success with which a team performs the primary assigned tasks. Yet, any measure must also consider the longer-term impact of any effort by the team as well as the ethics of the method adopted.

69. Effective leadership requires four basic conditions to be satisfied. It requires the team:
   a. to understand what it is being asked to do,
   b. to have the resources to do what is being asked,
   c. to believe that the actions being asked are consistent with personal values and interests, and
d. to believe that the actions are consistent with the purpose and values of the team and wider organisation.

SECTION 3-9. LEADING THE TEAM

Team Leadership Tasks

70. The key team leadership tasks were identified in Figure 3–5 as setting direction, building the team and managing the team. Figure 3–11 expands on this illustrating the process of leading a team with the leader as the central link.
71. The Leader. The leader must demonstrate the team vision through behaviour and commitment. Communication skills will be essential to allow the vision to be conveyed in language readily understood by team members. Effective leadership guidance is crucial in team development. It involves responsibility for developing individual talent, providing opportunity for growth and challenges which will enable team members to learn and grow in confidence.

72. Setting Direction. It is crucial for leaders to ensure that they quickly establish a clear understanding of role, mission and tasks. This statement must be easily understood and meaningful to the team.
73. **Building the Team.** Leaders should focus on the interdependent aspects of the group to ensure its effectiveness. Being aware of the stages in team development will assist leaders in establishing norms and standards that support a commitment to a shared goal. Guiding individuals and creating a decision-making climate will activate freedom of action and risk-taking within defined boundaries. This will require leaders to recognise the various talents in team members and harness these to assist the team to operate more effectively.

74. **Managing the Team.** Managing involves planning a means of achieving the goal or vision using available time and resources. Without planning and robust processes, the team is unlikely to be effective. Leaders must be flexible, receptive to feedback and able to implement change as necessary. If team members are excluded from the planning, problem solving and execution phases, the leader may be under-utilising the skills and resources of the team. Leaders will achieve the best results and commitment through involvement of all team members.

### Teams and Teamwork

75. Teamwork refers to the environment of trust, support, interdependence and group effort that each leader must create and sustain. This is not necessarily easy for the leader to achieve.

76. Effective teamwork requires structures and processes appropriate to the goals of the team. For example, a tactical team designed to execute a clear task requires a simple structure and highly refined processes. All teams must be based on a capable group of individuals who are committed to a common purpose. Within the Army, team members need to be action-oriented and possess a sense of urgency. Strong team identification is also crucial. Pre-selection or other strategies that match the personal characteristics of individuals to the objectives of the team may increase its chances of success. 'Maurie' Pears, a platoon commander serving with the 1st and 3 RAR in Korea and Japan recollects the following:

> I learnt many things about battle in Korea, principal of which is that 'the team ('mateship') is everything'. No individual, no matter how brilliant, can achieve anything by himself. Korea taught me to care for my men and they will care for me. They were as close to family as I

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6. The stages of group (team) development are commonly referred to as 'forming', 'norming', 'storming', 'performing' and 'adjourning'. Team development is discussed in Chapter 4 of *LWD 0-2 Leadership*, 2002.
will ever get. They proved to be my investment in the future and I was repaid a hundredfold.7

Developing Excellence in Teamwork

77. All teams can develop excellence to some degree through progressively improving the processes used. The characteristics of effective teamwork described below are illustrated in Figure 3–12.

![Figure 3–12: Characteristics of Excellent Teamwork](image)

78. **Common Goals and a Shared Vision.** High performance teams have both a clear understanding of the goal to be achieved and a belief that it is worthwhile or important. Allowing a shift in focus away from the goal, for political or individual reasons, may result in ineffective teams.

79. **A Results-driven Structure.** A team must have a structure that is appropriate to its specific performance objective.

80. **A Collaborative Climate.** A collaborative climate ensures that teams work well together. Collaboration thrives in a climate of mutual trust between team members. It allows the team to stay problem-centred, with a free exchange of information and communication. Involving team members and ensuring their autonomy will promote collaboration.

81. **High Standards.** Setting standards of excellence raises the level of individual standards and thus has a direct impact on the final result. Standards are influenced by a number of factors including individual expectations, team pressure to meet objectives, concern over the likely consequences of failure, or from leadership that inspires and demands the achievement of certain outcomes.

82. **Unified Commitment.** A shared purpose and commitment creates a strong sense of team spirit and unselfishness. There is a positive link between active participation by team members and their level of commitment. This also requires leaders to deal effectively with non-contributing team members.

83. **Competent Team Members.** Both interpersonal and technical skills are necessary to achieve results. Personal competencies are more difficult to define than technical competencies and can vary from team to team, but overall there must be a strong desire within the team to contribute and work together effectively. This requires team members to have clear roles.

84. **Team Leadership.** Effective leaders focus on the vision or goal, on managing change and on harnessing the energy and talent within the team. This approach has three dimensions:
   
a. what the team expects from the team leader, including impartiality, personal focus and commitment, openness, and a willingness to confront and resolve issues;

b. what the team members expect from one another: competence, collaboration, team commitment, trust, support, sharing of information and constructive response to feedback; and

c. the decision-making climate: different climates make it is possible for team members to act confidently on their own, to make choices and take risks, rather than be powerless and dependent on the leader.
85. Leadership, although a complex subject, is also a common and naturally occurring phenomenon. Regardless of role or context, every officer and soldier must be able to lead and continually seek opportunities to develop. The more leadership is supported and encouraged, the more it will flourish. Within a complex environment, the importance of having a clear purpose and direction, strong values and organisational belief increases. These attributes enhance team flexibility and responsiveness and are the foundations for long-term success. Strong leadership, coupled with clear direction and a sense of purpose, comprises a formidable combination. The capacity to lead must also be coupled with the practical skills to manage day-to-day situations ranging from administration to working with people to resolve issues that require an immediate response.

Annex: A. Theoretical Approaches to Leadership
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP

SECTION 3-1. INTRODUCTION

1. The historical development of leadership studies has progressed from an approach based on individual traits through behavioural studies to situational considerations and that of transformational leadership. For potential leaders, an understanding of the various approaches helps focus on the key factors that define successful leadership.

SECTION 3-2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES

2. Most research falls into one of four approaches: personality traits, behavioural style, power and influence, and situational or contingency theory. These are discussed in the following paragraphs. Other more current leadership theories such as participative leadership, transformational leadership and Senge's 'Learning Organisation' are also considered.

Personality Traits

3. One of the earliest approaches concerned the personal attributes of a leader. This approach, also referred to as the great-man theory, suggests that leaders are born with certain qualities or traits. While over 70 years of research has failed to find 'traits' that would guarantee leadership success, there are some consistent traits that separate leaders from non-leaders. These are:
   a. intelligence;
   b. honesty and integrity;
   c. self-confidence;
   d. ambition and high energy;
e. task-relevant knowledge;

f. the desire to lead;

g. high self-monitoring (that is individuals who are highly flexible in adapting their behaviour to different situations); and

h. emotional intelligence (an awareness and responsiveness to the feelings of oneself and others).

4. There are also traits associated with the transformational and charismatic leadership approaches. Charismatic leaders are, for example, said to possess an indefinable quality. Research has identified strong personal characteristics such as high self-confidence, vision and the ability to articulate this vision, extraordinary behaviour and environmental sensitivity.

5. Overall, the relationship of traits to effective leadership is well defined. The prime reason traits fail to guarantee leadership success is that factors that influence group performance, such as the situation and culture, are largely ignored. To understand leadership there is also a need to look at behavioural style.

Behavourial Style

6. Unlike traits that represent personality-based characteristics, behavioural style refers to consistent behaviours or actions that are seen by others as representing a leader's style. These styles are concerned with what a leader does in a particular situation.

7. Early work by theorists such as Kurt Lewin suggested that leaders were either autocratic or democratic. Major studies by the Ohio State University and Michigan University defined common behavioural styles. Blake and Mouton from the University of Texas represented these approaches in a 'managerial grid' along two dimensions – concern for people and concern for production (task). The managerial grid illustrated in Figure 3–13 provides a useful explanation of five different behavioural leadership styles.

Figure 3–13: The Managerial Grid
8. Later, studies in Scandinavia identified a third factor that captured more of the essence of leadership behaviour. The factor, termed *development-oriented behaviour*, values experimentation, the seeking of ideas and the generation and implementation of change. These perspectives on behavioural styles (people, development and task or production) define three dimensions of leader behaviour as illustrated in Figure 3–14.

![Figure 3–14: Three Dimensions of Leader Behaviour](image)

9. **Task versus Maintenance Functions.** Another way of expressing the scope of behaviour is in terms of task or maintenance functions. For any group to work effectively as a team, both functions must be performed. These functions can be performed in an ad hoc fashion by the group as a whole or coordinated by a single person, the leader. The leader's style will dictate whether this is done personally or whether it is shared among other individuals. The functions are grouped under the two broad headings as listed in Table 3–3.²

Table 3–3: Task and Maintenance Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task (directive)</th>
<th>Maintenance (supportive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiating</td>
<td>Encouraging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-seeking</td>
<td>Compromising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosing</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion-seeking</td>
<td>Clarifying, summarising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluating</td>
<td>Standard-setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Power and Influence

10. To understand leadership, the influence process between leaders and followers needs to be examined. To be able to influence and direct others, an individual must exercise some form of power over them. Power, in this instance, should not be given authoritative connotations but should be seen as the relationship that exists between people within groups. There are many sources of power and influence including:

a.  *Position or Legitimate Power.* Position or legitimate power is power that is delegated to an appointed commander. It will include certain legal obligations and responsibilities. Influence is gained through the establishment of set rules and procedures.

b.  *Physical or Coercive Power.* Physical or coercive power is generally concerned with punishment for non-compliance. Influence is gained through force. The threat of punishment can be a strong motivator to comply. It can be properly sanctioned, such as through the *Defence Force Discipline Act,* or not sanctioned such as through abuse of authority.

c.  *Expert Power.* Expert power is related to knowledge and skills. Individuals with expert power are able to influence others because of their competency in a particular field or area. In highly technical or specialist areas, subordinates may possess more expert power than their superiors. Again, influence is gained through rules and procedures.

d.  *Personal or Referent Power.* Certain people have a quality about them that others like or are attracted to. This is often referred to as charisma. Influence is gained through persuasion and the individual’s desire to identify with the qualities displayed by the individual with referent power.
e. **Resources and Reward Power.** Influence and control are exercised through the allocation of resources or rewards, generally for compliance or as an exchange. This type of power is only effective if individuals value the rewards being offered.

f. **Informational Power.** People may be able to influence others, because they possess some information that is needed to achieve a certain outcome. Often it may be used together with expert power but the specific information may not be the result of expertise. For example, a sapper may be able to influence decisions about breaching an obstacle because of observations from another team where a particular approach was found to be effective.

11. Each leader will use some (one or more) forms of power and methods of influence. The most effective leaders use a combination of sanctioned power sources and influence mechanisms simultaneously.

**Situational (Contingency) Approach**

12. The behavioural approach to leadership proved popular until theorists realised that it did not provide a complete picture of leadership. Contingency approaches emphasise the importance of the context in which leadership occurs. The context can be related to the nature of work, the environment and the characteristics of followers (such as skills and level of experience or maturity).

13. Fred Fiedler's contingency theory combined behavioural style (relationship and task orientation) and organisational situation (quality of relationships, task structure and power position) to try to explain leadership. One of the basic conclusions from Fielder's model is that a leader who is effective in one situation may be ineffective in another. Leaders, therefore, needed to recognise this and understand the impact that different situations may have on their effectiveness.

14. The Hershey and Blanchard situational leadership model focuses on follower maturity. In this approach, the characteristics of the team determine the appropriate leader style, which could be one of delegating, facilitating, coaching, or directive. The central idea of this model is that, as follower maturity increases, a leader should rely more on relationship behaviour (providing support) and less on task-oriented behaviour (providing guidance). Beyond a certain level of maturity, however, a leader should rely less on both task-oriented and relationship-oriented behaviours. This pattern, showing the changing leadership behaviour as a result of follower maturity, is illustrated in Figure 3–15.
Another situational approach model is that of path-goal theory. This theory is concerned with the leader’s responsibility for goal achievement and providing the necessary direction for the team. It defines four behaviours a leader may be required to adopt in achieving set goals: supportive, directive, achievement-oriented and participative. This theory integrates leader behaviour and ideas contained in expectancy theory where effort is related to the expected reward. Clarifying the path and increasing rewards have been shown to be effective in achieving greater follower motivation and effort that, in turn, results in more successful outcomes.

Figure 3–15: Concept of the Hersey-Blanchard Situational Model

SECTION 3-3. CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP THEORIES

16. What is evident is that leadership theory is a complex field. Participative leadership, for example, integrates power sharing and empowerment of followers (from behavioural styles), and transformational leadership integrates attributed traits and leader behaviour, as well as power and influence.

Transformational Leadership

17. Transformational leadership suggests charismatic leaders act as inspiring role models for their followers. These leaders are more successful than transactional leaders who operate solely on a performance-reward system. All leaders usually display both transformational and transactional leadership styles, but theorists argue that successful leaders are those who make the most of transformational behaviour and reduce their transactional behaviour. Such leaders provide the team or organisation with vision and strategy and inspire their followers to achieve improvement through quantum changes. Those who subscribe to this theory claim that it is suitable for both the industrial and military environments.

The Learning Organisation

18. A learning organisation is one in which all members at every level of the organisation are engaged in identifying and solving problems as they arise. This approach enables the organisation to continuously experiment, change and improve, thus increasing its capacity to grow, learn and achieve its purpose. In order to build a learning organisation, Senge suggests leaders need to develop mastery of certain basic disciplines:

a. **Systems Thinking.** Systems thinking is a conceptual way to understand organisations by having a broad and clear view of the many organisational interrelationships. This is necessary to facilitate effective change. Senge argues that systems thinking is the ‘fifth discipline’ as it is the discipline that integrates the other disciplines fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice.

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b. **Personal Mastery.** Personal mastery involves a level of proficiency in personal vision, focus of energy, patience and the ability to see reality objectively.

c. **Mental Models.** Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions and generalisations that influence how people understand the world and take action. Adaptation and growth depend on an individual’s ability to adapt and change mental models.

d. **Building Shared Vision.** Building shared vision involves translating personal visions into shared ones. Sharing a vision involves the skills of unearthing shared *pictures of the future* that foster genuine commitment rather than compliance.

e. **Team Learning.** Team learning is the capacity to think together and overcome defensiveness. Team learning is vital because teams, not individuals, are the fundamental learning unit in a modern organisation. Unless teams can learn, the organisation cannot learn.

19. The disciplines should not be regarded as a simple field of study but rather the lifelong development of a way of thinking. Unlike the importance of the charismatic leader in transformational leadership, within the learning organisation, the leader is one who acts more as a team coach and facilitates continuous, incremental organisational learning.

**SECTION 3-4. DETERMINING LEADERSHIP CAPABILITY**

20. Personal qualities (character), specific knowledge and skills (competence) and actions determine leadership capability. To be effective, leadership capability requires competence in four categories:

a. **Conceptual Skills.** Conceptual skills reflect the ability to think in the abstract.

b. **Diagnostic Skills.** Diagnostic skills reflect the ability to analyse, understand cause and effect relationships, develop alternatives and find optimal solutions.

c. **Technical Skills.** Technical skills are concerned with the ability to perform a specialised task involving certain methods or processes.

d. **Interpersonal Skills.** Interpersonal skills enable individuals to communicate with, understand and motivate other individuals and teams.
21. As Figure 3–16 illustrates, the mix of skills and knowledge will vary at different rank levels in terms of emphasis in scope and complexity. At the junior level, greater emphasis is placed on technical and interpersonal skills. At senior ranks, effective leadership relies more on conceptual, diagnostic and interpersonal skills. These will far outweigh the need for technical skills.

Figure 3–16: Scope and Complexity of Skills across Ranks
CHAPTER 4
MANAGEMENT

SECTION 4-1. INTRODUCTION

1. The Army has both a statutory and moral obligation to manage efficiently, effectively and ethically the significant resources provided to it. The Army must be proactive in meeting its responsibilities to the Australian people, the wider Defence organisation and its own people. As a consequence, there is a need for commanders and leaders to understand management and its associated processes. Effective management is an integral component of command and essential for success as a commander irrespective of rank.

2. Management is a science that can assist members of the Army in carrying out their normal tasks. It complements leadership and command and enables the Army to make better use of the resources allocated to it.

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the functions of management, the principles of management, the Government’s requirements regarding public sector reform and greater fiscal accountability, and the Defence and Army frameworks for its application. The evolution and development of various management theories is also addressed.

SECTION 4-2. THE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

4. Concern with management and its study began with the emergence of large organisations. The term ‘manager’ in the civilian environment encompasses some of the aspects the Army defines under leadership and command. Therefore, there will always be some overlap between concepts when management is considered in a command environment. Managers are catalysts: they make things happen. The manager is a coach, a facilitator, a developer, a director, an organiser, a decision-maker, a team builder and a consultant. Managers must be able to view the work effort with a practical eye. They see roadblocks and then prepare strategies and provide direction to remove the obstacles and motivate people as they combine their resources to achieve common goals.
A Definition of Management

5. Within the Army, management is defined as:

   The process of planning, organising, directing and controlling organisational resources in the pursuit of organisational goals.¹

The Functions of Management

6. While a considerable amount of debate exists regarding the use of the term management within the Army, in reality command, leadership and management are interdependent. Management employs procedures, processes, mechanisms and analysis to achieve and quantify efficiency and effectiveness, and has some unique and special characteristics. The three primary functions of management are to:

   a. Manage Strategy. Managing strategy allows an organisation to determine and plan long term goals.
   
   b. Manage Structure. Managing structure entails analysing processes that an organisation undertakes, and then designing or modifying organisational structure to enable the completion of those processes with optimal efficiency.
   
   c. Manage Organisational Behaviour. Management of organisational behaviour modifies processes based on observations of human behaviour within the organisation.

The Process of Management

7. Management is concerned with the appropriate, efficient and effective use of resources. This may involve the design, development, organisation, control, direction and application of a process to achieve a task with resources - whether that task is the achievement of organisational goals, missions or outcomes.

8. The French theorist Henri Fayol (1841-1925) identified five functions of management: planning, organising, commanding, coordinating and controlling. Fayol's management functions are illustrated in Figure 4–1.

¹ From Pierce J.L., and Durham R.B., Managing, Fresman and Company, Illinois, 1980. Use of this definition was proposed by the then General Officer Commanding Logistic Command and endorsed by the Chief of the General Staff Advisory Committee in May 1995.
9. In the context in which Fayol defined these terms, commanding means providing direction for employees and motivating them to do work. Coordinating encompasses the activity of making sure that the resources and activities are harmonised to achieve the desired goals and controlling means the monitoring of plans to ensure that they are carried out properly.

10. It must be appreciated that, over time, the usage of words and their meanings do change and evolve, and their contexts become distorted. The military concept of command has much broader meaning and in current management terminology coordination is seen as being synonymous with control. Fayol's concept of controlling is included in processes known today as performance monitoring and feedback.

11. From the definition accepted by the Army, the fundamental process of management involves the interrelated functions of planning, organising, directing and controlling as illustrated in Figure 4–2. Allowing for the evolution in language, it can be seen that Fayol's management concepts are covered in these four functions. Acceptance of this framework also avoids confusion with the military concept of command.
12. **Planning.** Planning involves setting goals and the methods to achieve them. Planning includes the development of supporting objectives and tasks, determining the timing for their completion, the specification of performance measures and the identification of individuals responsible for ensuring plans are carried out. At the organisational level, planning for up to ten years is not uncommon. Planning at lower organisational levels and at the tactical level of war is generally short-term in nature.

13. **Organising.** Organising focuses on allocating resources and people to achieve tasks. It includes identifying the appropriate organisational structures and capabilities needed to accomplish a given set of objectives.

14. **Directing.** The directing function of management is also referred to as motivating or leading. Directing is the function that involves influencing the team to achieve objectives. It involves communicating the vision, providing direction and working directly with people. Directing is reliant on managers having an effective leadership style if they wish to engage subordinates on a more personal level. Fayol referred to this function as command.
15. **Controlling.** The *controlling* function involves adjusting activities and monitoring performance to ensure that actual performance meets the desired performance. It includes establishing standards of performance and taking corrective action where there is any deviation from requirements.

**Management in Practice**

16. In practice, management processes and their components are more interrelated than implied by the models described in Figures 4–1 and 4–2. The functions are not separate or loosely related sets of activities, and the functions do not necessarily occur in the sequence as described. The management functions are also sub-sets of each other. For example, the function of planning involves the same aspects as the fundamental process. There is a requirement to *plan the plan*. Organising is required to arrange the planning team, directing to coordinate the team's effort and controlling to monitor progress as well as develop performance measures for the controlling function.

17. Within this fundamental process there are a number of inherent activities, qualities, attributes and influences including the outcome of the process. These include the capability for effective decision-making, ethical considerations, organisational leadership, constraints imposed by a superior authority, and environmental and social issues.

**Systems View of the Management Process**

18. An extended systems view of the management process is illustrated in Figure 4–3. While the four functions of planning, organising, directing and controlling form the core of the process, managers also require advice to improve the process itself as well as its associated procedures. This advice is provided through reporting and process (or system) evaluation.² There are also external influences, which may either dictate or influence the conduct or outcome of the overall process, such as being provided constraints, extant policy and legislation, and the impact of the environment and culture. The impact of these external influences can also be determined through evaluation.

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² Process (or system) evaluation is primarily concerned with analysing operations, processes and procedures as they relate to the ability of a specific function to perform efficiently or how well an activity has been implemented. Process evaluation provides information that impacts on outputs.
19. A fundamental element of the management process that is often overlooked is the concept of utilisation. Utilisation is the defining element that shapes outcomes from the delivered outputs. Utilisation is variable and the application of diverse methods, techniques and procedures on identical outputs, in all probability, will deliver different outcomes. Such outcomes may be expected or unexpected. This is not necessarily a disadvantage; however, the assumption that identical outputs will deliver identical outcomes is fallacious. In addition, unexpected outcomes may be advantageous, not necessarily undesirable. In the military context utilisation includes the conduct of operations and training, and the application of policy advice. Impact and outcome evaluation are therefore necessary to determine the appropriateness, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and efficiency of delivering the desired outcomes. The effectiveness of a capability is the assessment of the extent to which the utilisation of that capability is able to meet the desired strategic end-state.

3. Impact and outcome evaluation aim to identify whether a particular activity achieves its intent and the extent to which this is done in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Impact evaluation focuses on the immediate effects and judges how well objectives are met. Outcome evaluation focuses on the longer term and is more squarely directed on the assessment of the contribution that an activity makes to actually achieving the broader objective or goals. This may include an assessment as to the appropriateness of the objective.
Strategic Requirements
Desired Outcomes (objectives)

Resources
Inputs
Organise
Plan
Control
Evaluate

Outputs
Utilisation
Actual Outcomes

Feedback
(Planning adjustment)
Feedback
(Performance reporting)

Notes:
Output: The product or condition resulting from an activity, stated in a way such that it is rendered observable, and if possible, quantifiable.
Outcome: The longer term change or impact that occurs as a result of an activity. The consequences of an activity may be expected or unexpected.
Appropriateness: The extent to which objectives align with or meet the requirements of strategic guidance. In the public sector, the Government through White Papers defines strategic requirements.
Effectiveness: The extent to which actual outcomes are achieved in terms of the desired (planned) outcomes.
Cost Effectiveness: The relationship between inputs (or the price of outputs) to outcomes where prices are expressed in dollar terms but outcomes are not monetary or cannot readily be converted into dollar terms.
Efficiency: The extent to which outputs are maximised for a given level of inputs or to which inputs are minimised for a given level of outputs.

Figure 4–3: Extended Systems View of the Management Process
SECTION 4-3. THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT THEORY

20. To effectively understand and apply current management practice, it is helpful to understand the evolution of management theory and how the development of various approaches contributed to contemporary techniques. Table 4–1 outlines the key developments in management theory principally during the 20th Century. Annex A provides additional detail on the various management approaches.

Table 4-1: The Evolution and Development of Management Theory in the 20th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANAGEMENT THEORY</th>
<th>CONCEPT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Management</td>
<td>The scientific study of work methods to improve efficiency through the division of labour. Each job is broken down into a set of the smallest possible elements and standardised to achieve the highest possible efficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Management</td>
<td>The control of business operations as separate activities coordinated by management functions and principles of management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Management</td>
<td>A focus on the structure of enterprises operating on a rational basis. The establishment of rules and procedures, a chain of command, specialisation and official record keeping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Relations Approach</td>
<td>The human relations movement focussed on the social needs of individuals and took into account the psychological, emotional and sociological aspects of work in job design. It emphasised satisfaction of workers' basic needs as the key to increased worker productivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural Science Approach</td>
<td>An extension of the Human Relations approach emphasising scientific research as the basis for developing theories about human behaviour because of perceived deficiencies and inadequate descriptions of employee behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative Approaches</td>
<td>A focus on using mathematical models, information and statistics in attempts to reduce risk and uncertainty in decision-making. Quantitative approaches include management science and operations management.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MANAGEMENT THEORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEORY</th>
<th>CONCEPT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systems Theory</td>
<td>The application of Systems Theory to management views an organisation as a dynamic group of interrelated parts with a single purpose, where the impact of change on one part will influence the other parts of the organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Approach</td>
<td>The contingency view states that the particular situation will dictate the correct managerial practice to be applied. The solving of organisational problems was thought to depend on the managers' identification of important variables in the situation at hand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Approach and Culture-Quality Movement</td>
<td>Globalisation caused a change in management's approach. It emphasised the need to empower and involve employees, to focus on the customer, benchmark and seek continuous improvement. Organisational structure and culture were considered as elements for improving effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Management and the Post-modern Organisation</td>
<td>Continuous improvement was no longer enough. Post-modern organisations needed to achieve continuous learning to gain competitive advantage. Knowledge and the importance of intellectual capital were recognised as key assets to retain and improve this competitive advantage. These learning organisations are guided by a shared vision and systems thinking, with a team learning approach based on personal mastery and a strong, adaptive culture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. The evolution of various theories and approaches developed due to numerous environmental impacts with academic efforts generally associated with distinct time periods. Each period's thought, however, carried forward and influenced following periods. Aspects of classical and behavioural approaches to management are still relevant today. The broad periods over which management theory developed is illustrated in Figure 4–4.
Figure 4–4: Broad Periods in the Development of Management Theory
SECTION 4-4 FAYOL’S MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

22. Many principles of management have been formulated since approaches were undertaken to study management more formally. These principles are generally associated to viewpoints prevailing at particular times during the evolution of management as a field of study. While many still have relevance, their adoption depends largely on the frameworks, approaches and methods applied by individual organisations. The following management principles are from the early 1900s work of Henri Fayol who subscribed to the Administrative Management school of thought. While not a definitive list, they represent the fourteen principles Fayol considered he most frequently had to apply.

23. There is also criticism from some management theorists that the ‘classical’ theory, approaches and guidelines are valid for organisations in an environment where there is relative stability and predictability. The argument is that classical guidelines are less appropriate for the complexity and turbulence faced by the modern manager. This stated, Fayol's principles are still largely relevant and are described because they represent the common basis from which the accepted principles of command and leadership, addressed in Sections 2–6 and 3–6, have been separately derived and developed.

Division of Labour

24. Division of labour refers to work specialisation. This principle asserts that the more people specialise the more efficiently they can perform their job. This principle applies to both managerial and technical levels, but there are limitations to the extent to which work tasks should be divided. Within the Army, soldiers work specialisations are referred to as employment categories, and it is not uncommon for soldiers to have competency in more than one employment category.

Authority

25. Managers must give orders to direct work activity. Authority is the right to give orders and the power to exact obedience. Formal authority is derived from an individual's position within the organisation. This is referred to as workplace authority. It is commonly used with moral

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4. Defence policy on workplace authority for military personnel and civilians is contained in Defence Instruction (General) Administration 58-1, Authority in an Integrated Defence Organisation, 23 June 1999.
authority derived from an individual's character and leadership ability. For military commanders, formal authority is bestowed through law. Positions of authority also demand that incumbents accept responsibility for their actions.

**Discipline**

26. Members in an organisation must respect the rules and agreements that govern how the organisation functions. Fayol described discipline in terms of obedience, application, energy and respect, founded on effective leadership at every level, fair agreements and the judicious enforcement of penalties.

**Unity of Command**

27. Unity of command requires that subordinates take orders from one superior only. It is one of Fayol's most fundamental principles. Fayol claimed that if unity of command was violated; authority would be undermined, discipline jeopardised, order disturbed and stability threatened. The concept of this principle is to improve performance by removing ambiguity and potential conflict that may result from duplicate reporting chains. In the military, unity of command is a fundamental tenet.

**Unity of Direction**

28. Unity of direction requires that each organisational objective and the activities that support the same objective have only the one manager and the one plan.

**Subordination of Individual Interest to the General Interest**

29. Subordination of interest requires that individual or group interests should not prevail over the interests and goals of the organisation as a whole.

5. The notion of unity of command being a fundamental principle for organisational effectiveness has been challenged by the concept of 'matrix management'. In unique situations where there is continuous interaction between functional processes and output management a matrix design may be appropriate. To be effective, however, such an organisation would rely heavily on a collaborative and collegiate spirit to sharing power and resolving conflicts.

6. More contemporary thought is that the individual and organisational interests must be compatible or aligned in preference to the concept of totally subordinating individual interests to the organisation. Individuals require 'cultural fit' with their organisation if they are to remain motivated and effective. An organisation will not retain personnel who do not identify with the values and norms of the establishment.
Remuneration

30. The principle of remuneration states that compensation for work done must be fair to both the employer and employees.

Centralisation

31. Fayol’s principle of centralisation requires managers to retain final responsibility while also providing subordinates enough authority to do their jobs properly. There should be one central point in the organisation that exercises overall directional control, however, some degree of decentralisation and delegation of decision-making to lower levels may be necessary depending on the situation and size of the organisation.

Scalar Chain

32. Scalar chain is the term Fayol used to describe the chain of command. Scalar chain requires an unbroken chain of authority, communication and supervision from the bottom to the top of an organisation. Horizontal communication and decision-making across the chain of command is encouraged provided that managers in the chain are kept informed. The concept of the scalar chain is also reflected in the command principle that is expressed as clarity.

Order

33. This principle states that an organisation’s resources and people should be in the right place at the right time. An organisation ought to be based on a rationally thought-out plan. For individuals the right place refers to the jobs or positions to which they are most suited.

Equity

34. Equity requires that employees be treated justly and with kindness to evoke their loyalty and trust. The concept of equity parallels the leadership principle Know and Care for Your Subordinates.

Stability of Staff

35. This principle states that a stable workforce promotes efficiency. Employment competency takes time to develop and high staff turnover should be avoided. As a principle, the concept may be an ideal to aspire towards, however, reality requires a broad range of strategies to manage
the workforce. In the military, this principle is balanced against specific requirements of service to develop personnel with as broad a range of experience as is possible. The disruption of the posting cycle has the potential to create instability, but effective military training and standard practices and procedures helps alleviate this to some extent. In some key staff and specialist appointments, the impact of instability is more pronounced but is a tolerated tradeoff for developing people with broad-based experience.

Initiative

36. This principle relates to the requirement of management to encourage and develop subordinates’ initiative and give them the freedom to implement their plans. It is equivalent to the leadership principle *Develop the Potential of Your Subordinates* and also an espoused value that Army desires of its people.

Esprit de Corps

37. Fayol considered the promotion of team spirit fundamental to giving an organisation a sense of unity. He stated that in union there is strength. Every organisation should function as a team with every team member focused on achieving organisational goals. Fayol considered the use of verbal communication, instead of formal written communication, a key factor in developing *esprit de corps*. The Army is based on a philosophy founded on teamwork and this is reflected by the fact that teamwork is one of the Army’s core values. The Army’s structural organisation is based on the team, from the section through to the highest headquarters. The leadership principle *Build the Team and Challenge its Abilities* focuses on developing camaraderie among team members.

SECTION 4-5. THE GOVERNMENT REFORM AGENDA

38. The last quarter of the 20th century witnessed profound changes in public administration within Australia. Public sector reforms, enacted by the Government, were driven by a realisation that a regime of deeply entrenched and highly centralised prescriptive controls were stifling innovation and improvements to standards of service to citizens. The government sought to create *high performance organisations* in the public sector, in order to create a climate for ongoing and sustainable improvements in service standards.
39. Many of the key elements of the government's reform agenda were drawn from, or were discussed in, the National Commission of Audit–Report to the Commonwealth Government, June 1996 and a discussion paper titled Towards a Best Practice Australian Public Service, released in November 1996. Together the two documents provided insight into the Government's intentions with regard to public sector reform. Effective financial management coupled with greater fiscal accountability was considered the key to best practice management.

40. The government introduced a new legislative framework through various Bills and Acts that was supported by a principles framework involving competitive pricing policies, an accrual-based outcomes and outputs framework, Government Service Charters and a Performance Improvement Cycle.

41. The legislative reforms, enacted via the Workplace Relations Act, 1996, the Financial Management and Accountability Act, 1997 and the Public Service Act, 1999, transferred much of the decision-making power away from central agencies, thereby placing greater autonomy and authority with individual agency heads. In this decentralised environment, the intent was to shift the focus of management from being mainly concerned with efficiency to the difficult issues inherent in 'efficiency versus effectiveness' trade-off. This challenge was made all the more apparent in the case of capital-intensive businesses like Defence by accrual budgeting and management.7

42. The core themes of the Government's performance framework, integrating elements of effective financial management with the Government's desire for a competitive efficient and effective public sector are illustrated in Figure 4–5.

7. Accrual budgeting and management provides more information to support investment (and dis-investment) decisions, but also creates radical challenges to existing ways of thinking about the balance of current and future operations.
Responsibility for determining policy objectives
Responsibility for delivery of outputs in a contestable market
A clear understanding of the Government’s objectives
A public sector:
Focussed on value for money, Responsive to government objectives,
Striving for best practice management and Committed to delivering services in a contestable market

Responsibility for stewardship of public sector resources
Accountability for financial management
Publishing of performance information against outputs
Linking of outputs to outcomes

Contract management, Benchmarking, Market testing, Flexible employment practices, Outcome/output based management

Figure 4–5: Core Themes of the Government Performance Framework
Command and Management Implications of the Government Reform Agenda

43. The Financial Management and Accountability Act, 1997 provides the legislative basis for devolved management and financial accountability. Under Section 45 of the Act, Chief Executive Officers are required to 'promote the efficient, effective and ethical use of Commonwealth resources for which they are responsible'. Such promotion demands effective financial management at all levels within an organisation.

44. As a consequence, individuals from the CDF and Secretary down to COs, civilian managers, Officers Commanding and other ranks with management and financial delegation must exercise financial responsibility. It is not the exclusive domain of accountants. Commanders and managers must understand the full cost implications of their decisions. It is inappropriate to focus on achieving objectives while disregarding the budgetary consequences of actions.

45. There is no expectation that commanders and managers be fully proficient in all financial matters. The demand is for professionally qualified finance staff to provide the expert advice necessary to support management decision-making. Commanders and managers must, however, have sufficient insight and knowledge in order to ask appropriate questions.

SECTION 4-6. DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE

Defining Corporate Governance

46. Corporate governance is the process by which agencies are directed and controlled. It encompasses authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control.8 Governance and accountability relate to organisational and management performance – how organisations holistically manage their business, decision-making, policies, operations, dealings with stakeholders and the controls and behaviours that support effective accountability for performance outcomes.

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The Defence Governance Framework

47. During the period 2000-01, Defence reviewed its governance arrangements and developed an improved governance philosophy and framework to ensure its ability to deliver optimal results to Government. Defence's governance framework is oriented toward achieving a more explicit results-focussed, values-based approach that balances freedom from rigid rules with a strong emphasis on personal accountability, consistent with the Government's public sector reform agenda. The governance arrangements are critical to Defence's capacity to implement the Government's requirements articulated through White Papers.9

48. The Defence governance framework consists of three elements:

   a. mechanisms for individual accountability,
   b. a business model for results, and
   c. values-based behaviour focussed on performance.

49. Individual Accountability. The Defence governance framework encompasses a Directive to the CDF and the Secretary from the Minister for Defence. This Ministerial Directive unambiguously establishes the Minister for Defence as the customer for and owner of the outputs delivered by the CDF and the Secretary. The Directive is carefully structured to allow it to be cascaded to Service Chiefs and Group Heads in the form of Charter Letters. This clearly establishes the chain of accountability from the Minister, through the CDF and the Secretary, to Group Heads and Service Chiefs.10

50. Both the Ministerial Directive and the Charters specify key accountabilities and results, but not the means by which they are to be achieved. This reflects the underlying philosophy of the Defence governance framework to increase the capacity for Defence leaders to pursue innovation within clear accountability arrangements.

51. As part of this accountability structure, Defence Groups and Services are classified as either owner support, enabling or output executives. The three

9. A White Paper is the term used for a Government document, which details a confirmed course of action. White Papers are issued after reviewing and acting upon the submissions sought from previously distributed documents detailing proposed future policy which does not commit the Government to a course of action but serves as a basis for discussion. Discussion papers are referred to as Green Papers.

Services including Headquarters Australian Theatre, Strategy, and Intelligence and Security comprise the output executives. These classifications are based on the Group/Service's relationship with each other and the Government.

52. **A Business Model for Results.** The Defence governance framework supports a business model that recognises the Government as the 'Customer of the Business' with a core interest in purchasing outputs in support of the Defence Mission. It also recognises the Government as the 'Owner of the Business' with an interest in the capacity of the Defence organisation to continue to meet the Government's expectations of performance over the long-term.

53. Defence uses an internal purchaser-provider model called the 'customer-supplier arrangements'. Output executives (such as the Service Chiefs) are responsible for delivering outputs to the CDF and Secretary. They have funding allocated for use in purchasing goods and services from 'enabling' groups, namely the Defence Materiel Organisation and the Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group. The third grouping, the 'owner support' executives, do not sit neatly in either the role of a purchaser of services or as a provider of services. They support the governance role and are focussed on Government in its role as the owner of Defence. These arrangements ensure that those who have the responsibility for a particular result also have control over the resources necessary to achieve that result.11

54. One of the primary mechanisms used to realise Defence's mission is the Whole-of Defence Strategy Map, which is the core of the Defence Plan. It emphasises a 'results through people' leadership philosophy and aligns Defence's key strategic themes and objectives, as well as reflecting the standards for creating a results-focussed and values-based organisational climate. The strategy map sets the performance objectives that are fundamental to achieving the Government's White Paper objectives.

55. The organisational strategy is assessed using the balanced scorecard method of reporting. Within the ADF, the balanced scorecard methodology is called the Defense Matters Scorecard. This is an approach to performance measurement that translates an organisation's strategic objectives into a useful set of financial and non-financial performance measurements. The scorecard also assists senior leaders to communicate the whole-of-Defence strategy to their people and superiors, and to track progress towards long-term goals. This puts the focus very clearly on Defence's role in serving the Government of the day – both as the

customer for its outputs and as the owner of the assets it uses to ensure sustainable delivery of those outputs.

56. **Values-based Behaviour for Performance.** Defence places significant priority on becoming a results-focused, values-based organisation. Defence recognises six organisational values, which are articulated through the senior leadership group. These values are professionalism, loyalty, integrity, courage, innovation and teamwork.

57. In articulating these values, the senior leadership group recognises that the individual components of the ADF have their own unique set of values. The intent is to not modify or replace these values but articulate and promote behaviours consistent with the Australian Public Service, Defence and single-Service values.

**SECTION 4-7. THE ARMY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK**

58. The intent of the Army's planning processes is to align what Army does with what outcomes the Government expects within the resources provided. The desired outcome is for the efficient, effective and appropriate application of military capability inputs to deliver the agreed level of fighting power in the form of military capability outputs.

59. In some respects, military capability is an elusive concept. It represents the latent potential of a force; the impact of which is only realised when it is utilised. The term capability is often associated with equipment and materiel but this is an inaccurate and incomplete view. For commanders responsible for managing military capability, it is essential that they have an understanding of the concept of military capability.

**Defining Military Capability**

60. Military capability is defined as the combination of force structure and preparedness, which enables the nation to exercise military power. Preparedness is the measurement of how ready and how sustainable forces are to undertake military operations. It describes the combined outcome of readiness and sustainability that are defined as:

   a. **Readiness.** Readiness denotes a force's ability to be committed to operations within a specified time. It refers to the availability and
proficiency/serviceability of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables allocated to a force.

b. **Sustainability.** Sustainability denotes a force's ability to continue to conduct operations. It is measured in terms of the personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables necessary for the force to complete its assigned operational tasks.

61. This hierarchical description of military capability is illustrated in Figure 4–6.

![Figure 4–6: Hierarchical Description of Military Capability](image)

**Fundamental Inputs to Capability**

62. The Army Management Framework (AMF) utilises an open systems approach to managing capability. In this systems approach, the elements of capability (force structure, readiness and sustainability) are further broken down into sub-elements that are viewed as system inputs. Strategic capability requirements and other guidance combined with these inputs are transformed by planning and management processes through each level of command into individual command directives and plans. These directives provide the executive authority to conduct operations and training. For Army planning purposes, these system inputs are described as the Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC). FIC define a standard list designed to ensure that all Army elements manage and report capability using a common framework. The FIC and their scope are as follows:

a. **Organisation.** Organisation relates to the required personnel establishment with the appropriate balance of competency/skill-sets and correct structure to accomplish tasks and to ensure adequate command and control. Organisation is a dynamic input and at Army Headquarters level, consideration
must be given to developing flexible functional groupings that can meet contingency personnel rotation requirements and continual force development requirements.

b. **Personnel.** The personnel input refers to the Army's people with the required skills, knowledge and experience who satisfy the necessary individual readiness requirements. These requirements include medical/dental standards, physical fitness and appropriate individual training. Each individual must have the competencies to perform the functions of their positions (both specialist and common military skills) and the motivation to apply those competencies to achieve the required performance standards of the organisation. The personnel element includes the retention and development of people to meet the Army's needs. This category also includes salaries and wages, superannuation and allowances.

c. **Collective Training.** Collective training applies across combined, joint, single service and unit levels. To enhance performance, organisational elements must undertake a comprehensive and ongoing collective training regime validated against the preparedness requirements derived from Government guidance.

d. **Major Systems.** Major systems are those systems that have a unit cost of A$1 million or more and/or have significant Defence policy or joint service implications. They include ships, tanks, missile systems (eg. air defence batteries), armoured personnel carriers, major electronic systems and aircraft. While there is an apparent link with some classes of supplies, major systems are core components of capability that regularly require more detailed reporting and management and are, therefore, considered separately.

e. **Supplies.** Supplies include the consumables utilised in undertaking tasks that are identified across eleven classes of supplies. For many items, there is a need to identify more than just quantities (eg. serviceability, configuration status, operational viability resources and reserve stockholdings).

f. **Facilities.** Facilities includes buildings, structures, property, plant and equipment, and areas for training and other purposes (eg. exercise areas and firing ranges), utilities and civil engineering works necessary to support capabilities, both at home and at deployed locations. This may involve direct ownership or leasing arrangements.

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13. Ten classes of Supply are summarised in *Australian Defence Force Publication 101, Glossary, 1994*. Class 11 relates to controlled stores that are used in the quadripartite forum only.
g. **Support.** Support is a broad category that encompasses the wider national support base and includes training/proficiency support, materiel/maintenance services, communications/information technology support, intelligence, recruiting/retention, research and development activities, administrative support and transportation support. Support may be provided not only internally, from within Defence, but also through civil/private industry and contractors, other Government agencies (eg. the Defence Housing Authority) and the international support base.

h. **Command and Management.** Command and management underpin Defence operating and management environments through enhanced command and decision-making processes/procedures and management reporting avenues. Commanders and managers at all levels are required to plan, apply, measure, monitor and evaluate the functions their unit performs, with due cognisance of risk and subsequent risk management. Command and management includes written guidance such as regulations, instructions, publications, directions, requirements, doctrine, tactical level procedures and preparedness documents. Consideration must also be given to the adequacy of extant written guidance. Command and management also includes funding not readily attributable to any other FIC element (eg. discretionary funding).

### The Purpose of the Army Management Framework

63. The purpose of the AMF is to ensure that the Army's command and management processes are appropriate and coordinated. The AMF provides a capability and resource management structure, incorporating an Army planning process, designed to support commanders at all levels to closely align assigned missions, tasks and allocated resources with performance targets in developing their training and activities. The planning process is designed to:

a. enable commanders at all levels to plan, organise and control capability performance;

b. coherently link strategy, future capability and resources to current capability and outputs;

c. enable capability shortfalls to be proven;

d. directly link FIC and resource use to performance outcomes;

e. enable prioritisation of resources;

f. embed review, evaluation and learning; and
g. support a rigorous output performance-based approach to relationships with other Defence groups and service providers.

64. The effectiveness of the management system relies on a whole-of-Army approach and commitment from each person. The AMF being a dynamic relationship of systems within systems is not easily illustrated in its entirety. To assist understanding, the corporate and unit views of the framework are described in Annex B.

The Army Capability Management System

65. The AMF, and particularly the Army planning process, is supported through the Army Capability Management System (ACMS); a software tool which electronically integrates information on strategic guidance, preparedness requirements, activities, resources and performance. One of the key benefits of the ACMS derives from the use of web-based technology which employs sophisticated data warehousing practices. The ACMS provides:

a. integrated information access - data from various corporate systems can be viewed together, supporting on line analysis;

b. 'what if?' interrogation;

c. reduced requirement for staff analysis (ad hoc reports, etc);

d. reduced communication lead times; and

e. shared information with better accessibility and reliability.

Fundamental Inputs to Capability Plans

66. Activity related to the delivery of inputs or resources are managed through FIC Plans. These plans set out the material and services to be delivered by service providers in support of the capability requirements in the Army Plan. Plans are developed for each FIC based on the content of the Army Plan with the accountability for the ongoing management of each plan assigned to a senior Army officer.

67. As the Army planning process matures, the close management of resources will lead to improved resource data being available at the commencement of each planning cycle. Such information also better supports preparation for, and sustainment of, operations.
68. The ACMS generates both the Army Plan and the FIC Plans. In this way, consistent, single source information is available to serve all aspects of the Army's capability management needs.

SECTION 4-8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

69. The application of management theory involves the employment of a range of techniques and procedures within the control frameworks established by an organisation. Within the Army, some of the more common techniques include delegation, management by objectives, management by exception and management by walking around. In addition, the supporting control environment, that the AMF conforms to, is an accrual-based outcomes and outputs model. These techniques and tools are described below.

Delegation

70. Delegation is the process by which a commander assigns tasks and authority to subordinates, who then accept responsibility for those jobs. Delegation is thus related to the concepts of responsibility, accountability and authority.

71. Immediate subordinates assume responsibility for the assignment of tasks delegated by the commander. Accountability signifies the subordinate's obligation to that commander to perform those designated duties efficiently and satisfactorily. Authority related to the assigned duties must also be granted to the subordinate to enable the acceptance of responsibility for the fulfillment of the task. Delegation is encapsulated in the concept of mission command.

72. Delegation is obviously necessary for the efficient functioning of any organisation as well as being a valuable means for training subordinates for higher level duties. Work of increasing difficulty can gradually improve a subordinate's capacity to act independently.

Management by Objectives

73. Management by Objectives (MBO) is a goal setting and appraisal technique. The approach was popularised by Peter Drucker in his 1954
book, *The Practice of Management*, and has generated much debate and the development of MBO-type approaches to management.15

74. The process begins with specifying common and shared goals and clearly defined objectives, and continues through action plans and performance review. MBO is more than just a technique. It is a philosophy of management that encompasses subordinates and superiors at every organisational level in a participative enterprise to achieve the mission. MBO thrives in a climate where people have a great deal of drive and are eager to work.

75. With MBO, commanders and subordinates jointly agree on subordinates' goals (preferably in quantitative terms) and then systematically monitor progress achieved towards their attainment. MBO starts at the apex of the organisation. The AMF utilises an MBO approach where the Army Plan’s goals and objectives are ultimately broken down into activities and targets for sections and individuals. Objectives must be clearly stated and fully understood by subordinates. Hence, the resources needed to attain targets should be specified in MBO action plans. Subordinates' performances should also be reviewed regularly in order that shortcomings be quickly identified and remedied.

Management by Exception

76. Management by exception is a control principle that suggests managers should be informed of a situation only if performance feedback shows a deviation from standards. It is the practice whereby subordinates submit to their superior commanders condensed reports on normal operations but extensive reports on deviations from past average performance or set targets.

77. Once established, standards are monitored by identifying significant deviations from predetermined norms. Exceptionally good or bad results are analysed in detail and explanations supplied, but the day-to-day functioning of the organisation within reasonable divergences from normal practice is not questioned. Management by exception enables senior commanders to devote their full attention to major policy issues and avoid the distraction of becoming immersed in routine administration. For managers utilising this approach, care must be taken to also focus on the positive results and not be overly preoccupied with problems.

Management by Walking Around

78. Comparison of work performance is effectively achieved by direct observation in the workplace. This is often referred to as management by walking around. Management by walking around is effectively a leadership practice in which managers frequently tour their chain of command, talk to their subordinates and encourage upward communication. This is not so much an issue for tactical level commanders, who have almost constant face-to-face contact with their subordinates, as it is for senior management whose work environment may isolate them from the lower levels of their command. The practice of senior commanders meeting with and listening to subordinates is an effective management and leadership technique. It provides for direct and, in the case of Australian soldiers, very frank feedback.

Accruals-based Management

79. Accruals-based management is a funding and reporting methodology that provides the basis for the recognition of the full costs of an organisation's activities. It provides the foundation of better accountability and management. Accrual accounting, a component of accruals-based management, provides for the recognition of transactions and events at the time they occur, irrespective of when cash is paid or received.

80. The purpose of this methodology is to allocate costs and benefits to their corresponding reporting period thereby creating better visibility of costs relative to performance. Access to accrual information enables managers to:

a. meet the challenges of competition by having better costing data for benchmarking and market testing;

b. fulfil the requirement for consistent accountability and evaluation; and

c. monitor and assess the efficiency of output/activity delivery against targets.

Outcomes and Outputs-based Management

81. Outcomes and outputs-based management is a philosophy where the focus is on a clear understanding of the results required rather than on the processes that deliver outputs. In the Defence context, the focus is on what
the Government wants to achieve for the Australian community. For example, the Department of Defence contributes to the high level outcome of a secure and safe Australia. The Army's contribution is through the provision of a range of capability outputs.

82. Accrual-based management is an integral component of an output-outcome model as robust and relevant costing is essential. Outputs form the basis of funding through the Government’s budget and the requirement for external reporting. Implemented through the AMF, outcomes and outputs-based management provides commanders the necessary financial information aligned with their operational decision-making models.

SECTION 4-9. CONCLUSION

83. The concept of management is different from but fundamental to command. Legislative requirements oblige commanders and managers to use Commonwealth resources efficiently, effectively and ethically; therefore a broad understanding of management concepts and a clear understanding of the responsibility and associated accountability requirements, particularly financial, is necessary. The extent to which commanders and managers need to understand management concepts, techniques and tools depends on each individual’s rank and command status. Generally speaking, the greater the command responsibility, the more superior should be an individual’s appreciation of the Government, Defence and Army frameworks and requirements.

Annexes:

A. The Evolution and Development of Management Theory

B. The Army Management Framework Corporate and Unit Views
THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT THEORY

SECTION 4-1. INTRODUCTION

1. Management in some form has been used in all civilisations throughout history, but as a discipline for formal study, management did not receive serious attention until about 1900. Much of the momentum for developing management theories and principles came from the industrial revolution and growth of factories in the early 1800s. Since World War II, the practice of management has undergone enormous growth in its theoretical constructs, techniques, methods and tools as the requirement to coordinate the efforts of large teams became widespread. As with any social discipline, it is expected that this will continue as technology advances, organisational constructs evolve and assumptions about human behaviour and organisations change. As a case in point, this evolution can be illustrated by examining changes to organisational structure. World War I emphasised the need for formal organisational structure; however, following World War II the move was towards decentralisation. More recent focus has seen the team as the organisational unit and the emergence of collaborative individualism.

2. The evolution of management theories and approaches developed due to numerous environmental impacts with academic efforts generally associated with distinct time periods. Each period's thought, however, carried forward and influenced following periods. The development of these approaches and theories can broadly be classified into various viewpoints or schools of management, namely: pre-classical, classical, behavioural, quantitative and contemporary as detailed in Table 4-2.
### Table 4-2: Schools of Management

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<td><strong>Pre-Classical</strong></td>
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<td>Henry Towne</td>
<td>Administrative Management</td>
<td>Behavioural Science Approach</td>
<td>Operations Management</td>
<td>Contingency Theory</td>
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<td>Bureaucratic Management</td>
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3. In addition to the well-established and recognised viewpoints on management theory, there are emerging concepts and approaches to management as a result of economic pressures, changes in society and advances in technology. Yet to be accepted as major viewpoints in their own right, these approaches include the *Culture-Quality Movement* and *Knowledge Management*. Postmodernism is also an emerging field of academic study. Normally associated with other disciplines, the influence of postmodern thought is being reflected in organisational theory and in the attitudes and behaviours of the generations now entering military service. Such emergence requires not only management awareness, but if leadership is to be effective, commanders must develop an understanding of the generational differences and what motivates the individuals under their command.

**SECTION 4-2. THE PRE-CLASSICAL PERIOD**

4. The pre-classical period dates from early-recorded history to the beginnings of attempts around 1880 to approach the study of management scientifically. This period was characterised by practices where workers were almost completely dominated by their supervisors based on social caste systems of autocracy. Hereditary title was the only principle land owners needed to manage serfs. *The Age of Enlightenment* heralded the close of this period as Voltaire (1694-1778) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) were popularising the cry for liberty and equality,
and enlightenment in the fields of reason and intellectual thought. While the Age of Enlightenment may be said to have ended in 1789 with the French Revolution, it left a lasting heritage for the 19th and 20th centuries.

5. Not until the middle and late 1800s were foundations laid for the broader examination of management concepts by a number of individuals that included Robert Owen and Henry Towne. Robert Owen (1771-1858), a successful cotton mill owner in Scotland, recognised the importance of individuals. He pioneered ideas about the treatment of workers, their education and their living conditions arguing that better treatment would not only improve the worker's quality of life but also lead to increased productivity. Owen’s ideas laid the groundwork for the human relations movement.

6. Henry Towne (1844-1924) was an engineer who realised that good business skills were important in running a company. In a paper entitled The Engineer as an Economist, delivered in 1886 to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in Chicago, Towne called for studying management as a science and developing a set of principles that could be used in all types of management situations. As cited in Bartol, et al, 'Towne's presentation was attended by Frederick Taylor, who was subsequently instrumental in developing the management field.' Until Towne presented his paper, management was not viewed as a separate field. Pre-classical contributions were largely fragmented and no coherent body of management thought was developed. Henry Towne's call to establish management as an independent field ushered in the classical viewpoint encompassing scientific, administrative and bureaucratic approaches to management.

SECTION 4-3. SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT

7. The Scientific Management approach is based on the scientific study of work methods to improve efficiency. While Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915) is generally regarded as the father of scientific management other major contributors in this approach included Frank and Lillian Gilbreth and Henry Gantt. Taylor's methods were designed to resolve inefficiencies in the way work was done. His observation was that individuals deliberately worked below full capacity because of their belief that increased productivity would cause job losses. In addition, the existence of faulty wage systems encouraged attendance rather than

output. Taylor summarised what he conceived to be management's duties in four principles:

a. *The Development of a True Science.* The development of a true science of managing included clearly stated laws, rules and principles for each element of a person's work to replace the inefficient, traditional rule of thumb methods and the personal practice and experience of individuals. This science was based on time study (now referred to as time-and-motion study), which involves breaking down tasks into their component parts, eliminating unnecessary steps and determining the most efficient method for performing tasks. The timing of each motion was a predictor of the amount of production that could be achieved in a given period.

b. *Scientific Selection, Training, and Development.* The best method to conduct a task could be determined and standardised through the scientific selection, training and development of workers. Previously, workers either chose their own work or were randomly selected. They were also responsible for their own self-development but more often they were untrained.

c. *Cooperation.* The enthusiastic cooperation of management with workers focussed on ensuring that all work performed was done in accordance with scientific principles.

d. *The Equal Division of Tasks and Responsibilities.* The equal division of tasks and responsibilities between the workers and management supported accountability. Management was responsible for planning work methods and workers its execution. Under arrangements existing at the time, almost all of the work and the greater part of the responsibility was thrown upon the workers.

8. The major criticism of Scientific Management was that it created a division between the workers, whose primary function was to work, and the managers, whose primary function was to think and plan. This criticism led to attempts to develop management theories, which integrated management and worker contributions.

**SECTION 4-4. ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT**

9. While Taylor was developing scientific management, the French industrialist Henri Fayol (1841-1925) approached the study of management from the view of upper administration. Fayol's approach, termed *administrative management*, focused on business operations as separate activities coordinated by management functions and principles.
of management. Fayol identified a number of business activities that were closely dependent on one another. Labelled technical, commercial, financial, security, accounting and managerial, these functions still have relevance to business enterprises.

10. Fayol observed that the abilities needed by managers to co-ordinate these business activities depended on an individual's position in the organisational hierarchy. The higher up an individual was in an organisation, the greater the need for managerial ability and less the reliance on technical ability. This approach identified five functions of management. These functions, that are reflected in the definition of management accepted by the Army, are as follows:

a. **Planning.** Helping an organisation define and meet its objectives by outlining what an organisation must do to be successful.

b. **Organising.** Turning plans into action through leadership and motivation.

c. **Controlling.** Making sure the actual performance of the organisation conforms with the performance planned for the organisation.

d. **Commanding (Directing).** Providing the leadership direction and guidance for accomplishment of a mission or task.

e. **Coordinating.** Managing independent effort and resources for the timely accomplishment of the task or product.

11. To guide managers in applying the functional approach to management, Fayol listed fourteen principles of management that he felt were helpful. These principles are relevant, because they are the common basis from which the adopted principles of command and leadership have been derived and developed. Fayol's principles are listed in Section 4-4.

12. Administrative management laid the foundations for management theory and identified key processes, functions and skills that are still relevant for contemporary managers. Fayol considered that there is nothing rigid or absolute in administrative matters, everything being a question of degree. The intent of his principles was that they be applied with flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances.
SECTION 4-5. BUREAUCRATIC MANAGEMENT

13. German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) established the basic premises of how enterprises are structured. His approach emphasised the need for organisations to operate rationally rather than on the haphazard and subjective impulses of owners and managers. Weber coined the word bureaucracy to distinguish large organisations operating on a rational basis. While he accepted that the ideal bureaucracy did not actually exist, Weber emphasised that there were certain essential characteristics fundamental to ideal bureaucracies:

a. **Rules and Procedures.** Weber believed that fixed and official jurisdictional areas which are ordered by rules, that is laws and administrative regulations, assisted a rational approach by providing greater efficiency in the pursuit of goals.

b. **The Principle of Hierarchy.** Weber advocated a defined chain of command through a hierarchy and levels of graded authority where the lower offices are supervised by the higher ones. This assisted the maintenance of control.

c. **Division of Labour and Specialisation.** As with the scientific management approach, this involved not only breaking down jobs into well-defined tasks but giving individuals the expertise, authority and resources to accomplish the tasks.

d. **Impersonality.** In Weber's ideal bureaucratic system, impersonality, in which procedures are applied uniformly regardless of personalities and personal considerations, was designed to assist rational decision-making. It also made evaluation of individuals based on performance easier.

e. **Competence.** Competence provided for career advancement based on merit. A formal system based on expertise and merit would determine the selection of employees for hiring and promotions rather than favouritism or family ties. Weber saw credentialism as an important feature of an effective bureaucracy.

f. **Official Documents (Record Keeping).** The keeping of files and written records was important to assist the recollection of organisational memory, record decisions and rules, and facilitate checks on past performance.

14. The major drawback to bureaucratic management is that the emphasis on authority and an impersonal approach creates a perception that bureaucracy is characterised as conservative and inflexible, discouraging...
of personal innovation and resistant to change. In addition, rigid reliance on rules could lead to inability to cope with unique cases. In fairness to Weber, his characteristics were never intended to be accepted as managerial guidelines; rather, they were developed to assist understanding of the organisational concept.

**SECTION 4-6. HUMAN RELATIONS MANAGEMENT**

15. The human relations movement, which stemmed from the Hawthorne studies during the period 1924-1932, is based on the idea that a manager's concern for workers will lead to their increased satisfaction and improved performance. While the Hawthorne studies were widely criticised in later years because of major flaws in how the studies were conducted and the conclusions drawn, they had a profound impact on the way management thought evolved, particularly the social aspects to productivity in organisations. The movement advanced the concept of *social man* motivated by social needs and meaningful working relationships, extending the concept of *rational man* motivated only by personal economic needs.

16. By emphasising social needs, the human relations movement changed the focus of management from the classical approaches that treated productivity as somewhat of an engineering problem. In a sense, the importance of individuals, as identified by Robert Owen some hundred years previously, had been rediscovered. The human relations movement includes the *Hierarchy of Needs* theory of motivation, proposed by Abraham Maslow (1908-1970), and *Theory X* and *Theory Y* developed by Douglas McGregor (1906-1964). Both theories provided the groundwork for more research into behavioural science.

**Hierarchy of Needs**

17. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is one of the earliest and best-known theories of motivation. Maslow's theory advanced some propositions about human behaviour, namely:

a. Man is a wanting being – he always wants, and he wants more. In accordance with this theory, as soon as one need is satisfied another appears in its place.

b. A satisfied need is not a motivator of behaviour. Only unsatisfied needs motivate behaviour. An individual who has plenty of food is not motivated by more food. Only when hunger returns will food
motivate behaviour. Thus, only unsatisfied needs exert force on what a person does.

c. Man's needs are arranged in a series of levels - a hierarchy of importance. As lower-order needs are largely met, higher-level needs emerge and require satisfaction. This hierarchy consists of two main groups:

1. Lower-order Needs. Lower-order needs comprise physiological (food, water and shelter); safety (security and protection from physical and emotional harm); and social (affection, belonging, and friendship) needs.

2. Higher-order Needs. Higher-order needs comprise esteem (internal factors such as self-respect, autonomy and achievement, and external factors such as status and recognition) and self-actualisation (the drive for growth and self-fulfillment).

Theory X and Theory Y

18. Douglas McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y is based on making broad assumptions about individuals with the intent of changing worker behaviour through awareness and appropriate management response. McGregor's assumptions, which provide completely opposite viewpoints, are based on the belief that an individual's upbringing, personality and experience all contribute to their work behaviour.

19. Theory X assumes that individuals dislike work, need to be coerced even threatened to achieve goals, have little ambition, shun responsibility and focus on security needs. In contrast, Theory Y assumes that individuals do not dislike work, can exercise self-direction and self-control, can be creative and innovative, seek responsibility and focus on higher-level needs often not met by their job.

20. While it is accepted that individuals display a range of behaviour between such extremes, Theory X and Theory Y assumptions are useful to build a concept that helps managers develop alternate methods of interacting with and motivating their workforce. It may be argued that in some respects X and Y behaviours have a self-fulfilling prophecy. Making assumptions about individuals will affect the behaviour response of management.
SECTION 4-7. BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE APPROACH

21. Behavioural science is an approach that emphasises scientific research as the basis for developing theories about human behaviour in organisations that can be used to develop practical guidelines for managers. The emergence of this approach occurred because of the overly simplistic and inadequate descriptions of work behaviour developed by the human relations movement.

22. Behavioural science takes a holistic view of behaviour by addressing individual, group and organisation processes. Topics such as the individual's attitudes, motivation and performance, and larger organisational and social factors such as structure and environment are considered. In this regard, the behavioural science field is quite broad. Attempts to explain employee behaviour draws concepts from the sciences such as psychology, sociology, anthropology (culture, customs and beliefs) and political science.

23. There is argument that despite the contributions of behavioural science, the field has not been fully realised or developments fully accepted. This is because human behaviour is complex and the different attempts to explain behaviour, sometimes with complex and disparate theories, are too abstract to apply practically.

SECTION 4-8. QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES

24. Quantitative approaches focus on using mathematical models, information and statistics in an attempt to reduce risk and uncertainty in decision-making. Quantitative approaches include management science and operations management.

Management Science

25. Management science, also commonly referred to as operations research, encompasses the study of managerial decision-making through the development and use of behavioural, economic and quantitative methods of analysis but focuses specifically on the development of mathematical models to optimise solutions. Its central theme is based on systems theory (discussed later) with a basic tenet being that any problem can be reduced

to a mathematical algorithm. Management science’s use as a
decision-making tool has grown with the increased power and
availability of computers and associated analytical tools.

26. While the foundations for this method can be traced back to Aristotle and
Plato, it was Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who proposed a structured
approach based on observation, hypothesis and model refinement. Its
modern form was one of the chief scientific features of World War II, being
associated with the introduction of radar and the requirement to integrate
a workable system to effectively intercept intruding aircraft.

27. Significant success was also achieved in using management science to
determine optimal sizes for supply convoys due to allied shipping losses
during 1941 and 1942. The surprising outcome was that larger convoys
reduced losses. The concepts were also applied to the tactics for the search
and destruction of German U-boats. Changes to aircraft search patterns
and depth charge deployment methods increased the kill ratio so
significantly in favour of the allied forces that U-boats sank only a small
number of the thousands of ships that traversed the Atlantic during 1943
and 1944.

Operations Management

28. Operations management refers to the management of core operations of
an organisation. Core operations entail the process of transforming inputs
to outputs using technical, human and financial resources. It is an applied
form of management science used for the design, implementation,
management and improvement of production systems and processes. In
this regard, it has direct application in the manufacturing and service
industries; however, the critical role of operations management for an
organisation’s long-term sustainability is also recognised in less
traditional sectors such as hospitals, banks, departmental stores, hotels
and tourism, and government agencies.

29. Typical core operations of manufacturing would include product design,
production planning, procurement, scheduling and control, process
improvement, quality assurance, inventory control and overall logistic
chain design and management. Core operations within the service
industry may include asset acquisition, business segments planning,
scheduling and staffing, maintenance, operations, and overall
productivity analysis and improvement.
30. Quantitative approaches have assisted organisations to develop sophisticated techniques for decision-making and the control of processes, but are limited by an inability to fully explain or predict the behaviour of individuals. In addition, assumption-based planning models will provide flawed outcomes if the assumptions are unrealistic or unfounded. Equally, if problem definition is incorrect the solution will be wrong. Therefore, reliance on quantitative approaches requires sound judgment and accurate problem definition.

SECTION 4-9. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES

31. Since the 1960s, there have been attempts to integrate the various approaches to management. Among these approaches are systems theory and contingency theory.

Systems Theory

32. General Systems Theory, developed by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1940s, is a conceptual relationship that describes the behaviour of entities be they living or non-living. Systems are viewed as an integrated whole of parts, or sub-systems, that interact as a functioning unit. Laws theoretically could be formulated to describe how any system functioned and further refined by feedback. Systems Theory was quickly adopted by researchers and academics who applied the hierarchical ordering of Systems Theory to societies and their component sub-systems such as organisations, teams and individuals.

33. The theory provides for systems to be open or closed. Open systems interact continually with their environment by receiving feedback from external sources in which the acquisition of new properties results in continual evolution. In contrast, closed systems have little or no environmental interaction and limited feedback. Realistically, closed systems are strictly hypothetical because every imaginable system has some interaction with its external environment to some extent.

34. The application of systems theory to management views an organisation as a dynamic group of interrelated parts with a single purpose, where the impact of change on one part will influence the other parts of the organisation. Individual problems are not solved; rather, a total system of interrelated actions involving the management functions of planning, organising, directing and controlling are exercised to find the best solution. All organisations are open systems and depend on environmental interaction if they desire to remain relevant and
responsive. The Army, for example, is affected by environmental conditions such as the availability of potential recruits, financial appropriations, political imperatives and community expectations. Understanding how these forces impact on the organisation can help explain internal behaviour.

35. The major components that make up the organisation as an open system are illustrated in Figure 4–7. They are inputs, transformation processes, outputs, the system-environment boundary and feedback.

![Figure 4–7: The Organisation as an Open System](image)

36. **Inputs.** Inputs are acquired from a systems external environment. In the case of the Army (as a system), this includes people, resources (financial and materiel), government directives and other information such as doctrine and policy.

37. **Transformation.** Transformation is the process of changing inputs to outputs, which can comprise social and technological components. The social component consists of people, their interaction, the development of teamwork and the building of organisational culture. The technological component involves the tools, techniques and methods of production. Applying the concept to the generation of fighting power, transformation includes the development of individual mastery and the application of weapon systems, training, tactics, techniques and procedures.
38. **Outputs.** Outputs are the result of what is transformed. The Army's primary output is *fighting power*, comprising the intellectual, physical and moral contributions of both the individual and the organisation. Combined with the outputs of the Royal Australian Navy and Airforce, this provides capability options for Government as part of a joint ADF response.

39. **Boundaries and Environment.** Boundaries distinguish systems and the environment in which they operate. In the case of open systems, boundaries are permeable. Borders and system limits are easily seen in mechanical or biological systems but are more difficult to define in social systems because of the complex interaction between system elements. In the military, the delineation of various states of command is one mechanism that defines the boundaries for the exercise of command of assigned forces.

40. **Feedback.** Feedback is that information about the impact of outputs which is used to inform and develop the system. In systems theory, other information received that is not put back into the system is not considered feedback.

41. Another characteristic of Systems Theory is the principle of *equifinality*. Put simply, equifinality is a situation in which different initial conditions lead to similar outcomes. In a closed system where a direct cause-and-effect relationship exists, the same initial conditions must always lead to the same final result. In open systems, however, there is more than one way of producing a given outcome.

42. The systems approach is well established in management thinking with the concept having permeated into diverse fields of research and practical application. The same concepts and principles of organisation underlie different disciplines such as physics, biology, technology and sociology. Governments have social security systems and education systems. In fact, the Army's leadership model and management framework are based on a systems approach in which the components of the ALM and AMF are seen and understood as parts of a complex set of interrelationships.

**Contingency Theory**

43. While classic viewpoints to management attempt to describe the *one best way* to manage, the contingency approach, states that the particular situation will dictate the correct managerial practice to be applied. The contingency approach, like the open system, assumes that there is no best way to plan, organise or control. Instead of seeking universal principles
Applicable to every situation, this approach seeks to match different management methods with different situations. This approach is complementary to Henri Fayol and the Administrative Management school of thought. Whereas the systems approach emphasises the interrelationships between the component parts of an integrated whole, contingency theory builds on this by focusing on the nature of the relationships existing between the various parts. It seeks to define those factors that are crucial to a specific task.

44. This approach was developed in order to explain why the concepts developed by the major schools of management thought, when applied in real-life, led to different outcomes. Methods that were highly effective in one circumstance would not work in other situations. In some respects, contingency theory is a realisation by managers that the blind application of universal principles does not reflect reality. It may be argued that managers forgot that the universal principles as proposed by Fayol, Weber and others also came with the caveats that they be applied with flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances and were never intended to be applied rigidly.

45. Basically, contingency theory asserts that when managers formulate decisions, they must take into account all aspects of the current situation and act on those aspects that are key to the prevailing circumstances. Essentially, it is the approach in which the response is one where 'it depends'. In identifying the best leadership or management style, an individual may conclude that the best style depends on the situation. In fact the development of an individual's leadership style, as described in the ALM, is an application of contingency theory. For example, in combat situations where timely decision-making is critical, a commander may rely more on directive behaviour than seeking a collaborative opinion. If time is not a constraint then a team-based approach to decision-making may be more appropriate.

SECTION 4-10. EMERGING VIEWS

Culture – Quality Movement

46. The ascent of Japan as an industrial power following World War II ushered in the emergence of corporate culture and quality improvement as management approaches worthy of adoption. These themes received significant attention in the last two decades of the 20th century being popularised by Ouchi's Theory Z and Total Quality Management (TQM).
47. **Theory Z.** William Ouchi, a Japanese-American proposed Theory Z as an approach that could be adopted by American companies to increase their effectiveness. Theory Z puts forward organisational characteristics that combine the qualities of Western and Japanese management with elements compatible with American (and Western) society and culture. The focus of Ouchi’s theory was developed from the observation that there were significant differences between the ways in which Japanese and American organisations were structured and managed. Ouchi noted that performance in Japanese organisations was generally higher than in American organisations but that there would be difficulty in adopting such a structure because of cultural differences.³

48. The key to the success of the Japanese organisation was considered to be the clan-based approach where loyalty, collective responsibility, mutual understanding and lifelong commitment pervaded the culture of not only the organisation but also Japanese society in general. In contrast, the American focus was short-term and individualistic. Ouchi asserted that clan-type organisations were more effective, because they fostered a shared vision, mutual trust and the intimacy of individuals working together over long periods of time.

49. Theory Z involves giving workers job security, gradual advancement with broader career paths, increased involvement in decision-making, as well as greater concern for employees. The characteristics of the Type Z (modified American) organisation are contrasted with the stereotypical American and Japanese organisations (see Figure 4–8).

Figure 4–8: Characteristics of Theory Z Management

Type A (American)
- Short-term employment
- Individual responsibility
- Individual decision making
- Rapid evaluation and promotion
- Explicit formalised control
- Specialised career path
- Segmented concern

Type Z (Modified American)
- Long-term employment
- Individual responsibility
- Consensual decision making
- Slow evaluation and promotion
- Implicit informal control with explicit formalised measures
- Moderately specialised career path
- Holistic concern including family

Type J (Japanese)
- Lifetime employment
- Collective responsibility
- Consensual decision making
- Slow evaluation and promotion
- Implicit informal control
- Non-specialised career path
- Holistic concern

50. **Total Quality Management.** TQM is both a philosophy and a set of guiding principles that represent the foundation of a continuously improving organisation. It applies quantitative methods with high employee involvement and commitment in order to continuously improve the material and services supplied by an organisation. It encompasses all the processes within an organisation, concentrating on the degree to which the needs of the customer are met. Originally known as Total Quality Control, TQM integrates basic management technical tools using a disciplined approach that focuses on statistical principles and techniques to remove error and produce defect-free products. Whereas traditional approaches to quality were viewed in terms of minimising error and deviation from product and service standards, in contrast, TQM's focus is zero defects and precise conformation to desired standards together with the establishment and maintenance of organisational culture.

51. Japanese companies were among the first to embrace the concepts of TQM. At the conclusion of World War II, Japan was one of the most devastated countries in the world. The country had little food, clothing, housing or money for imports. It had to rebuild from the ruins up. Efforts to reorganise began in 1947 when Dr. W. Edward Deming arrived as a result of a formal request to the United States Department of Defense. Deming was an expert who, as a member of the American Standards Association, had worked on a classified project for the War Department. That project developed a statistical application for quality control of war materials and manufactured products. The American Standards Association's efforts established standards or control charts used by government agencies in the expeditious production and quality control of war supplies. The American Standards Association became committed to a change in management style that evolved into what is now known as TQM.

52. Deming cautioned that TQM involved risk-taking, tenacity, and patience. It required rethinking the way enterprises are operated, how planning was undertaken, how management dealt with people and how the organisation reacted to customers.

53. Deming identified a number of issues that he considered managers, particularly higher level management, needed to embrace to create a viable TQM effort to improve quality. In summary:

a. TQM demands long-term commitment, participation and leadership;

b. management must adopt the philosophy of concern for quality;

c. quality must be built into processes, not reliant on mass-inspection. TQM involves process orientation – product excellence flows from process excellence;

d. long-term relationships must be established with suppliers rather than awarding business on the basis of price;

e. the system of production and service must be constantly improved;

f. on-the-job training must be instituted. TQM begins and continues with training and a vigourous program of education and self-improvement;

g. institute leadership;

h. drive out fear so that everyone works effectively. TQM involves pride in work, celebration of success and rewards for performance;

i. break down barriers between departments and foster teamwork. TQM employs teaming structures, including extensive use of work groups;

j. eliminate slogans and targets asking for zero defects and new levels of productivity. Such action provides an oppressive environment, which can create adversarial relationships because low quality and productivity can be traced to processes beyond the control of individuals;

k. eliminate quotas and numerical goals. Substitute leadership instead; and

l. business transformation is everybody’s job.

54. TQM has developed from being a process control tool to the adoption of quality as a management philosophy. The focus has shifted from one of technical efficiency to one that is often reflected in the quest for continuous improvement.

Knowledge Management

55. The term knowledge management refers to a multi-disciplined approach to achieving organisational objectives by making the best use of knowledge. Knowledge management focuses on processes such as acquiring, creating,
managing and sharing knowledge and the cultural and technical foundations that support them. The intent is to align knowledge processes with organisational objectives.

56. Advances in management information science and communication technologies have enhanced organisational capacity to manage ever-increasing volumes of information, especially the aspects of collection and storage, and its manipulation and dissemination as knowledge. While the pervasiveness of computing power has assisted in the exploitation of knowledge, there is an important distinction between computers and knowledge management which is concerned with understanding how people seek, obtain, create, categorise, evaluate and use information.

57. Economic foundations have traditionally been based on land, labour and financial capital. However, with the growth of global competition and the accelerating pace of technological change, companies are increasingly recognising the importance of intellectual capital as a key asset to retain and improve competitive advantage. There is growing consideration that a company's only sustainable advantage in an ever-changing marketplace is what it collectively knows, how efficiently it uses what it knows, and how readily it acquires and uses new knowledge. It is the concept of knowledge as a commodity that highlights the importance of organisational learning, innovation and the need to manage knowledge.

58. For the military, knowledge management is not a new concept. The maintenance and development of the knowledge to fight has always been fundamental to the profession of arms and the provision of capability options for government. For organisations that have traditionally focussed on physical outputs such as the production of goods and services, the realisation of knowledge as a commodity is somewhat of a new phenomenon.

59. Knowledge management is central to the integration of the combat functions that provides a commander with the ability to conduct decisive operations. It includes capturing and sharing individual and collective learning gained through training and operational experience. As a small force, the requirement to maintain a knowledge edge over potential adversaries is a key demand for the Australian Army. The success of knowledge management is achieved through relevant doctrine, effective lessons learned processes and realistic training.
60. Successful knowledge-driven organisations foster a culture based on trust in the talent of people. Such a culture assumes that individuals have much more to offer than the traditional command and control cultures may permit. It requires the motivation of people to proactively use their knowledge and then harness the wealth of ideas and opportunities that are presented. This is achieved through exemplary leadership.

Postmodernism

61. Postmodernism is a critically debated philosophy that has only emerged as an area of academic study since the mid-1980s, although the timing of its emergence is also contested. With its origins in theories of language, one of the essential elements of postmodernism is that it is an attack against theory, methodology and order. It is an evolving philosophy that questions beliefs and assumptions about what is real and not real. Generally speaking, postmodern thinking de-emphasises rationality, highlights the symbolic and argues for the importance of individualism. It is anti-authoritarian in recognising the validity of differing views and interpretations away from one right answer. It seeks to create new truths by blurring reality, deconstructing existing paradigms and reassembling the pieces in different contexts.

62. Postmodernism can be described as a reaction to the approach modernism took to the application of scientific study and the need for proof. While postmodern ideas have been applied and debated in fields such as art, literature, architecture and social philosophy, the influence of postmodern deconstructive ideas and methodologies is spreading into organisational theory and behaviour with profound implications for leaders and managers.

63. Flexible production processes; flatter hierarchies; matrix management; ad hoc, decentralised and highly responsive work structures; and outsourced business functions are characteristics of postmodern organisations. Open-plan work environments to integrate the creative efforts of individuals are common. Flexible work practices such as job-sharing and smooth transition between full and part-time employment are used. Postmodern organisations continually adapt and change and seek to promote autonomy and collaboration at the same time. As such, they rely on the extensive use of information technology to control work processes, communicate and manage knowledge.
The implications for commanders and managers in such an environment are not dissimilar to the challenges of the battlefield – an environment of discontinuous, unpredictable and even radical change. For the military, the emergence of the empowered Generation X individual creates a challenge for leaders in fostering teamwork, maintaining authority and discipline, and forging bonds of camaraderie, mateship and loyalty – characteristics that are so essential in combat. Generation X is the label given to people born during the period 1960-1980. They are generally stereotyped as being selfish, cynical individuals who live in the present and look for immediate results, like to experiment and question authority. This, however, can be misleading if commanders do not balance this broad generalisation with the fact that the voluntary nature of military service and the Army’s socialisation processes mitigate these attributes to a large extent. Generation X military personnel are hard-working, professional and maintain strong bonds of loyalty. Such loyalty, however, is built on trust in leadership and individual relationships, and not necessarily with a sense of commitment to the organisation and the prospect of lifetime employment. Australian sociologist Hugh Mackay argues that for this generation ‘everything is changing, everything is relative’, therefore, they keep their options open.

Survival in the postmodern organisation, therefore, requires transformational leadership, with a strong emphasis and belief in a shared vision and the fostering of mutual trust. This is necessary to transform collaborative individualism into teamwork, sustain alliances and networks, and focus disparate organisational elements on the achievement of common goals.


THE ARMY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
CORPORATE AND UNIT VIEWS

SECTION 4-1. THE ARMY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK – CORPORATE VIEW

1. The corporate view of the AMF is illustrated in Figure 4–9. Higher-level inputs including strategic capability requirements and other guidance is transformed by Army planning processes with 'in year' management coordinating outputs in the form of tasking and training. Feedback is provided in the form of capability assessment.
To meet its preparedness responsibilities, the Army is required to raise, train and sustain land forces for operations. The Army must also provide prepared forces capable of short notice deployment to meet the Government’s and the ADF’s immediate operational needs, as well as provide baseline forces. At the start of each planning cycle, the Chief of Army sets the performance requirements for the Army, including:

a. specific guidance on the type and level of military capability required across the Army,
b. priorities for resourcing, and
c. the requirements for performance evaluation.

**Fundamental Inputs to Capability Resource Guidelines**

3. Available information on the FIC components (Organisation, Personnel, Collective Training, Major Systems, Supplies, Facilities, Support, Command and Management) is used in assessing the resourcing requirements in the Army Plan.

**Continuous Modernisation Requirements**

4. Army must plan the development and migration of its capabilities from the Army-In-Being through the Objective Force to the Army-After-Next.\(^1\) This includes endorsed and costed equipment options, arising from prioritised development outcomes, being introduced into service through the acquisition process. Non-equipment related elements are introduced directly through the Chief of Army’s Planning Directive and the FIC Plans.

**Higher Order Planning Directives**

5. Preparedness requirements (including priorities and performance standards), resource guidelines, capability development requirements and indicative resource levels are promulgated via Planning Directives through the chain of command for each Army capability. These capabilities include special forces operations, mechanised operations, light infantry operations, army aviation operations, ground based air defence, combat support operations, operational logistic support to land forces, motorised infantry operations and regional surveillance and protective operations. In addition to guidance to the functional commands, the Planning Directives cover the requirements for management visibility of the Army elements committed to areas of the Defence organisation outside of the Army.

**Activity and Resource Proposals**

6. In response to guidance from the Planning Directives, each Command develops and aggregates formation and unit activity proposals and resource bids to meet specified performance standards. Activity and resource proposals also provide an estimate of the impact on the specified level of capability of not receiving the necessary resources.

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1. This concept is described in *LWD 1 The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, 2002. The term Objective Force replaces what is referred to as the Enhanced Combat Force in this publication.
The Army Plan

7. After the Army resource bids are considered with other Defence bids, agreed resource allocations for each Army capability are entered into the Army Plan. This effectively becomes 'the contract' whereby Army is required to deliver an agreed level of preparedness and modernisation for the allocated level of resources. This contract becomes the basis for formal evaluation and reporting at the end of each annual cycle.

In Year Management

8. 'In Year' management is the process of coordinating the Army's output. Once the agreed performance requirements and resource allocations are included in the Army Plan, they are distributed through the Army's command structure. The Army tasks include maintaining baseline warfighting skills, meeting short notice preparedness requirements, command and administration, and developing new skills, techniques and tactics. The Army must also be prepared to maintain forces to meet UN commitments and undertake non-combat related tasks in support of community assistance programs, such as building infrastructure for remote Aboriginal communities.

9. The resources are managed to ensure that the Army maintains its individual training outcomes to support the Army's needs and are combined to deliver required preparedness levels through collective training, and to support operational planning. In Year management arrangements must also support strong relationships with the 'enabling' areas of Defence that are central to the Army's capacity to meet its performance requirements.

Capability Assessment

10. Performance outcomes (financial and non-financial) are collated in annual reports from performance data captured in collective training for each year. Lessons learnt are fed back into subsequent preparedness and continuous modernisation planning.
11. The unit view of the AMF follows a similar planning process to that of the corporate view. This is illustrated in Figure 4–10.

Figure 4–10: The Army Management Framework Unit View
Higher Commander's Intent

12. Examination of the higher commander's intent is the first step in the unit planning process. The Army's tasks and preparedness requirements stem from the Government's expectations of the Army. The Chief of Army provides direction to subordinate commanders that is interpreted by the chain of command and passed down.

Readiness and Tasks

13. Units within the Army are assigned tasks and a readiness notice to meet certain objectives. Superior headquarters undertake planning and assign tasks to their subordinate units in order to meet their higher Commander's intent.

Available Resources

14. The chain of command distributes what it believes are the resources required to achieve the tasks assigned to units. Resources come in the form of capability resources, such as cash, ammunition, rations, petrol, oil, lubricants and Army Reserve Training Salaries. Commanders also receive force structure resources in the form of personnel, equipment, doctrine, facilities and training areas, and other forms of supplies and support to achieve their assigned tasks.

Future Intent and Planning

15. An understanding of future intent and planning is critical to every unit's planning appreciation. To ensure it can meet the Government's requirements both now and into the future, the Army must remain abreast of modern and developing technologies. To remain at the leading edge of tactics, training and evolving equipment options, it is important that current planned activities link into where the Army wants to go in the future.

Draft Directives and Plans

16. As tasks cascade down the chain of command, commanders draft their own directives to meet their specific requirements. Draft plans and directives provide details of likely tasks and their relative priority. Commanders should also detail the conditions and standards under which the tasks are to be performed. Draft directives may also detail the commander's proposed resource allocations and the requirements in terms of back briefing and the development of options.
Mission Analysis and Proposed Plan

17. In response to the direction given in the draft directives and plans, commanders are required to develop a plan and options for achieving their superior commander's direction. The proposed plan should include the development of a training program, identification of the resource requirement, identification of the gap between the requirement and the proposed allocation, and options for the achievement of their commander's objectives including risk management.

Commander's Directive and Plans

18. After receiving proposed plans from subordinate commanders, the superior headquarters’ commander will review the plans and may reallocate resources between subordinate organisations where there is the capacity to do so. The superior commander may also request additional resourcing from higher in the command chain. The unit commander's staff will ensure that both their own and their higher commander’s intent have been met in the developed plans, and when this has been completed, the commander will issue a directive as the executive authority to conduct activities, training and the utilisation of resources.

Command and Manage

19. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that they meet the tasks assigned to them and wisely use resources in the most efficient and effective way possible. Although allocated to units, resources remain the property of the Army as a whole. Commanders are accountable and must monitor and report usage as required, and from time to time, either request additional funding or hand back resources. Unit commanders may also need to highlight deficiencies in the agreed level of resourcing to enable superior formations and Army Headquarters to resolve these issues.

Post-activity Reports and On-occurrence Preparedness Reports

20. Post-activity reports and on-occurrence preparedness reports are the mechanisms through which units report their achievement of tasks and their ability to complete readiness requirements. These reports inform the superior commander of issues within their command and enable lessons to be passed across the chain of command as well as providing a reference for future planning.
Clarity of Communication

21. The description of the AMF and its processes are not designed to be prescriptive or prevent commanders from exercising their initiative and command style. In keeping with the concept of mission command, commanders may choose different language, title their own directives or ask for additional requirements to meet their specific needs. Choice of language is important if the AMF is to be embraced at every level of the organisation as corporate terminology can, at times, be met with cynicism at lower levels of command.

22. Caution, however, must be exercised. Language can not only reduce but may also lead to confusion. In choosing terminology, commanders must avoid ambiguity. When tailoring the choice of vocabulary to their audience, commanders must remain cognisant of the key terminology that is widely understood and consistently used across the Army.
CHAPTER 5
INTEGRATING COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

SECTION 5-1. INTRODUCTION

1. The concepts of command, leadership and management are discrete, yet interdependent, each with their own focus. Command provides the legal authority to apply military force in an environment where there exists a complex milieu of threats and missions. Leadership focuses on inspiring and motivating individuals in situations that often may demand them to sacrifice their own self-interest for the sake of the team and mission. Management concentrates the Army's planning processes to deliver fighting power efficiently and effectively. Integrating these functions is the role of the commander.

2. This chapter presents a model for understanding command, leadership and management as an integrated system of action. Within this model the centrality of people to warfighting capability cannot be understated. However, it is the relationship between people and the organisation that combines to deliver military capability. This relationship is fostered through the concept of professional mastery. Professional mastery is the single most important prerequisite for operational success. In this regard, the concept and elements of professional mastery must be clearly understood in order to comprehend fully the integration of command, leadership and management.

SECTION 5-2. UNDERSTANDING PROFESSIONAL MASTERY

3. The Army's primary output is fighting power, comprising the intellectual, physical and moral contributions of both the individual and the organisation. Professional mastery is the human dimension of warfighting capability that integrates these components. Leadership, which is the key to professional mastery, is founded within the moral component of fighting power; whereas, command and management underlie the physical component described in terms of the FIC.¹

¹ For detailed discussion on professional mastery see, de Somer, Lieutenant Colonel Greg and Schmidtchen, John, D., (Major), Professional Mastery: The Human Dimension of Warfighting Capability for the Army-After-Next, Working Paper No 107, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999. Concepts in this section are drawn and adapted from this work.
Defining Professional Mastery

4. The Army defines professional mastery as follows:

*Professional mastery integrates the components of fighting power. It is an expression of personal competence displayed by an individual’s ability to combine character, self-confidence, effective leadership, professional knowledge, professional military judgment and experience. It is measured by performance in battle and is a process of continual learning developed through education, training and experience.*

5. Implicit in this description is that professional mastery is a state that changes as individuals continually learn and interact with their environment. It presupposes that individuals not only have the ability to perform given competencies but have an awareness of why they are being performed, the flexibility to perform them in a range of circumstances and the self-confidence to apply them in conditions of risk and ambiguity.

6. It is important that professional mastery is not confused with military professionalism. Military professionalism is an intrinsic attitude to work and the commitment to, and living of, the fundamental values of the Service. Professionalism is reflected in an individual's standard of conduct, discipline, judgment, ethical behaviour and accountability for actions in the performance of duties.

The Focus of Professional Mastery

7. The focus of professional mastery is people. The aim is to sharpen people's professional judgment through challenge and to increase their mastery of the military art through experience. It also seeks to build high-performance organisations at all levels - organisations that are well led and continually and dynamically adjust to the demands of their environment.
8. Professional mastery is a much broader concept than developing people that are adaptable and flexible. The Army needs people that can respond positively to change, particularly when confronted with novel problems, challenges and ambiguous contexts.² It encompasses both individual and organisational learning and involves:

a. understanding that individual and collective performance are interdependent and that the relationship is mediated by the environment that leaders create;

b. understanding and developing the human dimension of warfighting capability and appreciating that these elements are disproportionately important to success in warfighting; and

c. configuring the organisation so that all the Army’s personnel realise their individual potential.

The State of Professional Mastery

9. As alluded to in paragraph 5, professional mastery is not static but dynamic. Routines, drills and familiar problems are within the bounds of the existing state of professional mastery; consequently, the catalyst for change to a new state of professional mastery is novel problems and challenging contexts. Novel problems and changing, complex, ambiguous and uncertain environments may render a once competent person less competent. The desired criterion is the ability to successfully adapt to change rather than achievement of a set of specific job-related criteria. A focus on performance rather than knowledge is not enough to equip the future Army with the capacity to be effective in an environment with unforeseen, situation-specific problems. In such an environment, the commander may have limited or incomplete reference to prior environmental or procedural experience yet must have the ability, knowledge and understanding to develop new models for problem solving.

10. Changes in the state of professional mastery will not always be positive. The level of professional mastery in a particular area may be reduced as a result of a negative experience such that the next time a similar problem is encountered the person or team may not have the self-confidence to address it or, alternatively, they may choose to avoid it. Thus, to develop innovative concepts and solutions in response to challenges people must have drive, potential and opportunity.

² ‘Novel’ is defined as ‘of a new kind of nature that is strange and previously unknown’. The state of professional mastery cannot change unless the individual confronts novel problems and challenges.
11. Drive and potential are generated from within the individual. The continual process of individual character and competence development, as expressed in the concept be, know and do (Figure 5–1), illustrates the sources of drive and potential. Over time, character is enhanced and competence is increased through an ongoing process of acquiring additional knowledge and gaining new experience.

12. **Drive.** Drive resides in the core of the individual. The drive to tackle tasks and the effort expended is significantly determined by people's values. People come to the Army with ingrained attributes and values, attracted because of some basic alignment between their personal values and those projected by the Army. This alignment is manifested in the individual's commitment to duty and an understanding of the implications of this commitment.

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**Figure 5–1: Drive and Potential as Motivators in the Individual**

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5–4
13. **Potential.** Potential is derived from individual competence and knowledge. Competence and knowledge are developed through the actions of *knowing* and *doing*. Other attributes such as imagination and creativity, also contribute to potential.

14. **Opportunity.** The values-image projected by the Army defines the type of behaviour that is respected and rewarded, the nature of the work environment, as well as the Army's enduring purpose. This creates a performance environment that sets the conditions that guide the way people and the organisation interact with the wider world. Such an environment provides the opportunity for the potential and drive of the individual to be realised.

15. When combined, drive, potential and opportunity constitute the current state of professional mastery. The challenges of novel problems and environments are the catalysts for moving from one level of mastery to another. The change to the state of professional mastery is illustrated in Figure 5–2.
The Individual Contribution to Professional Mastery

16. If the organisation provides opportunity through leadership, its people provide the potential and drive to realise it. **Competence, knowledge and individual values** are the three elements that the individual brings to the performance environment. Again, the relationship between the elements is both interdependent and dynamic. A change in one element has the potential to impact on the others.
17. **Competence.** Competence is an outcome-focused approach to individual training that is based on how the task is performed now.³ It is the foundation of professional mastery. It is a basic assumption that the Army's training establishments deliver to the Defence organisation people who are competent.⁴ In developing competence, the aim is to provide a consistent and reliable method by which individuals can be judged on task performance. This occurs through the development of competency standards that are based on the analysis of current practice. It is a basic assumption that the people in the organisation are competent.

18. Competence alone is insufficient to prepare people to respond effectively to less tangible elements of performance such as novel problems and the demands of a changing environment. Final performance is a function of more than competence.

19. **Knowledge.** To be effective, people must have more than the knowledge to perform the task. In this regard, it is important to have a broader understanding of the term knowledge. In professional mastery, knowledge encompasses not only the knowledge required to perform a skill but also the knowledge of people and situations, concepts and processes, and the knowledge and understanding to justify action. Knowledge generated from experience contributes to increased proficiency and mastery, and builds on the levels of competence gained.

20. **Values.** Values provide the drive to perform. They are the source of internal motivation. Values define an individual's basic standards. They are the basis for crucial decisions, life directions and personal tastes. Importantly, mutual trust is based on adherence to a recognised value system. The interaction between the performance environment and people's values generates the norms of behaviour in areas such as decision-making, superior-subordinate relationships, standards of quality as well as learning and innovation. Congruence between individual values and the organisation's enduring purpose and espoused values will lead to higher productivity and individual satisfaction.

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³ Individual training is defined by the Army Training system as the training of individuals to achieve personal competencies.

⁴ The Army Training System defines 'competency' as the ability to perform activities within an occupation, function, or role, to the standard required in that employment. The concept of competency focuses on what is expected of a person in the workplace rather than on a learning process. It embodies the ability to transfer and apply skills and knowledge to new situations and environments.
21. The Australian Army emphasises shared values; the values that make an individual reach beyond self. The Army's values of courage, initiative and teamwork contribute to the building of cohesive organisations that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for their members in difficult and turbulent times. Leaders must immerse their soldiers in the Army's ethos, values and traditions ensuring that both superiors and subordinates show respect and tolerance of others and unswerving commitment to doing what is officially and legally right.

22. People bring to the performance environment the skills to perform the task, their existing knowledge, as well as the ability to create new knowledge. Along with the values that will ultimately determine how tasks will be approached, people decide how much effort will be expended and to what standard. Leadership in the organisation determines the culture, climate and structure that provide the opportunity for people to apply their potential and drive. Combined, leadership, potential and drive deliver the human dimension of warfighting capability.

The Organisational Contribution to Professional Mastery

23. Culture, structure and climate are the three organisational elements that leaders use to influence the performance environment. Combined, they provide the opportunity for people to make the best use of their potential and drive in making a contribution to organisational performance. These elements must be aligned such that they mutually reinforce the desired outcome of intellectual effort. They operate at all levels of the organisation. At each level, leadership is the key influence for determining the outcome of their dynamic interrelationship.

24. **Culture.** Culture expresses the enduring values and purpose of the organisation. It constitutes the shared basis for organisational understanding and action. It provides context or a way for individuals to interpret the world that is consistent with their individual values.

25. The Australian Army has a strong internal culture. Similarly, each corps has a particular culture, as do units. At each level, the culture of the organisation provides its people with an enduring sense of identity, belonging and purpose. Culture cannot be managed in the normal sense. It is deeply embedded within people's behaviour as well as the structure

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5. Organisational culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions, values, beliefs and norms that the organisation has learned over time and that unite the members of the organisation. Schien, E.H., *Organisational Culture and Leadership*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1992.
and function of the organisation. Consequently, culture is the most difficult organisational element to change. Significant cultural change requires considerable and consistent effort over time and across all levels of the organisation.

26. Structure. Organisational structure is the arrangement and interrelationship of parts that make up an organisation. How the pieces of the organisation fit together, in part, determines how it functions and is a key element of the performance environment. Changing the interrelationship between elements of the organisation impacts on how it performs. Structural change is a frequently used tool of organisational change; however, it is often more difficult than it first appears. People are professionally and emotionally tied to existing structures and often will seek to defend them until they are convinced otherwise.

27. Organisations, such as the Australian Army, must continue to recognise individual talents and appoint people to positions that best utilise their talents and potential. The structure that is ultimately required to maximise organisational performance should be the arrangement and interrelationship of the parts, and the placement of people within the structure to best use their talents.

28. Climate. Organisational climate is a variable phenomenon created by leadership. It is the how of culture that defines ways of thinking and doing within the organisation. Leadership practices, policy decisions and doctrine shape the organisational climate. These practices serve as a guide or model for individual action. Climate is a key ‘lever’ through which the leadership of the organisation can rapidly and effectively influence the performance environment. Leaders provide the opportunity for people to realise their potential and apply and develop their individual professional mastery.

The Performance Environment

29. A positive performance environment is essential if the people within the organisation are to exercise their full potential and drive. The performance environment is a driver of behaviour within an organisation to which leadership provides meaning and context.

30. The actions and decisions of leaders have a profound influence on the productivity of the performance environment, and consequently on the level of individual and organisational contributions to professional mastery. Leaders provide meaning. To generate a positive performance environment, commanders must clearly articulate an end-state that defines desired outcomes and appropriate measures of success, and
provide the resources and authority necessary to enable action. Figure 5–3 depicts the performance environment.

Learning through Professional Mastery

31. In essence, professional mastery is brought about by individual and organisational learning. Movement from the current state of organisational performance to a new state involves a change in the elements at both the individual and organisational levels. Figure 5–4 shows how the challenge of a novel problem results in both individual and organisational learning.

Figure 5–3: The Performance Environment
Organisational Environment

- People
  - Competence
  - Knowledge
- Values
- Novel Problem
- Structure
- Climate
- Culture

Organisational Contribution
- Opportunity
- Catalyst
- Drive
- Potential
- Individual Contribution

Professional Mastery

Figure 5-4: Learning through Professional Mastery
32. The catalyst of a novel problem focuses the elements of professional mastery. In response to a problem, people apply their competence and knowledge through critical and conceptual thinking to develop innovative concepts and solutions.\(^6\) A course of action is developed and implemented that ultimately results in outcomes. The whole process of problem recognition and thinking as well as feedback from action and outcomes involves the creation of knowledge.

33. Organisational learning is reflected in changes to the organisational climate that may in turn influence culture and structure. Organisational learning is translated into changes in leadership practices but is most likely to be reflected in changes in processes, policy decisions or doctrine.

34. At the individual level, learning will be reflected in increased knowledge that may be displayed as an increase in task proficiency. While learning in a team setting resides within the individual, it is often reflected in improved collective performance. That is, the collective knowledge and performance of the team improves as a result of individual experience.

35. It must be borne in mind, however, that embarking on a path of professional mastery is a matter of individual choice. Despite organisational encouragement and the promotion of a positive performance environment, no one can be forced to develop mastery. To do so would be counter productive. However, as discussed in Section 3-8, every individual has a professional responsibility to continually develop and attain a broader and deeper appreciation of all aspects contributing to the development of professional mastery. Organisations are more effective if they provide the training opportunities and foster a climate in which the principles of mastery are practised continually. This reinforces the idea that the organisation truly values personal growth in a supportive environment.

36. Many of the practices most conducive to developing mastery are embedded in the disciplines for creating learning organisations. These practices include developing a more systematic strategic view; learning how to reflect tacit assumptions; expressing a vision and listening to others’ visions and joint inquiry into different people's perspectives of current reality. The most powerful method to encourage professional mastery by subordinates is for the Army's leaders at all levels to be role models, set an example and foster the development of those in their

\(^6\) 'Critical thinking' involves making analytical evaluations or assessments of existing problems or situations. 'Conceptual thinking' involves conceiving a notion, idea or plan out of observations, experience or facts.
command. All leaders must appreciate that the command climate that they create has a profound influence on the dynamics of professional mastery.

SECTION 5-3. COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT AS AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF ACTION

37. As identified in Section 1-7, command, leadership and management is perceived as an interdependent trinity of purpose to engage and motivate people with a focus on achieving organisational outcomes. The supporting concepts behind this philosophy focus on the human element and are identified as individual character and competence, interdependence and enabling vision. Character and competence are the core of individual leadership development; whereas, interdependence relates to the Army’s requirement for individuals who are commanders, leaders and managers concurrently. Visualising a future state and creating movement towards that state is a central function of command, which requires leadership qualities and management skills.

The Functioning of Interdependence

38. The separate perspectives on command, leadership and management, as discussed in Section 1-4, in themselves are insufficient to capture the true nature of the interrelationship between these functions. Command, leadership and management do not occur within a vacuum. As explained in the concept of professional mastery, there exists a permanent dialogue between the organisation and its people, both of which develop through the concept of professional mastery and within the environment in which the art of command is exercised.

39. Figure 5–5 illustrates that the concepts of command, leadership and management occur as a unity of action in which the individual engages the organisation and its people to achieve the desired outcomes. It is not a hierarchy of responses or an alternate focus on command, leadership or management. Each aspect is applied simultaneously to varying degrees depending on the situation.
This broader perspective has at its centre the core ingredient for leadership – individual character. This is the foundation for the development of a level of trust between the leader and team members. While individuals may spend much time developing professional mastery, the quality and character of the individual best defines leaders. Professional mastery is more than the development of individual skills and competence. It is the glue that binds the intellectual, physical and moral contributions of both the individual and the organisation in the development of fighting power. The actions of commanding, leading and managing suggest that all three functions are required to efficiently, effectively and ethically achieve a task. This is interdependence. It also proposes that the interrelationship and interdependence of these three functions occur at every rank level and in every appointment.
Enabling Vision

41. As discussed in Section 2-8, vision is a core quality of an effective commander that is pivotal to both command and leadership. Commanders at all levels and appointments should focus on achieving excellence in outcomes. To do this, commanders must comprehend the present state, visualise and clearly enunciate the future state and through the application of command, leadership and management create movement towards and the attainment of this future state. There are usually many steps, stages, phases, interim achievements, setbacks and diversions on this road to achievement. However, through setting objectives, inspiration and motivation, and the effective and efficient use of resources within a framework of ethical principles, movement towards the achievement of the vision will be created.

42. There may be a number of visions and processes occurring concurrently, all at different stages of maturity. The aim, however, is to keep moving. At different times the commander may need to express encouragement, authority and commitment. The commander must be prepared to be decisive, take risks and celebrate the achievement of outcomes with subordinates.

43. In reality a superior most often provides a future state through the chain of command. Without exception, commanders must make certain their own vision is aligned to ensure that it meets the superior commander's intent. Also in 'reality', the commander often has a number of defined and/or visualised outcomes, which may compete against each other in terms of resources, concept, philosophy or even in outcome. The commander must have established a clear priority of outcomes and the mechanisms to achieve a balance between their achievement if overall mission success is to be achieved.

Model Summary

44. The important concept of the command, leadership and management integrated model is that a commander formulates the vision and defines the intent; then uses skills and qualities to provide the conduit for the delivery of the three functions of command, leadership and management. Applied together, they act on people, and the organisational processes and resources to produce the desired outcomes in an efficient, effective and ethical manner.
45. This approach suggests that every individual within the Army needs first to develop themselves before they can realistically lead others. They require at least a foundation of knowledge not only of their specialisation but also of the theory and practice of command, leadership and management. For each appointment, more comprehensive knowledge may be required about the unique command, leadership and management responsibilities involved in that appointment, leading to the concept of continual learning through professional mastery.

SECTION 5-4. CONCLUSION

46. Real fighting power and battlefield effectiveness does not come from technology or from following prescribed methods alone. Command, leadership and management and the ability to out-think an adversary generates real power, effect and the achievement of goals and objectives on the battlefield. While command, leadership and management are separate and have unique features, they are also interdependent. Using skills and qualities, commanders can create movement from the present to the desired future state. Undoubtedly, the tools and instruments of war are important, but without the effective, efficient and ethical application of force, 'the clash of human wills', that the modern battle represents, will be lost.
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Headquarters Regional Training Centres 30
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Headquarters Training Command – Army 5
Headquarters, Training Technology Centre 3
Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Cerberus 4
Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Creswell 4
Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Kuttabul 4
Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Stirling 2
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Joint Telecommunications School 1
Land Headquarters 5
Land Warfare Development Centre 2
Land Warfare Studies Centre 1
Maritime Headquarters 1
Melbourne University Regiment 2
Monash University Regiment 2
New Zealand Army Senior Standardisation Representative 1
North West Mobile Force 1
Parachute Training School 1
Principal Chaplain – Army 1
Queensland University Regiment 2
Recruit Training Wing 2
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Royal Australian Air Force College, School of Post-Graduate Studies 1
Royal Military College Australia 3
Royal Military College Detachment North Queensland 2
Royal Military College Detachment Northern Territory 2
Royal Military College Detachment Tasmania 2
Royal Military College Duntroon 1000
School of Armour 1
School of Artillery 1
School of Infantry 1
School of Military Engineering 1
Soldier Career Management Agency 1
Secretary, Department of Defence 1
Special Air Service Regiment 1
Special Forces Training Centre 1
Special Operations Headquarters 1
Sydney University Regiment 2
Land Warfare Development Centre, Technical Staff Wing 3
The Pilbara Regiment 1
United States Army Senior Standardisation Representative 1
University of New South Wales Regiment 2
Vice Chief of the Defence Force 1
Western Australian University Regiment 2
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Wigmore, L. (Ed), 1963, They Dared Mightily, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVE TRAINING PUBLICATIONS

BY FORWARDING SUGGESTIONS FOR AMENDMENTS, USERS CAN HELP THE ARMY TO IMPROVE ITS TRAINING PUBLICATION.

WHAT TO DO

Fill in one of the tear-off cards attached to the next page, stating any ideas or recommendations for improving this or any other training publication. Be sure to fill in all spaces provided on the card. Send your card directly to Doctrine Wing, D&SG, LWDC, which will acknowledge comments as soon as they have been received. All adopted proposals will be incorporated into the next amendment to the publication. Lengthy comments should be attached to the card and slipped into an envelope before forwarding. Additional copies of the Amendment Proposal Card may be obtained from Doctrine Wing, D&SG, LWDC.

TELL US ABOUT

Unclear or incorrect expression
Conflict or inconsistencies between publications
Out-of-date doctrine
Proposals for changes to doctrine
Any inadequacies of doctrine in relation to instructional objectives
Errors, omissions or suggested improvements in:

- Safety procedures
- Security procedures
- Technical procedures
- Doctrine
- Layout
- Illustrations
- Tables
- Check-lists

IMPORTANT

If the submission affects SAFETY or SECURITY, the card should be passed to an appropriate training supervisor for special handling.
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I have read the publication and find that it is:

- [ ] In Error
- [ ] Incomplete
- [ ] Difficult to Understand
- [ ] Poorly Arranged

Specific Comments (attach a separate sheet if necessary):

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